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INTRODUCTION
Wisdom does not burst forth fully
developed like Athena out of Zeus'
head.
--Bruno Bettelheim
The sun shone while we were on the lake.
helped keep us cool.

The light breeze

When we docked it was just two in the afternoon.

There was plenty of time to have a bite to eat and to catch the number
six bus home--the last bus runs at 7:00 P.M. from State Street.

As I

came to the bridge on the Chicago River at Michigan and Wacker, a young
man, beating drums·, with a sign before him which read "unemployed,"
looked me straight in the eyes.
pocket, the day's collection.
going, quickly.

I had a handful of loose change in my
I put the coins in the box and kept

I crossed the bridge going south, and reached the

Public Library, on Michigan Avenue.
old.

There I met a second man, this time

He simply shouted his needs.

for the night."
~eyes

She was an old scrawny woman, with grey

thinning hair and her hand out.

passed her.
little.

I have no bed

I deftly moved to the right of the sidewalk and then

squarely met mine.

anger rising.

"Spare some change.

This was too much.

My shame and guilt were engaged.

I could find my

Gruffly, I edged my way

The evening had turned suddenly chilly, and I shivered a

I no longer noticed people on the street, and I muttered my

depression to myself:

"what do these people expect me to do for them?"

"What have I ever done to them, that they should make me this upset."
l
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This self-talk became more accusatory.
something I can do.

I began to repeat "there must be

I must do something.

I must do something."

It was

as clear as dish-water to me what I must do, and I could feel my anger
escalating, each time I repeated"! must do something."

All this was

going on as I rounded the corner into Washington Street, and then into
State Street, where I stood, numbed, at the bus stop.
minutes, I began to look around.

After a few

I could not believe it!

Right there

across the street, sitting on the cement casing of a flower bed was a
fourth--again an old man--just staring, staring, staring, vacantly into
space.

Behind him a fifth trudged by.

two carrier-bags.

This time, an old woman carrying

The words of a song from the seventies, "The Streets

of London," came to mind and I began to hum the words
. so how can you tell me your are lon-o-n-ly
and say for you, that the sun don't shine . . .
This reverie was suddenly sundered by a shout from behind me.
God!, here was a sixth!

This time, a young man again.

And, My

He hopped along,

I suppose one could call it, in the most grotesque manner, for he bent
his knees and consequently moved along in a manner reminiscent of a
monkey.

His arms were rigid, fingers extended, he moved his head

jerkily from side to side.

He literally was in peoples' faces.

He

jumped at them as he passed by, and shouted something at them, not six
inches from their nose.

I could feel my numbness deepening, I began to

stare in front of me--not unlike the man on the opposite side of the
street.

To relieve the depression, the shame, the guilt, the

helplessness, and the boredom that I felt creeping all over me, I
reached into the bag I was carrying, and pulled out a book I had bought
earlier in the day, by Bruno Bettelheim.

I began to read the first
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paragraph.

This is how Bettelheim began his introduction to The Uses of

Enchantment, "If we hope to live, not just from moment to moment, but in
true consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and most
difficult achievement is to find meaning in our lives" (1989, p. 3).
stopped reading.

I

I thought for a new moments, stunned at the

coincidence, and I reread the passage.
a" moments people speak about.

I was having one of these "ah-

My own depression, my sense of

uselessness, and isolation, had its roots in the utter meaninglessness
that I felt, as I failed to relate to these six people-who had crossed
my path, in a time-lapse of less than five minutes.

Meaning for me, is

that sense of connectedness that I feel at times, when I recognize,
more, when I know, in my heart of hearts, how I am related to the
important people, events and circumstances of my life.

Meaning goes

hand in hand with a·sense of "wholeness" of my life, each part, like a
piece of a jig-saw puzzle, fitting, with precision, into the next part.
As I put words on what I felt happening deep within me, some of the
awfulness, and the boredom lifted.

I began to think a little more

clearly, reflecting on how important connection with other people is to
me, how vital it is for me to see and feel meaning in my relationships
with other people.

I remembered how humiliated I feel on those

occasions when I respond to people out of shame or guilt.

As I

meditated in this way, I began to think of the weeks and weeks of work
that has gone into this essay.

I realized it was that I had chosen to

work with the theology of John Shea and the psychological discipline of
Object Relations Theory.

Shea explicitly sets out to uncover the depth

dimension to all our relating, whether it be to human beings or to the
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cosmos and all the things it contains .. Object Relations is a powerful
tool with which to uncover the psychological byways and highways we
travel, on the journey to a cohesive self, and hence to meaning--for
those of us who are lucky, that is--and the psychological detours, culde-sacs, and the landmined-highways that those who are less fortunate
take, all the time.
time to time.

None of us, maybe, escape hitting a landmine, from

As a result of my six encounters, on that Saturday

evening, I know I have a powerful existential interest in working with
this theology and psychology.

They may help me to cope with the effects

of the landmines I may have wittingly or unwittingly set off in my own
life, assist in undoing some of the damage that has occurred, and
improve my skill at mapping that part of my journey that still remains
to be navigated.

On that Saturday evening, on State Street,

Bettelheim's further reflections were truly music to my ears.
It is well known how many have lost the will to live, and have
stopped trying, because such meaning has evaded them. An
understanding of the meaning of one's life is not suddenly acquired
at a particular age, not even when one has reached chronological
maturity. On the contrary, gaining a secure understanding of what
the meaning of what one's life may or ought to be--this is what
constitutes having attained psychological maturity. And this
achievement is the result of a long development: at each age we
seek and must be able to find, some modicum of meaning congruent
with how our minds and understanding have already developed . . .
Contrary to the ancient myth, wisdom does not burst forth fully
developed like Athena from Zeus' head; it is built up, small step by
small step from most irrational beginnings. (Bettelheim, 1989, p.
3)

I am not sure that I would want to say that the beginning of wisdom has
any irrational roots--my reading of Piaget, and Mahler, as we shall see,
makes me think otherwise.

Perhaps, non-rational is a preferable term.

But I do agree wholeheartedly that meaning and wisdom have to.be
created,
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small step by small step, over and over again, throughout our life
cycle.
Chapter I begins with an effort to uncover how a human being may
know the Ultimate, or God, which Shea refers to as Mystery.

The purpose

of this chapter is, first, to present the way in which John Shea
conceptualized the human encounter with Mystery, who is ground of all
being, the foundation of valuing and the inspiration of all concrete
action.

Mystery's gracious approach to the two-legged, upright being,

that the human person is, might be described in a spatial metaphor, as
directed downward.
human being.

This meets the upward, transcending movement of the

The fundamental characteristic of the human being, is his

or her ability to know in a sacramental manner.

Human beings can raise

questions, and as we discover, at the end of Chapter II, the question
which lies behind every other question is "what is real?"

The first

part of Chapter I, is an effort to illustrate the potential
meaningfullness and worthwhile nature of human existence.
How do human beings penetrate the Mystery-human relation, which,
at its most intense moments, is entirely a pre-thematized, preconscious
~vent?

This is where myth, myth-making activity, and story-telling

(which is one form of myth) take center-stage in a person's life.

The

second purpose of Chapter I, is to outline the nature and function of
myth or story-telling.

We need to know how it relates to consciousness,

to the shaping of attitudes and how it might give direction to patterns
of behavior.

We need to ask the question of how traditional Judeo-

Christian theological stories, first woven, as long ago as the year 2000
B.C.E., can still make sense in our twentieth century.

Hence we will
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review the processes of interpretation that are current among scholars
nowadays, which augment our skills in the task of creating meaning.
The third goal of this theological chapter is to describe the
experience that is possible, if we choose to inhabit a world, whose
contours are shaped by the Judeo-Christian stories.

We need to know

more about Mystery's graciousness towards us, and the nature of our
response; we want to know what we will be like, as a result of our
relationship with Mystery.

Then, of course, meaninglessness, and the

threat of anxiety and fear, are never far away--where do they fit in?
We fulfill the fourth goal of the first chapter by reviewing two
stories which John Shea weaves--stories of "Hope and Justice" and of
"Trust and Freedom."

In these stories, he takes our current twentieth-

century conditions seriously, and brings them into dialogue with some of
the major metaphors of the Judeo-Christian tradition.

In this

conversation, we see how the biblical images give birth to healthy
attitudes for contemporary living, which in turn, suggest the concrete
patterns of behavior one should take.
A final section of this chapter answers the question of where
exactly to locate John Shea in the whole of the Christian tradition, and
helps us find the basic question Shea and his tradition ask:

"What is

real?"--a question that offers us the bridge, so to speak, that will
span the distance between the theology we work with in this essay, and
the psychology we turn to, in Chapter II.
In Chapter II, as we acknowledge the achievements of Freud, we
achieve our first goal.

Passing onto a detailed examination of one of

the strands of psychodynamic theory and practice, that has sprung from

7
his seminal work, Object Relations Theory, we discover the importance of
the framework of Margaret Mahler and her collaborators.

They furnish

the paradigm which enables us to order the variety and the richness of
insight, not only of the Object Relations tradition itself, but of
psychologist Jean Piaget, of attachment theorist, like John Bowlby, and
of psychodynamic theoreticians/clinicians such as Selma Fraiberg and
Ana-Marie Rizzuto.
paradigm.

w.

Our second goal for this chapter is to present that

The third aim is to attend to the special contribution of D.

Winnicott.

His reflections on the.first "not-me" possessions of a

child--the so-called "transitional objects"--form a crucial link in
understanding the bridge that we can deduce between the theology of John
Shea and the work of these Object Relations Theorists.

Fourthly, the

fundamental aim of this chapter is to understand how meaning becomes a
quality of experience that blossoms, as it were, when a person's self
attains a satisfactory level of cohesiveness and integration.
Chapter III presents Ana-Marie Rizzuto's splendid study of the
formation and function of God-representations.

Building on the work of

Freud, who was the first to speak of God representation as a
transformation of paternal imagos, she offers us a way of understanding
the psychological resources we bring to the life-project of faith.
She eschews Freud's negative view of religion and religious experience.
Thanks to her creative use of the work of Winnicott, she corrects and
reinterprets his findings.

Especially important, as we shall see, is

her rehabilitation of illusion and imagination.

Like Selma Fraiberg,

Rizzuto thinks that the fictive creations of the human imagination are a
storehouse of creative energy and humanizing potential.
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Chapter IV is really the heart of this study and is in two
sections.

In the first section, using a methodology that John McDargh

calls the "constructional-relational model" (McDargh, 1983, p. 69), a
conversation between our theologian and Object Relations Theory is set

up.

Faith, a human dynamic of knowing, which empowers a person to

construct a meaningful world and which finds its fulfillment in
compassionate living, stands at the interface between theology and
psychology.

The first effort in this chapter is to establish the nature

of faith as a knowing activity.

Once this is done, the task is to

uncover the various dimensions of meaning that a person uncovers through
faith:

one develops a sense of oneself as real; one's relationship to a

real and meaningful world becomes consolidated; one can enjoy solitude;
and the final aspect of enjoying a meaningful world centers on one's
ability to tolerate dependence.

Funded by the resources that are rooted

in a meaningful world, the individual is then in position to enjoy a
sense of cohesiveness and integration and move out towards others in
radical self-giving and compassion.
In the second section, the dialogue between the theology of John
Shea, and the psychological perspective of the Object Relations
Theorists, continues.

This time we allow the theologian to critique the

fundamental and world-creating metaphors of the Object Relations
Theorists.

The purpose of this is to remind ourselves that "pure"

scientific activity is often impossible to sustain, and that the
scientist, whether she be a psychologist or not, may, consciously or
unconsciously, slip into prescriptive and world-creating mythic
activity.

Our question to Mahler, Winnicott, and the other Object
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Relations Theorists is "What is the nature of your fundamental metaphors
and what is the nature of the obligation that they imply?"
The fifth chapter, drawing not only on the published work of
John Shea, but also on a series of interviews, which this author
conducted with him, attempts to provide a tentative account of some of
the more prominent characteristics of the God representations with which
he works.

In this chapter, we will use the theory elaborated in Chapter

III.
When we reach the Conclusion, the hope is that we will be
equipped with compatible, and mutually enriching, theological and
psychological perspectives, to help us undertake and navigate what is
often referred to as the "hero's or the heroine's journey"--a journey
which always includes awesome perils and surprising joys.

CHAPTER I
STORIES OF DWELLING IN EXCEEDING DARKNESS
AND UNDESERVED LIGHT
Introduction
In this chapter we are in search of John Shea's theological
anthropology.

The terms theological anthropology indicate my interest

in discerning what his vision of being human is, a vision that is rooted
in, and shaped by, his theological concerns and commitments.
There are two kinds of issues in recent Western hemisphere
cultural history that are of special interest to this professor of
theology at Mundelein seminary.

The first group of issues center on

such experiences as disenchantment, contingency, temporality, autonomous
freedom and the pursuit of science--the list is not exhaustive.

The

second group of concerns focus on the place and function of myth in
human existence.

The list of experiences we have just met, names some

of the powerful and typical experiences of secular scientific people of
the twentieth century.

Shea, and his mentor before him, Langdon Gilkey,

have at least two reasons for focusing on these experiences.

Grounded

in such experiences, many people of our century have adopted attitudes,
and made choices, that threaten the very ecological survival of the
planet.

Second, these same subjects, in the name of such experiences,

exclude any religious language as meaningless and condemn the truth
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claims of religious symbols, as mystifying hocus-pocus.
John Shea's work is an effort to illustrate not only the
meaningfulness of religious language, but to ground the truth claims of
religious symbols, in a way that dialogues with people rooted in the
scientific secular community.

His work helps those Christians who,

while remaining within a religious faith vision of the world, would like
to integrate what they can of the undoubted goodness of scientific
advances.
I would like to approach John Shea's work with two questions:
1.

What are the contours of a meaningful human existence?

2.

How does a person create a meaningful world?
By means of these two questions, I hope to allow John Shea to

speak as clearly for himself as possible, .so that we have a solid
statement of his positions and enough material to facilitate a fair
dialogue with Object Relations Theory.
I. The Birth of a Meaningful World
The Breakthrough of Mystery
We start with the question of the nature of God's relationship
to the human person.

Shea refrains from using the word God, and instead

speaks of "the graciousness of immanent-transcendent Mystery."
not meant as a replacement for the word 'God.'

"This is

It is rather an attempt

to disclose the experiential base of God language and so rehabilitate
the word" (1980, p. 92).
set of environments.

We all participate, Shea says, in "a common

The self, family and friends, society and

institution, and universe are relationships that no human life escapes"
(1978, p. 12).
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The Self.

We have the amazing ability to be self-reflective, to

comment on what we think and feel; "to remove ourselves from ourselves
to see how we are doing with ourselves" (1978, p. 13).

This ability

means that we can never have "a simple animal reaction to stimuli."
Family and Friends.

We are born into this second environment.

We are introduced to intimacy and personal contact, by and with them.
Our development within the bosom of a healthy family and of friends
fosters the seeds of hope that will flourish throughout our lifetime,
and scatters the chaff that will yield its harvest of anxiety and
persistent fears.

"Intimacy or isolation, love or loneliness are the

qualities which are generated in the environment of interpersonal
relationships" (1978, p. 14).
The Third environment which shapes us, is that of society and
its institutions.

While not as personal as that of family, the

relationships at this level are powerfully influential.
Society and institution assign roles, grant legitimacy or
illegitimacy to certain behavior, control the means of production
and provide sanctions, as Michael has said, "from raised eyebrows to
death penalties." (1978, p. 14)
The fourth environment is that of the non-buman universe.

Shea

reflects on how closely we are linked to the whole of creation; on how
the weather's moods affect our own; on how the very landscape where a
person is born and grows up in, contributes to growth.

A careless or

wasteful attitude toward the resources of the earth begets an ecological
crisis, and humankind's dangerous interaction with the non-human
universe has left us all in a precarious position.
Having described these four environments within which we live,
Shea goes on to describe the dimension of experience that is so often
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neglected in secular times:

that of Mystery.

He begins Stories of

Faith by illustrating how the revelation of Mystery is anchored in "the
ordinary process of human perception and feeling" (1980, p. 33).

These

illustrations center on three developmentally significant experiences:
the experience of generativity in the case of the late-middle-aged
businessman, who exclaims "that's what life is about" as he reflects on
how his friend welcomes his grandchildren to his retirement home each
semester holiday; of the young adult who reflects on the impact of
meeting Mother Theresa, and who understands that identity achievement
lies in a life spent selflessly, rather than egotistically; of the
younger middle-aged man whose father lies dying, who is prompted to say,
"Let it go dad," and who thereby surrenders to the mystery of life and
death.

Each of these people come to a recognition of "the Mystery which

we dwell within."

They are in touch with a dimension of experience that

is variably referred to as "the transcendent, the Ultimate, the Sacred,
the More, the Whole, the Inexhaustible, the Encompassing . . . [and
which we] call the dimension of Mystery" (p. 17).
Shea insists on the reality of this experience of Mystery and
its reality.

One of the clearest expressions of his convictions occurs

in An Experience of Spirit (1983, p. 97).
We may be able to blot out other relationships by banishing them
from our minds; but this is an ontological constant. Two of the
metaphors of divine presence from the Hebrew Scriptures are breath
and blood. Divine influence is as subtle and as influential as the
inhalation and exhalation of air and the rush of blood. The words
on the wall at Delphi are eternally true: "invoked or not, God is
present."
The heart of Shea's contention is, that Mystery addresses the
human person.

This is what he understands is conveyed by the,notion of
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Revelation.

In Stories of Faith (1980, pp. lSff.) he conceptualizes the

process of Mystery's address, and the human response to it, that is
faith, as having five moments.
1.

There is a relationship to mystery.

2.

Mystery communicates meanings about the nature of the
relationship.

3.

This meaning is initially formulated, then pondered, acted on,
rephrased, reopened, reacted on, etc.

4.

The meaning that is received is related to the conflicts,
questions and needs of the people involved.

5.

Although there is an enshrined religious vocabulary to talk
about these experiences, it is seldom used.
I proceed now to consider the first four of these ideas and

leave aside the fifth since it is not directly useful for our purposes
here.
The Relationship to Myster:y
Mystery is not a "thing" that is given to us directly in
experience, nor does it ever enter our awareness directly.

We become

aware that we are related to mystery as we operate within the four
environments of self, family, society and universe.
discovering how all data are tinged with mystery.

It is a matter of
Shea

cla~ms

that a

special way of knowing, or better, of acknowledging, ultimate reality-he calls it the "Sacramental way"--is involved here.

In Stories of God

(1978, pp. 17-18) he contrasts it with mysticism and rationalism.

In

mystical experience, a person has a sense of merger with Mystery, and
"the everyday environments of the self are leapt over and left behind"
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(p. 17) since they are hindrances rather than helps to contact
with the Divine.

A Rationalist approach, on the other hand, begins with

a datum of sense experience, and then through a process of logical
inference, it reaches out to transcendence.

Rationalism and Mysticism

share the common characteristic of moving away from ordinary experience.

A sacramental understanding of awareness is much richer.

His own words

on this are:
Everyday awareness has two points. For example, I [l] see a bird
[2]. Sacramental awareness has three points--(1] see a bird (2] and
in and through this interaction become (3] aware of the dimension of
mystery. Gerard Manly Hopkins sees a windhover fighting the
currents of the wind and in his struggle he is plunged into the
mystery of human redemption . . . . This is sacramental awareness.
Unlike Mysticism it does not bypass our immediate environments but
goes through them. Unlike rational awareness it does not engage in
an extensive logical process. Mystery enters into consciousness as
the premise of life and not as the conclusion of logic. (1978, p.
18)
Elsewhere Shea calls this the "in and through approach" to awareness
(1980, p. 17).

Talk of knowing of this kind has affinity with the

language that Heidegger uses when he speaks of
all reality as constructed of Being-beings. Beings are all objects
which are available to the procedures of practical and theoretical
approaches. Being is the "to be" of whatever is, the power which
makes beings possible. Being and beings are distinct but never
separable. A being is never without Being for Being makes beings
possible. On the other hand Being is never without beings, for
being only reveals itself, if it does at all, through beings.
Therefore an awareness of b~ings, the surface of reality, can bring
with it an awareness of Being, the depth of reality. (quoted, 1978,
p. 19)
Shea himself talks about this kind of perceiving as perception through
feeling, a mode of acknowledgment that is both cognitive and affective:
[Feeling] is the way in which the total person appropriates Whole or
Mystery or Encompassing. Since the dimension of mystery in Gilky's
phrase "is not so much seen but the basis of seeing; not what is
known as an object so much as the basis of knowing; not an object of
value, but the ground of valuing; not the thing before us, but the
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source of things; not the particular meanings that generate our life
in the world, but the ultimate context within which these meanings
necessarily subsist," it is not observed and detected like
individual objects. Feeling perceives by participation. (1978, p.
19)
This is the kind of "knowing" that i.s typical of the artist or
the musician.

It is the "knowing" that grounds myth-making and ritual

behavior, two of Shea's major points of interest.
The core myth (the death-resurrection of Jesus) and ritual
(Eucharist) of Christianity reflect the artistic dimension of the
human person. . . . The artist in each person appropriates reality
by feeling its fullness . . . . Feeling responses to divine-human
interaction are usually expressed in imaginative forms. (1983, p.
64)
In Stories of Faith (1980, p. 92) Shea sharpens his account of
the developing divine-human interaction by contrasting supernaturalistic
and sacramental imagination.

For a person who operates with a

supernaturalistic imagination, "God" is a flat, descriptive word,
referring to a Supreme Being whose relationship to us is understood
through the use of analogy.
unsatisfactory.

But analogical knowledge of God is

That is not the only way in which use of the

supernaturalistic imagination is inadequate:

it leads to our addressing

God as if He were simply another being; it leads to our expecting God to
intervene in the gaps that our own activity cannot fill; and finally it
reduces the possibilities of contact with God to those special times and
places, where an ordinarily absent God, mysteriously makes Himself
available for contact.
trapped.

In this mode, the human imagination is utterly

It recognizes the poverty of its contents and resorts to the

use of reason to compensate for its deficits.

Reason becomes the pawn

of supernaturalistic imagination, and is pressed into the defense of its
cause.

Thus, reason develops treatises on the limitations of analogy,
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combines negative and positive language in God-talk, and develops
theories of secondary and primary causality to account for divine
activity.

Then he adds

imagination is an orientation toward reality more fundamental than
thinking. It has tendencies which pull us in a certain direction;
and although the mind might pinpoint the problems and try to solve
them, it cannot change the direction. In another image, if the
imagination has a gaping hole, thinking will not patch it for long.
In a final image, imagination is the room and thinking is the
furniture. (1980, p. ??)
Having dismissed supernaturalistic imagination as an adequate
mode for receiving Mystery's address, Shea now must give his own account
of how there is a proportion between Mystery and the human being's
capacity to receive It.

To attune us to a completely different form of

human imagining, Shea invites us to turn to our experience for a moment.
He recalls for us the reaction of a father who sees his newborn baby for
the first time:

"God."

Again, the word that is on the lips of a dying

person frequently is "God."

These people are echoing the cry of the

slaves in Egypt who address the heavens in their suffering by exclaiming
"God."

Or again, says Shea, take the example of the girl who has been

blind from birth.

Now, thanks to some surgical intervention, she can

see for the first time.

She looks around at the beauty and color of the

room she is in, and she exclaims "Oh My God! Oh My God!"

Her

exclamation expresses not only her intense gratification at being able
to see, but her sense of overwhelming amazement at the beauty she sees,
as well.

She does not see God.

See sees color and form, but in the

interaction between her and color or form, she is triggered into an
awareness of the greater Mystery she lives within.
awareness by calling out "God" (1980, p. 96).

She indicates this

In all these cases, the
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exclamation of the word "God" indicates the movement of the imagination
into the mode that Shea calls "sacramental imagination."
Rooted within this mode, we do not restrict the word "God" to an
exclamatory use only.

We use God in the nominative case as well.

The

reason for this arises from a quality, which Mystery has, as it
discloses Itself to our awareness.

We do not experience Mystery in a

continuous way, nor is our ability to experience it dependent on our
willing it.

It comes and goes, and we do not control it.

We are graced

with it.
In order to communicate this felt perception (that the initiative
rests with Mystery) we make God the subject of the sentence . . . .
To start a sentence with "God" is simply to state the fundamental
dynamic of the relationship. The referent in experience for "God"
as subject is completely different than the referent in an
experience for "Joan" as subject. At this moment we are not engaged
in analogy, but in linguistically expressing the felt perception
that the Mystery instigates all interaction. (1980, p. 97)
With God in the nominative case we soon use verbs and objects.
We say God is love.

In the context of sacramental imagination, we are

not ascribing qualities to God.
loving" (1978, p. 97).

"We mean our relationship to God is

The person who says God is love, and speaks out

of a sacramental imagination is not someone who betakes himself or
herself to an uninhabited island and cuts connection with every living
soul, in order to enjoy God's love.

Rath~r,

this person is someone who

has loved another and in and through that love has discovered that a
greater love, which supports and encourages the interpersonal love, has
been disclosed.
In sacramental imagination God, self and others are permanently
bound together. We cannot talk of our relationship to God without
talking of our finite relationships; and we cannot talk about our
finite relationships at any depth without talking of our
relationship to God. (1980, p. 98)
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Sacramental imagination takes the universal presence of Mystery for
granted, so it is never a question of making the absent God present.
The question is how does the ubiquitous God enter the heart and mind.
The answer to that question is by responding in the mind, heart and
action to what has been disclosed.

This is what faith is:

"responding

in mind, heart and action to what cannot be escaped" (p. 98).
Among the consequences of being able to perceive sacramentally
which Shea considers worth noting let us attend to two.

The first is

that what we are brought in moments of sacramental awareness, is not an
awareness of ourselves in ourselves, or of Mystery in Itself.

"What is

revealed and responded to is not the fact that there is a Mystery, but
the fact that we are bonded to that Mystery" (1980, p. 19).
this relationship is perceived as very real.

Second,

The Mystery we have

encountered is truly other than the person encountering it.

It is not a

projection of fantasy, nor a concept, but a reality which invites us to
become engaged with Itself.
thesis:

Having said all that Shea drives home his

"Therefore the first element of revelation faith experiences

is, that in and through our concrete interactions we are involved in a
real relationship with Mystery" (p. 19).
In this section I have tried to present the way John Shea
perceives the human person as being adequately equipped to acknowledge
and receive the address of Mystery.

It is thanks to the ability to use

imagination in a sacramental way that the connection between Mystery and
the human person enters awareness.

Reason functions within the "room,"

to use his own metaphor, that sacramental imagination provides, in the
process of explicating that awareness.

We now turn to the task of
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forming an initial understanding of what is communicated in the divinehuman encounter.
Mystery Communicates Meanin&s About
the Relationship
It is not enough to say that "I'm in a relationship with
Mystery."

A meaning is also given in the encounter concerning the way

that the relationship is to be lived.

In Stories of Faith, Shea returns

to his senior middle-aged businessman, his young adult and young middleaged· son, to illustrate just how the flow of their relationship is
indicated, in their encounter with Mystery.

It "hit" the first man that

he should have contact with his grandchildren "It 'jumped out of' his
experience, appearing as an invitation he had very little to do with"
(1980, p. 20).

The girl listening to Mother Theresa knew that

"something came to her."

She did not deliberately set out to find some

kind of meaning for herself in the lecture.
she manufactured it" (p. 20).

"She received it more than

The man at his father's death bed, who

whispered to his father that it was time to let go, was expressing a
meaning that came to him as a response to his father's situation.
was the truth of the situation and I responded.

"This

I didn't take it on my

own, but only spoke what was already there" (p. 20).

These incidents

illustrate how we do not have to be Sherlock Holmes-like types questing
frenetically for Mystery.
surprise us everywhere.

Rather Mystery is "on the make," ready to
It is this sensitivity on the part of Mystery--

constantly moving towards us--"which is the experiential base for all
talk of grace" (p. 21).

This talk of grace might seem to leave us all

sitting on our oars with nothing to do, but Mystery's communications are
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not sedatives, they "also have the quality of an imperative" (p. 21).
The meaning which we perceive in our encounters with Mystery are
pointers to how our life is to be lived in such a way that there is
compatibility between Mystery and the unfolding of our life story.

"As

such the meanings do not appear as options but as truths that must be
conformed to" (p. 21).
To avoid getting the impression that John Shea is preaching some
kind of illuminism it is necessary to hear him tell us that
the felt perception that the meaning is given and therefore
imperative does not mean that it appears in awareness untouched by
the person who receives it. The given never actually appears as
given, but only transformed by its reception. (1980, p. 22)
Part of this transformation is effected by the very fact that we
exclaim "God," or whatever word carries the affective response to the
disclosure of mystery.

The reception of the disclosure is further

transformed by what happens next:

the experience evokes images, which

have both an affective and cognitive power.
Through the images we know something about the relationship to God,
but we also have "some feel" for what it is like to live in that
relationship. This rounded ability makes images an appropriate
first form to convey the experience of God" (1980, p. 99).
Use has been made of a multitude of images, in the Christian
tradition, to convey this God experience, though the reality of God is
never fully captured in one or in all of them.

Yet, on the other hand,

we can both establish and deepen our contact with Mystery through them.
"This paradox, an imageless God, available through images, is at the
heart of sacramental imagination" (1980, p. 100).
The images a person uses may come from diverse sources.
Sometimes they may reflect the medium through which Mystery has been
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disclosed in hisjher life.

For example, one may look at a beautiful sky

at sunset, have intimations of Mystery and exclaim "Heavenly God!"

The

disclosure came through interaction with the sky and sky is used to
convey the meaning of transcendence.
interpersonal love.

Another common example is that of

A man loves his wife and becomes aware of a

transpersonal source, which encourages and authorizes his feelings and
behaviors.

Thus he says "God is a lover."

"To focus on the illusive

presence he linguistically 'separates it out' and names it with the
feelings, attitudes and values through which it entered awareness"
(1980, p. 100).

Parental imagery, rooted in the human experiences of

fathering and mothering, has frequently been used to express the Mystery
of Ultimate Reality, as generative loving.

A person may choose imagery,

not because it has been associated with experiences which have mediated
Mystery in the person's own life, but for the simple reason that they
accurately convey the felt perception of the relationship.
The experience of the relationship is logically prior to the images.
So various images are tried out to see if they capture the nuances
of the relationship. In the book of Kings, Elijah is ordered
outside the cave to watch the Lord pass by. The writer then uses
the images of a mighty wind, an earthquake and a fire; but God is in
none of these images. Finally, a whispering sound carried the
presence of God. (1980, p. 101)
Once the divine-human encounter breaks into consciousness,
images are born.

The process does not end there however.

The images

are explored so that the felt perceptions of the relationship between
the person and Mystery can be further appropriated.
exploration that we now turn.

It is to that
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Meaning Is Initially Formulated.
Pondered. Acted On
As we have seen, since Mystery suffuses the totality of our
lives, we are able to receive and express Its intentions towards us.
But at the same time Mystery is transcendent to us and therefore every
formulation of Mystery's intentions will be incomplete and inadequate.
Quoting Schillebeeckx, Shea describes Mystery as the "UltimateIntimate."
As Intimate we receive and articulate our relationship to it.
As Ultimate, the meaning of our relationship eludes full expression.
(1980, p. 23)
Since our formulations are always partial, we constantly return to the
experience, to "remember, rehash," and slowly clarify the meanings.

As

this happens, the original experience yields what Shea calls "a
distilled meaning."

"This meaning, now detached from life-giving

dialogue with experience, accompanies the person through life.
takes the form of a proverb, slogan or one-line truism" (p. 23).
so, his friends will hear the businessman say:
know your grandchildren."

It often
And

"You've got to get to

The young adult will appreciate or criticize

her friends on the basis of whether she perceives them as self-centered
or not.
time.

And the son will often repeat "When it's your time, it's your
You've got to go with it."

The danger with these distilled gems

is that they can appear arbitrary to anyone who is

unacquain~ed

with the

process which gave rise to them.
Shea takes pains to point out the misunderstanding that can
occur when he talks of "faith formulations."

This can be taken to mean

that his concern is with an intellectual response to a revelatory event.
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But faith-revelation experience engulfs the whole person. It
affects the centred self, addressing the heart mind and behaviour.
In a similar way the faith formulation process is an activity of the
whole person, unfolding the convictions, feelings and behaviours
which are suggested in the experience. (1980, p. 24)
In An Experience Named Spirit, Shea returns to this topic and
clearly describes how a person negotiates the process of translating the
ineffable experience of Mystery into "faith formulations."

He speaks

here of Mystery stirring the "soul," "the ultimate source of human
activity . . . the hidden, unifying centre of the person" (1983, p. 68).
Once an experience of Mystery occurs in a person's life, there is an
immediate bubbling forth of image after image--theologians assign the
term "first order language of religious experience" to this outpouring.
However, as soon as this prayerful explosion of expressive and evocative
language.subsides, the mind wants to get a clearer grasp of what has
happened in the Mystery-human interaction.
first order language of

religio~s

And so it "inhabits anew the

experience" and thus explores the

relationship with Mystery.
Through this activity it comes to some touchstone truths and states
them in a first order language of its own: . . . the first order
language of cognitive appropriation (the first order language of
theology) . . . . Some biblical candidates (of which) might be: "God
was in Ghrist reconciling the world to himself" (2 Gar. 5:19) or "It
is precisely in this that God proves his love for us: that while we
were sinners, Ghrist died for us" (Rm 5:8). (1983, p. 69)
In expressions such as these, we have a cognitive expression of our
experience and a statement of the basic tenets of our faith.

They

express the experience in a summary phrase, in order to clarify it.
distilled truth becomes permanently available.

Once these touchstone

truths are in place, the mind begins another task:
investigating these truths:

that of

"This is the second order language of

The
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theology" (p. 70).

In this task of exploring the meaning of the basic

affirmations of faith, theology takes into account the findings of the
various human sciences and sets up a dialogue between them and the
faith-expressions.

"This mental activity is a drive toward

intelligibility and coherence" (p. 71).
the story.

That still is not the end of

The next move the mind makes is that of trying to extend the

influence of the basic beliefs to every area of human functioning.
So the mind works to construct an appreciation of everything within
life, from its foundational convictions about the mystery of life.
What does our relationship to God have to say about: joining the
military, sexual love, the distribution of wealth . . . . This
theological activity constructs a world in which we see properly,
the dynamics of every area of life. (p. 72)
There is yet a third moment in this mental activity, which
focuses on the "personal and social ecology of beliefs" (1983, p. 73).
That is to say that theological reflection has a self-critical moment.
"It is deeply suspicious and attempts to unmask false processes that may
be operative in the espousal of belief and the construction of theology"
(p. 73).

If, for example, I choose "the poor sh<lll inherit the earth"

as the hermeneutical key to the New Testament, then engaging in
theological reflection of this third kind, I will ask myself:
involved in some reaction formation here?

"Am I

Is it because I am convinced

I can never be rich, that I adopt this perspective as central?"

On the

social level, this kind of reflection looks for the ideological
mechanism in belief and theology.

"After a theology of salvation has

been elaborated and the Catholic Church is more gloriously reigning than
ever before, the critical mind becomes suspicious" (p. 74).
We still have not yet touched on the final item of the heading
of this section:

"action."

From Shea's perspective, every Mystery-
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human interaction has a "core imperative," a drive to action, going with
it, inevitably (1983, p. 77).

It may well be in many instances, that

the need to translate the experience into action is much more pressing
than the need to ritually celebrate it or to cognitively grasp it.

"The

ethical impulse is to pass along what has been experienced . . . . The
experience of God catapults the person into the human world with a
divine agenda" (p. 77).

Not that this agenda is spelled out in specific

strategies, rather the ethical imperative that flows from an experience
of Mystery "is an overall orientation" (p. 77).
form:

They might have the

be just, be loving, be caring, and thus direct our energies in a

general direction.
Tbe Meanin~ That Is Received Is
Related to the Conflicts. Needs.
and Questions of the Person
John Shea is concerned lest we attribute a causal power to our
own needs, conflicts and questions in our talking about our encounters
with Mystery.

Rather these needs, conflicts and questions predispose us

to a certain kind of openness to, and "gear us to certain
communications" from Mystery.
(1980, p. 25).

They "shape the content of revelation"

He recalls Thomas Fawcett's rendition of the dynamics of

a faith-revelation experience, which explicitly refers to the conditions
previous to an encounter with Mystery.
1. The presence of an existential need.
2. The moment of disclosure or perception itself.
3. The embodiment of the experience in symbolic form.
The connection between the moment of encounter and that of

em~odying

it

in language, or symbolic form, is close indeed--so close that in stage
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two, Fawcett uses both the word disclosure and perception.

The former

expression attends to the movement from Mystery to the subject, while
the latter points to the person's apprehension of the meaning of the
encounter.

Stage two immediately opens out into stage three.

Fawcett, Shea continues

Quoting

"The moment of revelation cannot therefore be

separated from its symbolic formulation, because the subject can never
speak of the experience without the use of symbol" (1980, p. 26).

While

there are distinguishable moments in the encounter with Mystery, the
experience of that encounter, and the formulation of·its meaning is a
single unified process.
Lest we come away with the idea that the revelation of Mystery
is always a positive, affirming perception, Shea reminds us that this
may not always be the case.

Where persons have spent their lives

systematically opposing Mystery's invitations, "the interchanges are
often anything but smooth" (1980, p. 26).
The existential situation is often not one of sincere search but one
of distortion which is not recognised. A life has so gone against
the grain of mystery within which it lives, that the revelationfaith experience is the recognition of its wrong-headedness, and the
possibility of change. (p. 26)
In this case there is a striking congruence between a person's .
existential situation and the demands of Mystery, but this congruence
brings shock, disbelief or discomfort in its wake.

While the person is

now receptive to what Mystery has to say she or he has lost control, in
a real sense.
The Origin and Function of Myth
We have a first answer to our question:
create a meaningful world?

How does a

p~rson

It is an answer in broad strokes.

Meaning
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is grounded in the dynamic interrelating that goes on between the self
and its multiple environments, and which, thanks to our ability to use
our sacramental imagination, unfolds for us the attractive and
enrapturing presence of Mystery, whose demands on us are the source of
our values, behaviors and the object of our affections.

It still

remains for John Shea to spell out in detail, how imagination, engaged
in its sacramental mode, conducts itself, and how in metaphorical terms,
the furniture in its room is to be arranged, how, in other words,
reasoning unfolds under its influence.

Let us use Shea's own words to

map out for us the further horizons we have to explore in our quest for
the detailed answer to our question:
We are inescapably related to this Mystery which is immanent and
transcendent, which issues invitations we must respond to, which is
ambiguous about its intentions, and which is real and important
beyond all else. Our dwelling within Mystery is both menacing and
promising, a relationship of exceeding darkness and undeserved
light. In this situation we do a distinctively human thing. We
gather together and tell stories of God to calm our terror and hold
our hope on high. (1978, p. 39)
Why is story selected to play this important role?

Shea chooses

"story" to fill such a role because story is one of the two principal
forms of myth, and myth is the means by which meaning is generated and
the medium through which our relationship to mystery is expressed (1978,
pp. 47-52).

Though some would lean towards an explanation of myth as an

escalated idea (e.g., Evolution as a total explanation) Shea himself
clearly prefers the description of George Whalley:
(Myth) embodies in an articulated structure of symbol or narrative a
vision of reality. It is a condensed account of man's Being and
attempts to represent reality with structural fidelity, to indicate
at a single stroke the salient and fundamental relations which for a
man constitute reality. .
Myth is an indispensable pri,nciple of
unity in individual lives and in the life of society. (p. 51)
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In Stories of Faith, our author elaborates further on the
characteristics of story.
(a) Stories are

interestin~.

both the teller and the listener.

They have the power to engross

The teller is engrossed because when

one speaks, one is touching the inner core of one's identity.

Shea

shares with his readers, a reflection of Gertrude Stein:
What is interesting is the way everyone tells their stories. If you
listen, really listen, you will hear people repeating themselves.
You will hear their pleading nature or their attacking nature or
their asserting nature. (1980, p. 87)
Hearers are engrossed because they become participants in the
story.

Think of Jesus telling the story of the Good Samaritan to the

Scholar of the Law in Lk: 10:29ff.

In my own case, I can still feel the

hair on my head standing up as I joined my neighbors back home telling
ghost stories.
happening."

Shea calls this "entering into the time of its

When we tell stories in this way we are using the concrete

narrative form and are willing to
re-experience in diminished form the feelings and insights of the
event. In re-experiencing it, we see it differently, and "unpack"
its meaning further. Storytelling has a power of involvement and
appreciation that the mere noting of patterns and talking
analytically about experiences does not have. (1983, p. 104)
Stories told in this form are indeed interesting because of
their personal significance.

Personal significance gives rise to what

Shea calls a preference for existential, rather than chronological time,
in these narratives.
This means the person creates time units in terms of their personal
impact with only a nod to the hours, days, weeks, months, and years
way of counting. An experience may take place in five minutes or
five years. But however long or short, the time is unified in terms
of its significance for the person. (1983, p. 104)
Stories are often engrossing because an image has emerged which
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"kernalizes" an experience.

The image is not a replacement for the

story, but somehow grasps its core.

"As such it functions as a code for

the experience, anchors it in memory, and is its main linguistic medium
through which it is shared with others" (1983, p. 106).
(b) Stories are accessible.

They are concrete and their basic

material is the everyday events in the lives of ordinary people.
To ask what someone's values are is often to be greeted by silence;
but to ask them about a time when they "felt on the line" is to
reach the question of values through the world of story. The
mystery of story is that everyone is one and everyone has some; and
in a conducive setting, everyone wants to tell them. (1980, p. 87)
(c) Narrative is an inherent quality of buman experience and so
a primal form of buman discourse.
A person like J. P. Sartre may complain that each moment of
existence is a separate entity in itself, isolated, unconnected with
every other moment and therefore meaningless, yet, he can spend page
after page narrating this meaninglessness and at the end of it all
"courageously accepting that existence" (1980, p. 88).
(d) There is a

reli~ious

or sacred dimension to

storytellin~,

where religious or sacred is defined as the affirmation of ultimate
meanin~.

Shea identifies with the position of Sam Keen on this, where

he claims that storytelling undoes the randomness of the present moment
by inserting us in the larger framework.
the sacred to break through.
Winquest.

Storytelling allows a sense of

How this happens is elaborated by Charles

He contrasts

the act and the content of storytelling, "What is absent in many
modern stories is a content of positive affirmation. What is
present, even in relating a story of nothingness is a positive act
of affirmation. . . . The escape from meaninglessness is achievable
through the transcendence· of act over content. "True exis.tential
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atheism is not telling a godless story, but having no story to
tell." (1980, p. 89).
(e) The stories of the Christian tradition are crucial in the
process of growth into a religious self-understanding.

These stories

bear a sufficiently strong resemblance to our own story that we can see
ourselves in them, and yet they are different enough from our lifestory for us to have our conscience pricked and see new possibilities.
Traditional stories, whether they are historical accounts (David and
Bathsheba) or fictional ones (the creation story) "reflect concerns and
conflicts present in our lives and suggest ways of dealing with them"
(1980, p. 89).
When we tell traditional stories we are searching to give
meaning to all that we experience in our relationships with

o~r

proximate environments (through which we engage the dimension of
mystery).

When we succeed in generating such meaning, we end up with "a

personally shaped world where faith vanquishes fear, freedom wins out
over slavery and hope vanquishes despair" (1978, p. 42).

This meaning

is functioning for us in an "ultimate way"--it grounds the meanings of
our proximate environments, gives them vitality and sustains them.

Shea

accounts for the passion with which we quest for ultimate meaning, not
by an appeal to innate curiosity or need for neatness.

Rather we search

for ultimate meaning in order to have a "perspective which enables us to
orient ourselves within 'the givens' of any situation" (p. 47).

Once we

have this perspective we can relate to even the harshest and violent of
realities, such as death in a creative way, without succumbing to panic
and chaos.
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The drive for ultimate meaning is for the purposes of salvation, not
curiosity. This redemptive function is cryptically conveyed in
Isaac Dinesen's remark "any sorrow can be borne if a story can be
told about it." (1978, p. 47)
It is our ability to engage in myth-making that answers our need to
discover or create ultimate meaning.

Our task now becomes that of

describing the function of myth within human consciousness.
Ihe Four Functions of Myth
What does Myth do?

It has three functions, says John Shea,

"Mythic activity creates worlds by structuring consciousness,
encouraging attitudes and suggesting behaviours" (1978, p. 52).

We

shall add a fourth.
Myth Structures Consciousness
We can illustrate what is meant by myth structuring
consciousness (Shea also calls this the "attention directing" function
of Myth) by referring to the examples used in Stories of God (1978, p.
53).

In his clinical practice, Freud was struck by the conflict between

son-mother-father, that frequently emerged in the lives of his clients.
He named the syndrome of characteristics that emerged in these conflicts
"The Oedipus Complex" and thereby unwrapped an ancient story which
provided the psychoanalyst and his clients with a powerful myth by which
to interpret the conflict which was tearing their nuclear families
apart.
What makes this story mythic is that its plot is accepted as
applicable to every family situation. It creates a world, a
perspective, an angle of entry into the primordial situation of
father, son and mother. (1975, p. 53)
The second example is that of Gilgamesh, an ancient, near-eastern heroic
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figure.

In the story, he has to struggle fiercely against death and

searches for the secret of immortality.

If people today show interest

in the story, it is not because they are especially interested in the
man himself, but because in some way his story is everyone's story.
"The pattern of the story creates a context in which personal death, and
life lived in the face of death, can be appropriated" (1975, p. 53).
From these examples we can learn what Shea means when he says
that myths structure consciousness.

Amidst the welter of stimuli which

hit us from the multiple environments we inhabit, myth focuses our
attention on certain elements of the incoming reality rather than
others.

It helps a person then, find patterns in these elements and

"entices the person to relate to that reality through those patterns"
(1978, p. 52).

Whether the myth takes a story or an idea form, it deals

with individual, concrete cases, but at the same time it transcends its
concrete reference, and has the power to touch into and cast light on
the "formless but powerful impulses" of a multitude of circumstances.
Trivial events can never be the stuff of myth.

It grows out of the

primordial circumstances of human living, and intends to shed light on
every and all experience of birth and death, awe and reverence, psychic
and political struggle, natural disaster or beauty, etc.

"The ambition

of myth is not to be one more interesting for forgettable account, but
to become the structure of consciousness through which human situations
will be appropriated" (p. 52).
Myth Uncovers Values and Arouses
Commitment to the Values
Mythic activity's second task is to uncover a set of values for
I'

,
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the subject and to awaken commitment to these values.

Shea illustrates

what is involved here by retelling the Darwinian evolutionary myth
(where one might expect to find a "scientific facade of distance and
non-involvement" (1975, p. 54) as it has been recast poetically by the
Greek poet and novelist, Nikos Kazantzakis:
Animals appeared--worms--making themselves at home in water and
nude. "We're just fine here," they said. "We have peace and
security; we're not budging!"
But the. terrible Cry hammered itself pitilessly into their
loins. "Leave the mud, stand up, give birth to your betters!"
"We don't want to! We can't!"
"You can't, but I can. Stand up!"
And lo! after thousands of eons, man emerged, trembling on his
still unsolid legs.
The human being is a centaur; his equine hoofs are planted in
the ground, but his body from breast to head is worked on and
tormented by the merciless Cry. He has been fighting, even for
thousands of eons, to draw himself, like a sword, out of his
animalistic scabbard. He is also fighting--this is his new
struggle--to draw himself out of his human scabbard. Man calls in
despair, "Where can I go? I have reached the pinnacle, beyond is
the abyss." And the Cry answers, "I am beyond. Stand up!" All
things are centaurs. If this were not the case, the world would rot
into inertness and sterility. (pp. 54-55)
Such a story is recounted, not so much to pass on information,
but to arouse the teller and the listener to a passion for the
particular rendition of the processes of life that it conveys.
Referring to Donald Evan's study, Shea says the language of this story,
and others like it, is "self-involving."
the attitudes the myth proposes. . . .

"To speak the myth is to adopt
Myth creates worlds by providing

patterns of interpretation and urging commitment to the values they
embody" (1978, p. 55).
The process of generating different values and insights from a
story is illustrated with an example from St. Luke's gospel (1980, p.
115), with the parable of the "Unjust Steward."

This story ends with
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applause from Jesus for the Steward.
praised and gives two reasons.

Luke asks why the steward was

The first, a chilling thought for a

Christian, is that cheating simply is not an option for him or her:
"Because the worldly take more initiative ·than the other-worldly when it
comes to dealing with its own kind" (Lk. 16:8).
finally fail us.

St. Luke has the addendum:

Second, wealth will

"make friends for yourself

with dishonest wealth, so that when it fails, you will be welcomed into
eternal dwellings" (Lk. 16:9).

But there is a third insight or value,

which is that intended by the historical Jesus, namely that the way to
react in a crisis is to exercise ingenuity.

Shea goes on then, to speak

like this:
If, when Christians gather today, the story is read, it will
undoubtedly trigger other meanings. They will not be the exact
insights of either Jesus or Luke. Of course they must be in general
conformity with scriptural insights, and this is basically assured
by the fact that the same story instigated them. But they will also
be different, and this is basically assured by the fact that we are
neither first century Jews nor Hellenistic Christians. (1980, p.
117)
Myth Suggests General Patterns
of Behavior
The third function of myth is to suggest general behavior
patterns.

It is less a matter of myth telling us what to do in

particular circumstances and more the case of its indicating "a broad
directionality."

If we adhere to the myth of the loving God then we

will develop a lifestyle of caring; if we espouse the myth of the
liberating God, then we will cherish activity related to the liberation
of the marginalized.
This does not really tell us anything and the difficulty Shea
himself raises in Stories of God, still stands unanswered:
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But the arena of personal and social interaction is vastly
complicated. To be dedicated to loving activity does not assure the
ability to love or the knowledge of what the "loving thing" is in
any ·situation. To be committed to the causes of justice give no
indication of what is just or how justice is to be enacted. Myth
paints activity in broad and generally motivational strokes . . . .
The working out of mythic demands in the complexities of concrete
life is a process of on-going evaluation and mediation. (1978, p.
SS)

In Stories of Faith (1980, p. 119) we find Shea dealing again
with this function of the mythic story under the heading of
"Implications."

There he spells out the steps in the "decision-making-

that-leads-to-action" process, in greater detail.

Yes, stories do

sensitize us to areas of life that we might otherwise neglect.

Yes,

values do flow from the archetypal experiences as these are told in
story, and values do elicit stable attitudes.
concrete embodiment.

Indeed, "they push toward

They unravel into strategies."

are not the product of strict deductive process.

But the strategies

Rather when faced with

a concrete situation we consult the myths, insights and values and out
of that consultation comes an approach to the situation which is
genuinely influenced by them.

Shea approves of David Tracy's

formulation of the steps involved in moving from values to action, and
quotes it, saying while Tracy's specific concern is social ethics, his
distinction applies to any area of human activity:
There is a well recognised set of distinctions in contemporary
social ethics which bears recalling here: the distinction between
general [and usually fairly abstract] ethical principles [love thy
neighbor]; middle axioms, or ethical dictates which are still
relatively abstract but more concrete [racism is in all
circumstances wrong]; and finally, concrete social ethical policies
[the debate on bussing as a specific policy to fight against
racism]. (1980, p. 122)
Christian mythic stories provide the general, more abstract
principles but at each "out of God," so to speak, and "into" the world,
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more and more human initiative is demanded, and more and more ingenuity
is called upon.

Perhaps the account of these strategies that Shea

gives, as they have flowed from his own ministry is the best commentary
on this:
No one is long in ministerial game before they know a big piece of
it is fidelity to people in the grip of destructive forces . . .
The teenage dropping out of school has to be pursued; the grieving
widow has to be "sat with"; the divorced have to be patiently helped
back to trust; the sick have to be visited. What is important is
the actual .other. The vast abstractions I so easily fall into are a
falsification of the real. There are no poor students; there is
only Mary who needs some help. There is no problem of divorce;
there is only John who is hurting and needs to be put in contact
with other people . . . . All that is important is concrete and
actual. The abstractions are meant to serve that. (1983, p. 110)
This is John Shea's account of the functions of myth.

But there

would be serious shortcomings about it, were there not another function
that myth fulfills.

The person who uses myth, as he has described him

up till now, tends to live in isolation and independence, from all round
him or her.
island.

However, Shea knows as well as anyone, that no one is an

Myth does indeed have a fourth function--that of grounding a

person in his or her cultural world.

As he describes this additional

function, Shea celebrates the primacy of the relational in human
existence and the bonding of each person to his or her own culture.

We

turn now to a consideration of myth as an initiation into the life of a
tradition.
Tradition, Myth and the Personin-Community
Each one of us arrives in a community that existed before us.
The evolution of this community has occurred on the "rails," so to
speak, of its own myths with their corresponding worlds of attitudes,
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values and behavior patterns.

John Shea reflects on how a person's

identity is formed in dialogue with these worlds.
community means a person inherits its legacy:

Birth into this

a particular

imaginativeatmosphere; contact with a special pattern of relationships,
a pattern that is the embodiment of particular mythic stories.
As we grow, we are in dialogue with the world-creating tales of our
people. These stories are encouraging and critiquing us, setting
boundaries and modelling behavior. It is in the intricate
interweaving of community myth and personal experience that identity
is born. (1975, p. 57)
Let us look at this "intricate interweaving of community myth
and personal experience" in action.
76ff.)

In Stories of Faith (1980, pp.

Shea asks us to consider the person in the process of

appropriating the tradition.

The typical case is that of someone who

has chosen Scripture as the exemplary expression of the Christian myth
(liturgy, hagiography, the great church councils: are other examples
that might be chosen as modes of faith expression).

Our Christian might

sit down and read the bible alone, or pray with it, or talk to another
or others, about what was striking.

But for Shea, the most powerful

reading of the scriptures occurs, when it is done in a group setting.
Since they have come together to discern the meaning of these documents,
in an interactive setting, all with their own preunderstanding and
insights, Christians generate new vision and possibilities, of which
independently, they would never have dreamed.

"When this happens, and

the awareness of the group is that they are responding to a reality they
share, but which is greater than they are, they talk about the movement
of the Spirit" (p. 81). ·
In a situation like this, the individuality of a person (she
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achieves her identity as "an innovator of insights and attitudes . . . a
unique embodiment of the human" [1980, p. 81)) and her embeddedness in
her multiple environments (genetically and culturally she is a "walking
tradition") are both acknowledged, and the task of living, in Marshal
McLuhan's phrase, of "driving into the future looking through the
rearview mirror" is taken care of (p. 81).
In a group like this, there are those whose primary concern is
to understand "the convictions, feelings and behaviors of those who
preceded us" (1980, p. 81).

They like to express the link between our

lives and those of our predecessors--"they are one partner in the
dialogue" (1980, p. 82).
Then there are those who spend their times embroiled in the
turbulence of everyday problems and issues, "trying to celebrate the
ongoing hopes."

"They are one partner in the dialogue" (1980, p. 82).

Two moves are made in this conversation between tradition and
experience.

First, people search the tradition through the lens of

their own special interests, in the hope of discovering perspectives and
values that resonate with their concerns.

For example:

The awareness of social, economic and political injustices
sensitizes us to the Exodus story of liberation, the political bite
of Jesus' message, and the ideological mechanism of all our
doctrines and theologies .. (1980, p. 83)
If our initial interests are in ecstatic experiences then we
will turn into very different themes (creation, resurrection and
pentecost).

If we have feminist concerns or liturgical concerns, then

we will have different readings of this same scripture.
what Shea called the second move:
this in either of two ways.

But then comes

The scripture talks back.

First, it may say:

It can do

"Yes . . . but":
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The tradition affirms the insights and values that are genuinely
Christian but contextualizes them with other insights and values.
The tradition offers direct critique when it spots a conviction (we
have no reason to hope) or a value (hoarding the goods of the earth)
which is directly contrary to the Christian vision. (1980, p. 83)
Second, in a more creative kind of critique, it may ask us to
expand our interest and the scope of our concern, and prods us to
develop a broader approach to the issues.
To the affirmation of ecstatic experiences which have the backing of
creation, resurrection and spirit is added the consideration of
fall, crucifixion and sin . . . . Yes we must be actively engaged in
the political, social and economic spheres, but this involvement
stems from belief in God; and this belief means we enter the
struggle in a specific' way: (p. 83)
I have been faithful·, I Hope, to Shea's description of the
process of how the personal and the communal are interwoven in the case
of a person, who is a Christian, and who creates her own meaningful
world through the appropriation of the myths of her tradition.

But

there are real difficulties standing in the way of such an appropriation
that must be dealt with.

As we saw earlier, once the work of shaping a

"first order" theological language has been completed, there immediately
emerges another task--that of formulating a "second order" theological
discourse.

This is the task of making the Christian message

comprehensible to contemporary hearers.
sound easier than it actually is.
can we overcome them?

As we have just said this may

What are these difficulties and how

I hope I can answer this question in the next

section.
The Need for Hermeneutics
When a community has an ancient history--as is the case with the
Christian community--the people who enter that community have to face
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the fact that the mythic stories of the Judea-Christian tradition go
back, in the oldest strata, to the dawn of human history.
"youngest" writings are at least 1,850 years old!

Even the

This is a first and

major obstacle to the process of appropriating the tradition.

The

creative imagination they reflect is light years removed from our own.
Second, biblical research, which has been spectacularly successful,
overwhelms us with information about the bible's origin and the process
of its formation.

This flood of information, very often, reduces us to

silence, because it is not clear how to connect it with the live issues
of today.

John Shea draws the inevitable conclusion for us:

"If the

Christian Stories of God, whose basic shape is given in Scripture, are
to create worlds and mediate the sacred, they must go through the
process of interpretation" (1978, p. 68).
We can begin our process of interpretation with questions
generated with the method of scientific histography:
recounted in this story really happen?

Did the events

What is factual here?

When

questions like these are asked, one is seeking historical support for a
story, and if it is not forthcoming, then a historian will cast doubt
upon the truth of the story.

On the

o~e

hand, Shea welcomes the

application of the Historical Method to Christian sources, since the
events celebrated in the Christian tradition are rooted in history.

On

the other hand he adds a caution.
Yet myth, even when based on history, is more than history.
Historical inquiry can place the story in a context, show its limits
vis-a-vis the present understanding of historical fact but it cannot
validate or falsify it with regard to its nature as mythic . . .
rational and historical inquiry does not exhaust the mythic story.
(1978, p. 69)
A second kind of historical question takes the form of:

"What
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did it mean for the people who first told the story?"

Asking this

question is a first step in explorin& the meaning of any story.

It is

essential to ask it, since a mythic story has its roots in a particular
community and is rooted in its life.

If a modern reader can understand

how they understood it, then she or he can begin to construct a
contemporary meaning for it.
When the work of the preceding two types of inquiry is completed
a third type of question awaits an attempted answer:

"What picture of

self, others, nature, history and God does this story convey?" (1978, p.
70).

With this question on our lips, we set about exploring the mythic

meaning of the story and the emphasis is on finding out how the myth
functions as a world-making reality.

To link up with the preceding two

paragraphs, let us imagine a court scene.
prosecutor is not History or Science.

Myth is on trial.

The

The prosecutor is The Quality of

Life of people who want to see if the world that the myth holds out as
possible is fit for human habitation.
Shea is drawing on the work of Paul Ricour at this point.
Ricoeur's concern centers around determining the sense of a text.
have to

~et

Do we

behind, or beneath the words to an existing reality in order

to get to its sense.

Ricoeur denies this.

He says on the contrary, as

Shea quotes him.
The sense of a text is not behind the text . . . not something
hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is not
the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a
possible world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text.
Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his
situation. It wants to grasp the world propositions opened by the
reference of the text. To understand a text is to follow its
movement from sense to reference; from what it says to wh~t it talks
about. (1978, pp. 70-71)
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Shea spells out for us the process that is involved in moving
towards the "non-ostensive reference" of the biblical mythic
narratives.

We approach the text with the question "what are the

enduring religious situations that give rise to these symbolic stories?"
This is a different question from that raised by the scientific
historian or the form or redaction critic.

It is a question that tries

to touch into the primordial experiences of birth, death, fate, love,
fear, anxiety or hope, etc., that ground these mythic stories.

What

this gives rise to is the phenomenon of the birth of a possible world,
engendered by the religious foundation which stands as the source as the
mythic narrative.

The reader who approached the traditional myths with

this question is setting up the possibility of a collaboration between
biblical and contemporary religious situations, and actively pursuing
the task of creating a world that is meaningful, and yet drawing
nourishment from the sources of his/her community's genius.

Shea now

can comment
Through the process of interpretation the contemporary person's
relationship to the Christian symbolic stories changes (in the
language of Ricour) from a primitive to a second naivete. For the
pre-modern person there existed an immediacy of belief, a flushtight relationship to religious symbols, a primitive naivete. But
the modern person, precisely because she is modern, is a critical
creature. She is informed by philology, exegesis, history and the
phenomenology of religion. . . . Consequently she does not have an
immediate and undifferentiated rapport with the symbolic stories.
. . . For the modern person, primitive naivete has been irrevocably
lost.
Yet .
the modern person is able to inhabit them in a second
naivete. The second naivete is achieved . . . in and through
criticism. The story is critically assessed in such a way that its
power is restored rather than destroyed. (1978, p. 72)
This helps us appreciate the struggle we have to make as human beings to
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create or uncover meaning and to develop a lifestyle that is congruent
with it.
Summary
At the beginning of this section we set out to answer the
question: . "How does a person create a meaningful world?"
rather complete answer at this time.

We have a

Meaning is first of all rooted in

the gracious approach that Mystery, without interruption, makes to human
beings.

Tilat is the foundation of everything else.

Rather than

imposing a fixed meaning on human beings, this address from Mystery
arouses human creativity and responsibility.

Tilere is a proportion

between the revelation of Mystery and the human capacity to know
Mystery's relationship with us.

Each of us is graced with what Shea

calls a "sacramental imagination."

Through the use of sacramental

imagination, we come up with, first, images which are a first effort to
enter the meaning of the relationship we unveil as present in our
experience.

Hot on the heels of image, we pour forth words, the words

of first order theology, then second order and finally of the selfcritical moment of theologizing.

None of us is ever entering virgin

territory when we give birth to the images that try to contact the
Mystery that reveals Itself so graciously.

We are part of a long line

of a tradition, bursting with images and theological discourse, the
legacy of our ancestors' attempt to appropriate that same Mystery, in a
different age and in a different culture.

If we approach this tradition

and see in it a collection of stories, then we can begin to create a
dialogue between these stories and our own, personal, story.

Part of

that dialogue involves a hermeneutical effort that will allow the
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tradition to speak to us, in our contemporary setting, in a way that is
still immediate, attractive and empowering.

In the next major section

of this chapter, we will look at what happens as we engage in the
dialogue with our tradition.

We shall hear Shea tell us of the contours

he sees as shaping his twentieth-century, American, Christian life.

We

will see his answer to the second question we asked at the beginning:
"What are the contours of meaningful existence?"
II.

The Contours of Meaningful Existence

The Varieties of Faith-Revelation Experiences
Put in its simplest form, John Shea proposes that our bond to
what is ultimate is the nucleus on which human capacities work in order
to create world.

"Certain events of our lives bring with them the

awareness that we have a relationship not only to the events themselves
but also to the mystery of life with which they occur" (1980, p. 16).
Through everyday events like that of the grandfather on the plane who
reflects on how his friend welcomes his grandchildren to his retirement
home, and who can say "that's what life is all about," or like that of
the young woman, who while listening to Mother Theresa comes to the
realization that she is called to a life of selflessness or the middleaged man, at his father's deathbed who sees the need to surrender to the
flow of life, the truth about Mystery of life is being discerned and all
of us are being "enticed to think feel and act in accordance with that
truth.

This everyday way of proceeding, this ordinary and unavoidable

human process goes by the name of revelation and faith" (1980, p. 15).
Each of these experiences are Revelatory experiences through
which Mystery discloses itself.

There are two other kinds of
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experiences which Shea points to:

conversion experiences and

experiences of expansion of consciousness.
these in turn.

We shall examine each of

We have to keep in mind that these experiences overlap

and are not meant to be mutually exclusive.
Revelatory Experiences Where the Stress

ls on the Communication of a Message
The experience of the grandfather on the plane whom we mentioned
earlier typifies this experience.
responded:

To Mystery's disclosure, he

"that's what life is all about."

Life may well be about

other things, for but him it is certainly welcoming his grandchildren to
his home, after retirement.

Though this experience took place on the

plane to Chicago, what was revealed is true no matter where he goes.
What the man carries with him is not the solution to a problem.

The

truth he has, is an insight into what constitutes the secret of a full
life for him, it is the secret to being "fully alive."
Experiences Which Stress the
Process of Change
Rarely does anyone solicit conversion experiences.
they happen.

Sometimes

One perceives one's life sharing in what Tillich called

the structures of destruction.

The choice then is to remain within

these structures, or to freely choose to extricate oneself.

The

conversion process comes· to term, if one chooses to change; it is
aborted where there is refusal.

"The pattern of the experience could be

laid out as destructiveness, catalytic occurrence, human freedom,
movement toward new life" (1983, p. 100).
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Mvstery Experiences Which Stress
E;{pansion of Consciousness
All these moments we are brought to consider the wider, more
encompassing context in which we live.

Four possibilities have been

suggested for the quality that these experiences may take.

Sometimes,

these experiences confirm the beliefs we have held up to that point.
simply are aware of God's presence.

There are others, where we sense

there is a mutual recognition between the self and God:
and I God.

We

God notices me

When this mutual recognition is acknowledged as loving, then

there is an ecstatic experience:
notices me, loves me.

that which I notice and in turn

And this expanded awareness experience may

finally include a revelation, in which Mystery lets me know of Its plan
and invites my participation.
Qualities of Our Relationship with Mystery
Shea emphasizes that what is revealed to us by sacramental
perception is not truth about ourselves or truth about Mystery itself,
but rather "the fact that we are bonded to mystery" (1980, p. 19).
enumerates some qualities of this relationship:

He

because of it we are

made people of depth; this relationship has the strong accent of reality
because the mystery encountered is other than we are; we may be enthused
by the encounter with Mystery, but Mystery cannot be reduced to this
enthusiasm: while Mystery is genuinely other than we are, ·11 it is an
otherness we participate in"; while Mystery has the feel of being
objectively real, we cannot treat it in a detached manner, because it is
a reality which always involves us.

When he says this Shea is

protecting the experience of Mystery from any kind of psychological or
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sociological reductionism.

What he says, in this connection, in An

Experience Named Spirit echoes what he says elsewhere, many times,
Psychology and Sociology can illuminate what happened, but in the
last analysis, they cannot determine what happened. The experience
becomes explicitly religious when it is judged to be a time of
contact with a transcendent otherness. (1983, p. 101)
In an earlier book, Shea wrote many pages describing the
privileged moments when the awareness of Mystery has broken through into
human consciousness (1978, pp. 25-39).

Some have come to an awareness

of mystery through experiences of contingency, dialogue, communion,
moral ambiguity and disenchantment.
mystery through nature.

Others have realized relatedness to

Experiences of order, play, hope, damnation and

humor hint at a transcendental dimension for Peter Berger.

Michael

Novak points to freedom, honesty, community and courage as experiences
that open into the transcendent.
Yet there is more to this than just the mere fact of our
relatedness to Mystery.
and nuances.

Our relationship to it has definite qualities

Three qualities in particular hold Shea's attention in

Stories of God (1978, pp. 37-38).
i.

ii.

iii.

We sense a closeness and yet a distance with Mystery. Mystery
is within us and yet without. It is in our midst and yet beyond
us. In traditional language it is both immanent and
transcendent.
Our awareness of Mystery is not continuous. Sometimes it is
there without our willing it, and when we want it, it does not
come. Mystery comes upon us unsolicited. We are invited to
awareness. This is not comfortable for anyone who always wants
to be the initiator. With Mystery, we learn we are not the
first.
Our relationship to Mystery is ambiguous. Sometimes it seems to
be on our side, at others it seems to be our deadliest enemy.
This ambiguity of the intentions of Mystery is taken up at

length in Stories of Faith (1980, pp. 36ff.).

The question is:

"Is the
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Mystery of life ultimately gracious to all that is within it and in
particular to this two-legged stand-up that is asking the question?" (p.
39).

The Ubiquity of Faith-Revelation Experiences
Before answering that question, he pauses to clear the ground.
Shea first turns his attention to the claim that even asking such a
question is narcissistic, appearing to once more place the human person
at the center of the universe with everything evolving around her.

Such

an interpretation, he claims distorts the real intention of the
question.

Mystery permeates all the environments we live in.

We cannot

be indifferent to the question, because we are not neutral about the
answer.

We simply need to ask it.

But the real answer to the charge of

narcissism is that people who have lived out of a sense of the
graciousness of Mystery have shown a great freedom from selfpreoccupation.

Such people have been able to lower their defenses and

risk themselves in the world around them.

"The paradox of theistic

faith, which is exemplified in the life of Jesus, is that living in a
relationship to a gracious God means living dangerously in an ungracious
world" (1980, p. 40).

Shea's use of "faith" and "religious" gives these

words a special significance.

"Religious" designates the bond that

exists between each person and that which is perceived as ultimate.
Faith in conventional use refers to theistic faith, but this language
neglects the fact that everyone, "believers and unbelievers" work out of
faith assumptions, based on faith-revelation experiences.
Faith is as common and as unavoidable as air . . . . ·Theistic,
atheistic and agnostic positions are faith assumptions garnered from
experiences taken to be revelatory of the ultimate meaning of our
relationship to Mystery. (1980, p. 44)
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The question is not "Do you have faith?" but "What is your faith?"

With

this understanding of faith then, it is clear that reason is not opposed
to faith.

Faith and reason are not enemies, for all human knowing is

initiated from fundamental assumptions which are not the product of
logic, but which mark the point from which logic starts.

As we saw

earlier the starting points for logic are the images provided by the
imagination.

"All efforts of reason are grounded in assumptions derived

from faith-revelation experiences; all faith assumptions are eventually
tested in experience and explored by reason" (1980, p. 44).
The Ultimate Graciousness of Mystery
Having done that groundwork, Shea now is in a position to tackle
the question as to whether Mystery is ultimately capricious or gracious.
To do so, he turns to the literature of Annie Dillard since she, like
other artists, is in contact "with the springs of creative imagination"
(1980, p. 45).

Theological thinking springs from the imagination's

contact with Mystery and Annie Dillards's imagination has had that
contact.

Her book, Holy the Firm (1977) is an exploration of the

experience of being both caressed and violated by Mystery.
Holy the Firm is the story of three days, November 18th, 19th and
20th. The first two days reveal life as capricious, at one moment
thrilling us, at the next terrifying us. The third day is given
over to the experience that there is a reality that holds us beyond
thrill and terror. (1980, p. 46).
On November 18, Dillard is enraptured by the beauty of Puget
Sound, the setting of the book.

"The god of this say is 'child, a baby

new filling the house'" (1980, p. 46).
day, named "God's tooth."

November 19 is a very different

Dillard is terrorized as she witnesses a

plane crash and sees the face of a seven-year-old burned off.

"The god
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of today is a delinquent, a barn burner, a punk with a pittance of power
in a match" (p. 46).

And hence her question:

or is time on the loose?"

"Is there anything firm

In theological jargon this translates into

"Is there a God beyond the gods, a Lord of History?"
The answer to this question comes to her as she is walking to a
communion service on Sunday the 20th, carrying the wine for the liturgy.
She becomes aware of the wine on her back.

She stops to look down from

the mountain which she is climbing, to view the sea beneath here, and as
she does, she has a vision of Christ being

baptized~

Coming out of the

water, Christ's body is caressed by beads of water which sparkle in the
sunlight.
Each one bead is transparent and each has a world . . . . I deepened
into a drop to see all that time contains, all the faces and deeps
of the world and all the earths contents, every landscape and room,
everything living or made or fashioned, all past and future stars,
and especialiy faces, faces like the cells of everything, faces
pouring past me talking, going and gone. And I am gone. (Quoted
from Dillard, 1977, p. 67. 1980, p. 47)
Out of this mystical experience comes her conviction, the sense, of the
gracious grounding of all her life--"Holy the Firm."

Of course Annie

Dillard will face November 21, and God alone knows the disaster that it
will bring.

God's tooth may well appear as a fang again.

But· the

Sunday experience was not a repetition of the 18th, just another day up
among the many of up and down days.
It is an entirely different calibre of encounter with an entirely
different communication. It generates an assurance beyond the
capriciousness that continues to characterise human living. As such
it becomes an "anchor," a touchstone for belief in God. (1980, p.
47)
The sense of the ultimate graciousness of Mystery towards "the
two-legged stand up" that we are, does not thereby make all things
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understandable.

When we have said that the ultimate power in the

universe is on our side, we still have to make sense of the experience
of indifference.

We have not solved the riddle that tormented Job or

answered the torturing puzzle of why Christ dies, abandoned on the
cross.

All we have, Shea says, is "a perspective, a stance, a posture,

an orientation within the continuing ambiguity" (1980, p. 49).

So, the

question of ambiguity survives and so does a host of other questions.
Once we have contacted the graciousness of Mystery, we are obliged to
offer an explanation of, and live creatively with, those aspects of the
relationship that appear capricious:
moral evil.

senility, death, sickness and

Once the graciousness of mystery is perceived by us, or

better is revealed to us, the struggle begins of trying to bring every
event of our personal and communal life within the sphere of influence
of the graciousness, but yet at the same time, taking care not to
violate life's integrity.
An answer to the question we are asking in this section--what
are the contours of a meaningful existence?--is beginning to emerge.
The first horizon that appears is that of the approach of Mystery to us.
What is rather staggering for us to absorb, is that Mystery's intentiQn
towards us is gracious.

Such is the second horizon.

The presence of

gracious Mystery is not a magic wand that waves away all hopelessness or
the meaninglessness that we frequently have to cope with.

It is rather

the firm footing we can stand on, in order to begin to creatively deal
with them.

In what follows, John Shea leads us through a process of

reading the stories of our tradition in such a way that links our
efforts to live out of graciousness, with those of some of the great
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heroes of our tradition, especially, with the efforts of Jesus of
Nazareth.

The key metaphor he uses to do this is that of the journey of

faith, though he also uses four other metaphors, of God as companion,,
God as path, God as seductive lure, and that of "dangerous exchange," to
deepen the exploration of the world opened up by the key metaphor.
Facing the Ambiguity and Celebrating
the Graciousness
Through the use of a series of metaphors, drawn from the JudeoChristian tradition, John Shea introduces us to the actual process of
meaning-making and the creation of a world that is congenial to human
existence and which engenders nurturing, mutual patterns of behavior.
The ambiguity that he has spoken about is not lost sight of, but he
invites us to test out the three metaphors:

Mystery as Companion,

Mystery as Path and Mystery as seductive lure.
Mystery as Companion
The journey of faith begins with the conviction "of an all
powerful and faithful presence" (1980, p. 54).

Discourse about this

belief in God is less a statement about the essential structure of
reality and more a daring statement of the speaker's conviction that she
or he can overcome anything that enslaves him or her.
Mystery brings "an influx of power" (p. 55).

Contact with

The Jesus of Mark's

gospel, whose experience of gracious contact with Mystery, causes him to
call out "Abba," becomes an interpreter of this power for us.
for this power is nurturing fathering love.

His image

To understand what this

power is doing in him, Jesus tells the parable of "tieing up the strong
man" in Mk. 3:27 "No-one can enter into a strong man's house to plunder
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his property unless he first tie up the strong man."
autobiographical for Jesus.

The story is

Through him God is plundering the house of

Satan, the source of alienation and destruction.

The graciousness of

God is "a matter of superior strength before it is a matter of superior
knowledge" (p. 56).

The resurrection is a celebration of the lengths

that this power will go to, in order to oppose ugliness, evil and death.
It is a power, which at the same time, is love.

The meeting of love and

power gives a peculiar twist to the way that power operates in human
life.
To illustrate the twist in the story of power with us, Shea
recalls the story of Elijah (1 kg. 18), a story with two scenes.

In the

first scene, with Yahweh's help (he cracks the match at the right moment
Elijah triumphs over his rivals, drags them to the river and slits their
throats.
belief.

Every believer's fantasy!

God's mighty power vindicates

The people who see it are fervent in their conviction, and

enthusiastic in their commitment to God.

We might be tempted to say

that miraculous events elicits faith, but there is a wisdom in listening
to what Claudel puts on Judas' lips in a meditation on the relationship
betw~en

Jesus and Judas.

"Claudel has Judas say that he would rather

watch a cat walk tightrope along a fence than watch Jesus unbend another
twisted leg" (1980, p. 59).

Rather than eliciting faith, miracles are

much more likely to arouse curiosity which is followed, nearly always,
by boredom.
Shea then turns to the second scene of the Elijah story (1 Kg.
19).

In this scene the queen, Jezebel, is in hot pursuit of Elijah,

through the desert, having ·sworn to do worse to him than he did to her
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prophets.

After a day's journey he is depressed.

tree and prays for death.

In his misery he falls asleep.

angel arrives, bringing him bread and water.
asleep again.

He lies down under a
And then the

Refreshed, Elijah falls

A second time the angel comes and prods him:

eat, else the journey will be too long for you."

"Get up and

He eats and drinks and

walks "forty days and forty nights into the desert to the mountain of
God, Horeb."

Shea invites us to understand this scene in the light of

the faith-revelation processes that he had proposed, and then he
suggests that the meaning of graciousness is brought into focus.

Elijah

wants to give up; but the touch of Yahweh is the power to go on.
The graciousness that characterizes our relationship to mystery is
made concrete in the sustenance and encouragement to continue. The
extended insight of the story is that in every situation of life the
nurture and the lure of God is present. This is one of the meanings
the Christian Cross conveys. To look at a broken man on a cross and
say "Son of God," is to say that there is no situation where the
divine power to undergo and overcome is not present. If this man
who is abandoned by friends, church, and state, is the presence of
God, then no-one will be abandoned by that presence. Graciousness
is experienced as water and cake in the desert and the unrelenting
commands, "Get up," "Eat," "Walk." (1980, p. 60)
With a bond like this linking us to Mystery, we become people with three
major characteristics:
1.

We become a people of coura&e, ready to risk the unknown,
unwilling to shrink from new possibilities, and desire to go
beyond the familiar and secure.
Mystery trusts us.

We are courageous because

"Trust is the God-ward-side of human

courage" (1978, p. 156).
2.

We choose humility as a basic virtue.

We become adept at

distinguishing between "Mystery" and "problem."

We are ready to

fall in love with Mystery, more and more, while embracing our
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limits to control or understand it.

We are ready to recognize

our problems and to struggle to overcome the limits they impose.
Humility is not a rejection of the human person, but a
perspective that gives us truth.

A humble person rejoices in

the power that is in him or her and that he or she channels, but
neither he or she has the ambition to be all-powerful.

Humble

people recognize the people they are, but do not regret that
they are not all loving.
3.

We become a people who can laugh at ourselves.

In this way, we

stay in touch with our creaturehood, and remind ourselves of
God's transcendence, just at the moment we are most likely to
forget it.
Our courage, humility and laughter are all rooted in the
gracious quality of Mystery towards us, in the companionship God extends
towards us, on a continuous, uninterrupted and intentional basis.
This metaphor of God as companion is open to abuse.

It may lead

us to image Mystery as "saccharine god"--"me and my best friend God
approach"--one who becomes anything we want him to be, a chameleon god,
who is a crutch for the insecure as much as he is a weapon for the
envious or another angle for the shrewd.

Hence, it needs to be

complemented by at least two other metaphors:

God as path and God as

seductive lure (1980, pp. 63-66).
Mystery as Path
When we talk of God relating to us as a path, we are
acknowledging that Mystery is not indifferent to who we become.

If God

is path, then our lives are "impelled by the perspectives and values of
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the divine companion" (1980, p. 64).

The desire, above every other

desire that moves us is that expressed in the ancient prayer:
in me, 0 Breath of God."

"Breathe

We commit ourselves to bringing everything

about us into conformity with Mystery.

Shea goes on to reflect that if

our experience of mystery is that it is indifferent, then we will try to
live out of that indifference.

If on the other hand we find mystery is

gracious, then we will try to go with the flow of graciousness, even
when we are tempted to prefer indifference.
initially blind.

"Religious passion is

It does not specify its content.

It is a raw drive to

think, feel and act out of whatever is the ultimate truth" (1980, p.

65).
Jesus, like all of us, was motivated by this passion to be one
with ultimate reality, as can be seen from the reply to the question of
why enemies should be loved:

"My Father makes the rain to fall on the

wicked and the good, the sun to shine on the just and the unjust" (Mt:
5:45).

The equality of the sunshine and rain is not a sign of cosmic

indifference, but one of universal love.

Love is grounded, not in an

astute law, or the necessity to build a just society, but is a command
flowing from the heart of reality.

"'Be you perfect as my heavenly

father is perfect' is not a plea to become like God, but to live in
Communion with God" (1980, p. 66).
Mystery as Seductive Lure
The metaphor of God as path corrects any tendency we might have
to create God in our own image, but it takes another metaphor, that of
God a seductive lure, to help us talk about the passion we

ex~erience

on

recognizing ourselves chosen as God's companion, for the journey on his
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path.

Shea introduces his reflections on this metaphor by recounting a

scene from Kazantzakis' Zorba the Greek, which he claims has
autobiographical truth for the novelist.

This is Kazantzakis as Shea

quotes him:
I was at an exhibition of Rodin's works, and I had stopped to look
at enormous bronze hand, "The Hand of God." This hand was half
closed, and in the palm an ecstatic man and woman were embracing and
struggling.
A girl came up and stopped beside me. She looked, .and was moved
at the disquieting, eternal embrace of the man and woman. She was
slim, well-dressed; and had a wealth of fair hair, a powerful chin
and thin lips. There was something determined and virile about her.
I normally hate inviting a conversation, and I do not know what
urged me to turn to her and ask:
"What are you thinking about?"
"If only we could escape?! she murmured resentfully.
"And go where? The hand of God is everywhere. There is no
salvation. Are you sorry?"
"No. Love may be the most intense joy on earth. It may be.
But now I see that bronze hand, I want to escape."
"You prefer freedom?"
"Yes."
"But supposing it is only when we obey that bronze hand that we
are free? Supposing the word 'God' didn't have that convenient
meaning the masses give it." (1980, p. 67)
Shea comments on this story:
'bronze hand.'

"Religious passion wants to obey the

It does not seek to escape, but to merge, to be in

communion with the ultimate truth" (1980, p. 67).
Once we are fired with this passion for merger, for communion, a
"complex and dangerous" exchange takes place:

We hand over, and receive

back, our life from God, at which point it is utterly focused on God's
concerns.

God receives it and gives it back.

Before we look at this

process of handling over and receiving back, let us look at its result
as these are seen in Jesus.

At the time of Jesus it was unthinkable

that a decent person would eat with those marginalized people referred
to in scripture as "tax collectors and sinners."

Jesus ate and drank
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with them?

Why?

the Sabbath.

At that time, it was absolutely forbidden to work on

Jesus picked ears of corn on the Sabbath and untwisted

contorted limbs.

Why?

At that time the class distinction between

master and servant was rigorously enforced.
his servants.

Why?

Jesus washed the feet of

"Because Jesus is acting of out the power and

perspective of the One he had handed himself over to as a carpenter and
received himself back as the Son.

Jesus carries the cause of God"

(1980, p. 70).
Now we turn to the task of understanding what is involved in
"handling oneself over."

Shea is at pains to say that there is more

involved here than "mental moves" or psychological mechanisms.

"It is

an inner act which we perform out of a spiritual centre" (1980, p. 67).
This is a way of ref erring to the existential and total nature of the
surrender of "the heart."

In An Experience Named Spirit (1983, p. 147)

he writes
the heart is hidden in the cage and ribs which is further covered by
muscle and skin. It cannot be seen; but it pumps blood and is the
source of life. When the heart is damaged in any way, the entire
person is affected. It is these physical facts that make it an apt
metaphor for the relationship with God. The relationship to God is
the invisible centre of the person . . . the heart is the ultimate
relationship to God, which is the permeating context of all other
relationships.
Everything is surrendered, including those aspects of our life, our
"extremes" which are hardest to separate from.

Instinctively, we cling

to our achievements and talents, for it is these that give us value,
maintain our self-worth.

The fear of letting them go is "awesome," lest

we become indistinguishable from the mass of others who surround us.
the other hand there is our smallness, the mean, petty, sordid, part of
self.

The terror involved in letting them go is even greater, because

On
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in order to let them go, we have to name them for ourselves.

Letting

them go, means knocking down so many of the defenses we have erected to
stay functioning.

Letting go both beauty and wart means that the total

self is involved in the transaction, and the Mystery whom we approach
with them, will settle for no less, as we know from the prophets.
Echoing their words, what God wants is broken hearts (as in Ps. 51:17,
R.S.V. translation) not burned sacrifices.
Once our "heart" is surrendered, it is returned, and in the
traditional language, what arrives is "a new person."

"We now possess

ourselves in and through God's possession of us" (Shea, 1980, p. 69).
With St. Paul then, we can rejoice in our greatness, even if we would
not dare boast about it, since the greatness we are and the great things
we do, are gift.

Our meanness is accepted and in the acceptance is

paradoxically transcended.
This does not mean that it disappears, but that its destructive hold
on us is broken. We experience ourselves through a distinction that
is perhaps Christian theology's greatest contribution to human
wisdom. We love our finitude and battle our sin. (p. 69)
We are "loved sinners," and in that awareness comes an outburst of
energy which many name freedom.

This freedom is not so much release

from all structures and circumstances that alienate us, but an awareness
that we are "funded from beyond," attached and bonded to ultimate
graciousness.

We cry, not "We can do everything" but "in God all things

are possible."
Shea inverts normal Christian language in a reflection on this
"surrender and receiving back of our heart."

In the gift to us of

ourselves, God entrusts Himself to us, and invests us with the mission
of looking after His concerns:
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Our faith in God becomes God's faith in us. Our handing of our life
over to God is reciprocated by God handing his life over to us. In
standard Christian theology, God is the saviour of the human race.
Kazantzakis calls the human race the saviours of God. God is more
than a faithful and power presence. He is a presence that provokes.
What he provokes is activity on behalf of his cause. This would be
reprehensible manipulation except for the fact that his cause is us.
(p. 70)
Taking Stock
Meaning then, is created as we discover how--as others like
Elijah and Jesus before us--to journey with Mystery as our companion,
but also as our path, as the lure which draws us on and with whom we
enter into a surprising exchange.

As we have said, all of this does not

magically wave away a reality that has to be faced, in all places and at
all times.

That reality is sin.

One of the tests any map of the

Christian world must face, is that of showing its value in empowering
those who use it to negotiate the roadblocks that sin erects on the
faith-journey.

Let us watch John Shea's map prove itself in this

matter, in the following pages.
Recognizing the Strategies of the Panicked Heart
Earlier, we briefly alluded to the ·insight, that though we
perceive Mystery as gracious towards us, ambiguity still remains.
Perhaps, we might have come away with the impression that waiting for
Mystery's approach is a matter of merely being quietly patient.

We have

not really said anything either about the human sinfulness that Mystery
must grapple with, and has grappled with, throughout the story of the
Hebrew and Christian testaments.

What we need to consider is what

happens to the human "heart" while it struggles with the ambiguities of
life, while it tethers on the brink of faith on the one hand and
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nihilism on the other.

These issues are faced in An Experience Named

Spirit (1983, pp. 155ff.).

When the human "heart" is panicked by life's

ambiguity, Shea suggests it takes, "two different but complementary
tracks."

"The first is to court the attitude of waiting for one who

does not come and to live in rejection.

The second is to try and please

and not be able and to live in envy" (p. 155).

The heart that waits

anxiously for its love to arrive, begins to spurn itself, and though it
might like to stop hoping for Mystery's approach, it cannot.

Its

defense then, is to strike back at Mystery by proclaiming that it is
rejected by Mystery, and plays out this rejection in all it does.

In

answer to the question what the rejected heart "sees," Shea poetically
answers thus:
It sees everything in devalued form; it reduces everything to the
lowest common denominator. Nothing true, good, one or beautiful
flourishes in its sight. In sexual love it perceives lust, in
sacrifice and dedication, guilt; in charity, condescension; in
political skill, manipulation; in the powers of mind,
rationalizatibn; in peacefulness, ennui; in neighbourliness, selfinterest; in friendship, opportunism. The vitality of the old is
pathetic; the exuberance of the young is immature; the steadiness of
middle age is boredom . . . and the rejected heart gloats . . . when
sex falls to lust, sacrifice is grounded in guilt . . . peace sleeps
and friendship turns ego-centered. . . . (p. 156)
And as sure as night follow day, as the rejected heart sees, so it acts.
The behavior that flows from it is like an acid that burns everything
before it.
spurned.

Dignity is granted to no one and community norms are
Anything goes and the more outrageous the behavior the better.

"Each act that tears down and destroys symbolizes the unloved centre
which the rejected heart takes as the premier truth" (p. 157).
There are times when the rejected heart will act out in a much
more passive way.

It is as if it had a radar that surely guides it to
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those places in life where all there is is wasteland.
This strategy of the rejected heart attempts to crush all desire
(for Mystery]. The spurned heart compounds the ignominity of
poverty by deigning it appropriate for one so unlovable . . . . It
bows its head in obedience [to other people] not because it hears
the author of life, but because a non-assertive self is the natural
weakness of a heart that is not cherished. It makes a home in
places where life is perishing. (1983, p. 157)
On the other hand, the track that the envious heart follows is

one of self-beautification.

It whispers to its panic, "Maybe if I make

myself attractive enough I can force Mystery's attention, and end this
waiting" (1983, p. 159).

And so this heart undertakes the mammoth task

of trying to please and persisting in that activity, even when it is
clear that it cannot succeed.

This heart will use whatever is at hand

in its pursuit of beautification:

high grades in school; high

productivity at work; it will fall back on sex, wealth power or fame and
the message always is:
personable, wealthy?

'How can you fail to love me, I am so bright,
And yet all that ever greets its frenetic activity

is silence.
[This heart] is trying to please, but it is not able. Once our
panicked heart begins this process of preening and strutting, we are
on our way to a life of anxious striving, self deception and
oppression . . . . We live a life of anxious and hopeless striving.
(p. 159)
The envious heart falls a prey to idolatry.

A finite reality is

invited in to fill the place of Mystery and then it is twisted in such a
way that it is made to promise fulfillment.

But talent or wealth, or

fame, or whatever, is ill-equipped to fill Mystery's place and such a
person becomes a victim of making their self-worth depend on a part of
the self--that part that is put on display.
is tied to one segment of the person.

"The totality of the person

The mystery of who we are in
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relation to all there is is restricted to 'the stuff we strut"' (1983,

p. 160).
Hot on the heels of idolatry, follows another unwanted, and
painful reality:

self-deception.

The envious heart is so intent on

preening itself, that it dare not take the risk of checking out the
success or failures of its strategies.
feedback.

It

It dare not look for, or accept,

an never acknowledge that it may do wrong.

yet, inevitably we do wrong. Sin runs deep in
ways that we do not expect. The generous deed
serving motives. We are silent in the face of
benefitting from. There are no innocents East
160).

us and breaks out in
is done for selfunjust systems we are
of Eden. (1983, p.

The coalition of idolatry and self-deception spawns a third
reality:

oppression.

can say who it is not.

The envious heart only knows who it is when it
If one had placed one's salvation in knowledge,

then there is a vested interest in keeping others ignorant; if goodness
is one's game, then it cannot be recognized or encouraged in others; if
Paradise is found in prestige, then others must be kept in theirsecond-place.
unlovable.

"Making ourselves loveable means making other people

All our efforts to build ourselves up mean that other people

will be automatically put down" (1983, p. 161).
Such are the strategies that are used by the heart in its raging
desire to be filled by what it desires.

When and if this desire is met

may be this destructiveness could be redirected.

We will see, I hope

that indeed such an eventuality is possible, as we try to see how
contact with Jesus of Nazareth, opens up renewed possibilities.
Looking Back and Plotting Forward
In this section of the chapter, we have been trying to answer
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the question of what the contours of meaningful existence are.
the basic human activity.

Faith is

No one--theist, agnostic or atheist--can

escape this basic structuring activity of human existence.
have you?" is the question that counts.

"What faith

In the case of the theist, her

faith is in the ultimate gracious intention of Mystery towards us:
Mystery's graciousness towards us, funds our lives.
is that "in God, all things are possible."

The cry on her lips

And so, she chooses to

become a courageous, but humble person, a person who can throw back her
head and laugh at her own foibles and seriousness.

Faith of course has

to take sin and evil as important parts of experience.

Coping with them

is the heart of the creation of a meaningful existence.

What we ask

John Shea to do for us now, is to weave stories from the Christian
tradition.

In these stories we want to see a faith-world open up that

is credible to us, we want to see faith come face to face with
contemporary forms of evil, and to point out to us the directions we
might seriously choose, to create a viable future for ourselves.

We

want to hear these stories in order to be enthralled, attracted, by
graciousness at work.

We are ready to have these stories teach us how

to live creatively, connected, one to another, in a world that
frequently is dangerous.
Stories of God for the Contemporary World
Shea weaves many tales that shape a world where faith vanquishes
fear and freedom wins out over slavery.
such tales of special interest to us.

In Stories of God he tells two
In the tale of "Hope and Justice"

he brings together the fundamental Judea-Christian metaphors of rescue
and covenant, judgment and apocalypse, resurrection and parousia.

He
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summarizes his vision of the world shaped by these metaphors in this
way:
The story places us in a world concerned with justice and urges
compassion. The compassion is neither pity nor condescension. It
does not imply an inequality, one group suffering and helpless and
another group neither suffering nor helpless but "compassionate."
On the contrary, compassion is rooted in the felt perception of
solidarity. It is the attitude of people who understand that,
despite all that separates us, the last truth is a common humanity
within a common mystery. Compassion is the way into the lives of
others to understand their claims and shape our social and political
institutions to respond to them. This sense of solidarity is
grounded in the valuation of life. The story stresses justice
because life, every life is valuable. We do not struggle for a just
world for the sake of justice, but as a way of valuing what we have
received. Justice in the last analysis is an act of respect. To
tell the story of hope and justice is to live in compassion,
solidarity and care. (1978, p. 114)
Then there is the tale of "Trust and Freedom."

This time the

story is told around the metaphors of "Creation, Incarnation and
Spirit."

In this story these great metaphors have to take account of

another tale that is told while using the metaphors of "Fall,
Crucifixion and Church."

There is a story within a story here.

"The

Story of Creation, Incarnation and Spirit is a skeleton; its heart is
Fall, Crucifixion and Church.

The story within a story does not bring

contradiction, but explosion" (1978, p. 120).
As Shea tells the creation story of Genesis 1, its message is
one that celebrates God's gracious celebration of the goodness of all
that has been created.

The symbol of the Sabbath rest is a statement of

the purpose of creation which is to delight in its own holiness.

We can

understand the holiness which God's sabbath presence bequeaths to all
creation through the category of dignity.

All people share in the same

dignity that is conferred through God's presence to creation.

-And

dignity is the basis of meaning, which Shea proposes is found when each
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person senses and knows how he or she is related to the larger context
in which he or she moves.
deeper question emerges:

Once the meaning of one's life is grasped a
"Do I have worth?

Is what I do valuable?"

God's sabbath presence speaks of that worth, too.
God goes beyond the presence of the sabbath rest.

Looked at

from Shea's point of view, the sabbath is "the world's aptitude for
incarnation."
[Christ became incarnate] because we were made for him and his
presence makes us holy and we delight in ourselves in him. He came
primarily becaus~ he wanted to, not because we needed him. This is
the reason of a friend whose presence brings dignity and worth.
(1978, p. 128)
The story of the incarnation delights in telling about our
dignity and worth, because God is Emmanuel, God-with-us.

When we

recount the Story of Pentecost, we discover we are holy (dignified) not
merely because God is Emmanuel, but because God is present in us.

The

friendship God had with us in Jesus, has not become an event in the
past, it is contemporary, for each of us.
Creation makes way for the Incarnation and Incarnation unfolds in
the Spirit. All three symbols have a common aim. They wish the
sanctification of the world through the presence and indwelling of
God. (1978, p. 129)
From Shea's reading of the Creation story in Genesis 2, comes a
vision of human existence that is positive and optimistic.
beings there are of the earth, yet name the animals.

The human

There is a balance

between kinship and stewardship which fosters an ecological balance.
God's pronouncement that "it is not good for man to be alone" is the
canonization of the relational nature of human existence.

Pride, which

leads a person to be contemptuous of human relating, and sloth, the
failure to respond to another's approach, are both anathema to God's

intention.

Sexual union between the man and woman is affirmed as good.

The molding of the woman from Adam's rib prompts a reading of the text
that sees Eve and Adam as radically equal.

The woman is made, not from

the earth, as all the animals are, and over which the man is given
stewardship.

The woman is "bone of his bone," his equal.

key to interpreting the text.

This is the

The fact that she is made after him is

not the major point, and should not be taken to mean that the later is
the least (Brown, 1990, p. 12).
[The] man and woman live with each other in nakedness. The goal of
the interdependent sexuality is healthy community.
The whole account of what it is to be human--to be related to
God, to be both kin and master of the earth, to live in
interdependency--is pervaded by a sense of entrustment. Humankind
is entrusted by God with the Garden . . . and with each other.
This is preeminently the story of trusted creatures, empowered by
God to live life and care for creation. (1978, p. 132)
The message of Genesis 2 compliments that of chapter 1.

The

same power of God, in chapter 1, which made human beings holy or
"dignified" becomes their empowerment in chapter two.
The world of created dignity unfolds into the world of the trusted
creature. The world of friendship and celebration unfolds into the
world of sexuality and communion. The world of reverence and beauty
unfolds into the world of freedom and solidarity. If people are the
stories they tell, the people who tell the stories of Creation,
Incarnation and Spirit, are, most surely, a people of God. (1978,
p. 141)
To say that estrangement and alienation of human beings begins
with the abuse of freedom is to tell only half the story.
of why freedom is abused is the heart of the matter.

The question

One traditional

interpretation is that God gave a command, and human beings transgressed
it.

The source then of alienation is disobedience.

A second

traditional interpretation focuses on the content of God's command.
this interpretation, humans want the prerogative of determining for

In
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themselves the limits of right and wrong.

They want to be "god."

Pride

is their undoing.

Shea would deepen these two interpretations and he

focuses on trust.

The root of the problem lies in those moments when we

attempt to move outside of Mystery by not trusting it, even though we
are grounded in it.

This happens on those occasions when we loose sight

of creation's goodness.

Then we try to control the givens of life,

rather than relate to them.

"We seek to be god because we have lost

confidence in being a creature . . . . The heart of the matter is that
the trusted creature does not trust" (1978, p. 145).
There is of course evidence which supports the option not to
trust in the goodness of all there is.

We have already pointed out that

our relationship to Mystery can be ambiguous:
die.

we get sick, age, and

Shea reviews some of the answers that the Jewish tradition came up

with as answers to this ambiguity.
The first was based on a firm belief in a cause and effect
structure . . . . If suffering visited you, you had brought it in
your own head. . . . A second response . . . was the idea of
training. God sends suffering, not because of previous sins but
because they are purgative and pedagogical. (1978, pp. 148-49)
While there might be a limited validity to both these responses
to suffering, they cannot be made to bear the burden of being a total
explanation of death and suffering.
response to the question:

Shea then turns to the Cross as a

"How do we trust in a world that is distorted

by our own betrayals and filled with deliberate sin and arbitrary
suffering?" (1978, p. 151).
The Cross is a symbol of the most cruel and outrageous death and
torture.

Yet the person on it is not just anyone, but the Son of God,

as the centurion at the foot of the cross, in Mark's gospel, confesses.
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The Cross revolutionizes our understanding of God and presents to us
new possibilities for life. God is not a heavenly king and the
question is not how does he reward good and punish evil. God is a
passionate presence to all human life, never deserting it. The
Cross is the symbol of the fellow suffering of God. . . . The love
of God demands that he be wherever his creation is. (1978, p. 151)
To accept the symbol of the Cross is to commit oneself to
trusting that God has penetrated to the most unholy of places and
situations.

God is present in loneliness, suffering, self-hate and sin.

She is there not with a wagging accusing finger, but with open arms.
The Cross speaks of God's care, God's care as given from the inside,
from the position of suffering.
inside" (1978, p. 152).
presence to us.

"The Cross is God loving us from the

The Cross speaks to us of God's uninterrupted

Even in the experience of alienation and estrangement,

we are not abandoned.
part in our lives.

When we have said this, complacency can have no

Set free from anxiety over our own precariousness,

or the fear of nonacceptance, or the fear of all kinds of dangers, we
have solid grounds for caring action.
When the acceptance symbolized in the Cross, suffuses our lives, we
are free to be for the other, to love in the same way that we have
been loved . . . . In the deep peace that acceptance brings, there is
an imperative to change, a missiori to share what has been
experienced. (pp. 153-54)
Shea asks a question, typical of medieval times, but which can
be interpreted as a question about the possibility of authentic human
living:

Would we still have to die had Adam not sinned?

He answers

that positively, since death is part of the natural process of reality.
What would be missing though is the anxiety we bring to death.

We would

be able to trust and get beyond the debilitating effects of anxiety.
would face up to our social responsibilities, not shrink from .

We
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relationships, sexuality or friendship.

This leads him then to suggest

that fear is trust's real enemy.
Fear is suspicious of the contours of life. To fear is to
experience the last covenant curse and to think that both waking and
dreaming are tricks. For the person who lives with the Cross of
Christ, trust is the Godward side of human courage. (1978, p. 156)
The final metaphor in this group is that of Church.

Shea

returns to the Jesus on the Cross, in John's gospel, to begin his
reflection on the contribution of the church metaphor to human living.
Devotion is quite sure that the church was born from the blood and water
that flowed from Jesus' side.
the church is?

How does this image speak to us of what

Three things follow, Shea says.

"The Cross is the

grounding of the Christian community, its symbol of realism and its
ongoing principle of critique" (p. 158).
The Cross Is the Groundin~ of
Christian Community
The Cross clearly reveals God's self-giving love which liberates
us from egoism.

Since we have handed ourselves over to God and received

ourselves back from Him, entrusted with His cause, we are empowered to
belong to each other in a life-giving manner.

The God in Jesus has

taken the worst that humans can do into Himself, and has turned it
toward the good.
The law of the Cross is not that evil has been eliminated but that
it has been transformed into possibility. The power of sin and
suffering which generated the anti-community styles of domination
and manipulation and deceit have been broken. If we dwell with the
Cross of Christ, the compulsion to protect ourselves at all costs
yield to the possibilities of dialogue, respect and integrity. The
funding experience which makes Christian Community possible is God
on the Cross. (1978, p. 158)
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The Cross Introduces a Note of
Realism into Christian Livin~
If, in the process of setting us free, God had to enter into
suffering, struggle and sin, then anyone who engages in a similar
presence to others can expect no less.
To pursue a life of trust, friendship and justice is to follow the
discipleship of the Cross. In the concrete world in which we live,
the trusted creature is often the suffering creature; the one who is
responsible is the one who risks his life. (1978, p. 159)
The Cross Is the Church's On&oing
Principle of Critique
Traditionally we have looked on God as the almighty, the
powerful one.

We see that power hang on the Cross.

Jesus got there by

his opposition to the false power, which eventually crucified him.
Jesus was God's ambassador on a mission of self-giving love, which
brought people together in genuine community.

His mission, and the

memory of it, continue to cut through all the machinations of selfprotecting fear.
The God on the Cross will not sanction our manipulating ways and
dominating styles. The facile wisdom that power is for control, and
muscle makes community, is folly before the cross. Vulnerability .
. . the vulnerability of those who care . . . is what binds
together, the vulnerability of God on the Cross. Before the God on
the Cross, our strivings for total control and absolute power are
unmasked for what they are: fear of life. (1978, p. 160)
Telling the Story of Jesus' Identity
In weaving these tales from the great metaphors of the JudeoChristian tradition, Shea is exploring the historical nature of human
existence.

His concern with human well-being, with human development

and the transformation of human persons is evident.

This

conc~rn

flows

from a conscious choice he has made in his approach to Christology--to
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the burning questions of "Who Jesus is for us today?" and "Is contact
with the graciousness of Mystery possible for us through Jesus of
Nazareth, today?"

Before elaborat"ing his own Christological choice,

Shea reviews some of the current, influential approaches of other
theologians.

He presents the approach of those who chose "the way of

admiration," and marvel at the story of Jesus; the way of imitation,
which tries "to put on the mind and the heart of Jesus" (Phil: 2:5), as
well as, sometimes at least, literally imitating the behavior of Jesus;
the way of explanation, which focuses on the person of Jesus and pursues
the question of his identity.

He entitles his own approach "the way of

telling his story" (1980, p. 127).

This is an approach which

consciously adopts a trinitarian perspective and thus presupposes "the
primacy of the relational" (p. 140).

By this latter expression he

emphasizes that if Jesus is at all important today, it is because we
have an encounter with him of such depth and power that we want to
extend its influence to every area of concern in our lives.

We want to

find ourselves in the position of those, who "in the days of his flesh,"
discovered God striding into their lives in the approaching footsteps of
th~

carpenter from Nazareth, who talked, not at all about himself, but

about what he called the "Kingdom of God."

The primacy of the

relational also means that when we speak of Jesus, we are speaking of
our own commitments and experience.
Jesus-Talk" (p. 140).

"There is always a self-referent in

If I say "Jesus is Love," I mean that "When I am

with Jesus, I experience myself as being loved."

In other words, I do

experience the graciousness of Mystery through him.
the case then "he would be dispensable" (p. 141).

If this were not
The conditions which
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permit this redemptive encounter with Jesus are fulfilled in the telling
a?d the hearing of the stories others have told about Jesus, as long as
these stories are told within "a fully appropriated trinitarian
perspective," within a trinitarian experience of God, which prevents
Jesus of Nazareth from sinking into "the seas of the past" (p. 146).
Shea explains what he means by reflecting on how Jesus "leaves
twice,"

"First he departs into the realm of death from which he emerges

triumphant.

Secondly, he departs for his permanent home with God"

(1980, p. 147).

The gospel narratives are clear:

Jesus was not available as he used to be.

after the ascension,

When this happened, people

began to tell stories of what they remembered about him.

Their

pref erred place for storytelling was in the context of the meal they
celebrated, in memory of his own favored practice, which was also an
expression of their hope that he would "return to establish a new
fellowship" (p. 147).

In their view, Jesus came once to live his life

among them, he would come again in power, with the escathon.

This

earliest view of Jesus followers soon gave way to another--that of the
Jesus who led an earthly life and who now, at the right hand of God was
Lord of life and the sender of the Holy Spirit.

As time passed and

Jesus did not return, there was an increasing emphasis on the Spirit's
activity.

Christians increasingly came to view the resurrection in

terms of their own experience of the Spirit which anointed them for
mission, in terms of the reconciliation and metanoia they practiced, and
of the eucharistic fellowship they enjoyed.
absence of Jesus was real.

They realized that the

But there was a paradox:

he was still

present, they could encounter him as forcefully as when he walked the
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streets of Capernaum, only now this encounter took place "through the
Spirit of God."
The experience which Jesus was able to trigger [when he was on the
earth] did not go into the far reaches of God with him. What had
happened when the earthly Jesus was with people continued to happen
when the earthly Jesus was not with them. Yet this experience was
so linked to the person of Jesus that it was inconceivable to
experience God as Father without simultaneously experiencing the Son
who bodied him forth. The logic was inescapable. The God of Jesus
was here, so Jesus must be here. But Jesus is definitely not here
as he once was. Rather his Spirit is here among us. And since the
Spirit belongs to Jesus and to the Father, it is capable of
initiating the experience of God as Father through Jesus. (p. 148)
Telling the Story of the Trinity's
Presence in History
At this point, what we are getting from Shea seems to me to be
Christian specification of "the gracious mystery" that reveals itself at
the heart of reality, to every person.

This gracious Mystery in

Christian terms, has a threefold relationship to humans:
We dwell now with the Spirit, who is actively at work soliciting our
freedom and transforming our lives and our environments. But this
Spirit directs our minds and hearts to the events of which Jesus is
the center. Jesus is the Son, the concrete embodiment of God; and
any experience of the divine gravitates toward him. Yet the Son
carries our minds and hearts to the ultimate reaches of transcendent
Mystery we live within and calls it Father-generating love. (1980,
p. 149)
The Trinitarian structure of our faith is traditionally expressed in the
formula:

"we live in the Spirit and go

throu~h

Christ, to the Father.

Shea now applies this formula to the metaphor of the journey of faith
and demonstrates how the contours of that journey are clarified.
When we initially become aware of Mystery, we are caught up in
the "fray of everyday living."

There is the experience of ambiguity we

have already described, and we are not at all clear about what we are to
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think, how we are to deal with the confusion of feeling, much less be
clear-sighted about what we should do.
But the Story of Jesus is the story of faith in the concrete. He is
the visibility of the invisible movement of God: and contact with
him, means the specification of God's intention and the spark to go
on. To experience Jesus is to experience yourself "on track" in the
Spirit on the way to the Father. This trinitarian approach is the
inevitable structure of every meeting with Jesus after his death,
resurrection and ascension. (1980, p. 150)
When the evangelists got around to telling their stories, they
were not in the ahistorical and uninvolved position of giving a heavenly
account of what happened to Jesus.
situation of everyday struggle.

Theirs, like ours, was the "murky"

So, while they knew Jesus as a

historical figure, and while they proclaimed him a-s "seated in glory, at
the Father's right hand," they also knew him as a presence among them
through is Spirit.
Therefore, they structure the remembered elements of his earthly
story so that his continued presence in the Spirit can be discerned.
The Spirit of Jesus is at work in the community, but its intentions
are difficult to discern. The story of the Giver of the Spirit
clarifies the Spirit's urgings and maps the journey to the Father.
(1980, p. 151)
This accounts for the very different Jesus-story that is told by
each of the evangelists.
of Luke.

We might contrast the story of Mark with that

For Mark's persecuted, yet expectant, community Jesus is the

Suffering Son of Man who will return in judgment.

For Luke's community,

which is settling down in history, such an account of Jesus is
inadequate.

Luke makes his Jesus the exemplar of Christian life:

if

Jesus prays and attends worship, so does the believer; if Jesus forgives
his enemies, so does the believer (Stephen).
Differing historical and religious conditions provoke different
renditions of Jesus. Certain features of the story become
prominent, because they speak to a given situation. These features
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in turn reorganize and interpret the rest of the tradition.
p. 151)
These writers teach the rest of us an important lesson:

(1980,

in our efforts

to faithfully respond to Mystery's self-disclosure, our situation makes
us attentive to certain dimension of the story of Jesus, and we all
retell the Story of the Son so that the path to the Father is revealed,
and the movement of the Spirit is clarified.
Exploring Our Historical Existence Through Story
We are now in a position to understand why Shea weaves the tales
he does from the great metaphors of the Judea-Christian tradition and
why he explores the historical nature of human existence.

Today,

under the impact of the Holy Spirit, people are deeply exploring
their commonly shared humanity, specifically in terms of its
historical development. The way to the Father is not to escape the
conditions of individual and social living but to transform them.
(1980, p. 152)
Consequently, people have a lively interest in "the quest for the
historical Jesus" and in the "portrait of him which current historical
methods would consider reliable . . . . In pursuing the historical Jesus
we are attempting to "enter our own humanity and historicity through
his" (p. 152).
We allow the life story of Jesus to focus the areas of importance in
human life and to give a perspective on these areas. In no way do
we give up our critical faculties but we allow the story to guide
and sharpen their use. The story of Jesus which is the initial
partner in this dialogue,k is the historical portrait~ (p. 156)
Shea does not want to deny the value of the faith portrait of
Jesus which the gospels give us--the portrait that is an interpretation
of Jesus, that has the inner meaning of Jesus and his impact as its
guiding principle.

He values the stories of the faith portrait.

These
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stories highlight what happened to the followers of Jesus in their
interaction with him.
To call Jesus the Lamb or the Vine is not to engage in historical
reconstruction. These are metaphors of significance. They carry
acknowledgement and allegiance. However, it is the portrait of the
historical Jesus which is most fascinating. Today, to say the
historical Jesus is the Christ of faith . . . enshrines a
contemporary preference. People take their lives to this historical
Jesus for affirmation and challenge. (p. 155)
III.

By Way of Conclusion and
Contextualization

At the conclusion of this chapter I want to do two things.
Firstly, I want to try to organize all that we have heard John Shea say,
into a single perspective, in order that when we have reviewed what
Object Relations Theorists have taught us about human experience and
God-human relationship, we can engage the two disciplines in
conversation.

It seems to me that a powerful metaphor which organizes

much of his insight into an organic whole is that of graciousness.
living and all life is pregnant with graciousness.

All

The details of each

person's life-journey open out into Grace, which is Mystery.

No one,

potentially, is excluded from the possibility of gracious experience,
(cf. pp. 14-19, 47-52, above) since every person is able to engage all
reality through the use of his or her sacramental imagination.

Shea

calls the response he makes to the invitation Mystery offers him, faith.
There are individuals, of course, whose depth experiences lead them to
perceive Ultimate Reality as indifferent or even hostile.

Shea is

respectful of their perceptions, and of their beliefs, attitudes and
values, which flow from these experiences.

His faith response joins him

to, rather than separates him from, these others.

They, no less than
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he, are engaged in the quest to bring every aspect of life under the
influence of these revelatory experiences--whether gracious, indifferent
or hostile.

Agnostics or atheists differ from Shea, only in that their

faith assumptions see Ultimate Reality as indifferent or hostile, while
he is urged to see the same Reality, Mystery, as gracious.

The metaphor

which helps me appreciate "the faithing" a person carries on, is that of
self-interpretation.
active process.

I use the word "faithing" because faith is an

Once Mystery takes the initiative to reveal Itself,

faith begins, with the exercise of sacramental imagination, continues,
as an appropriating response to the gracious relationship to Mystery
that is revealed, and climaxes, as a capacity to celebrate life's
goodness or to creatively live in the presence of the ambiguities of
human existence, such as senility, illness or moral evil (p. 27).

On

the humanward side, the appropriating response to Mystery is
fundamental.

It involves the telling of the person's own lifestory,

retelling it in the light of his or her appreciation of the story of
Israel and of Jesus (pp. 28-32); the forging of his or her own preferred
metaphors or adoption those of his tradition; working out a set of
values which are shaped by these stories and metaphors; and finally the
incarnation of these stories, values and attitudes in the concrete
behavior-patterns of his or her daily life, in the context of intimate
interpersonal relations with others, and of the less personal milieu of
social roles and involvement, as well as in the context of his
relatedness to the whole of creation.
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The "From Whence of Faith" for John Shea and the
Tradition of Which He Is a Part
The second thing I want to do is to locate Jack Shea within the
Catholic tradition, on the question of faith, and to point to his
affinity to that part of this tradition that has been developed in the
work of Karl Rahner.

Whereas much of the Catholic.tradition, since the

Reformation has looked on Revelation as a fixed body of Truth, and on
Faith, as the graced assent to these truths, typically, the Rahnerian
view looks on human existence itself as the graced locus of God's
revelation and faith as an ever present human activity, developmentally
prior to an explicit formulation of faith-propositions.

The roots of

faith plunge down to the very sources of the human personality, and
anyone who reflects on faith is invited to look for faith, not only in
his or her own believing community, and in other faith-systems, but also
must look to his or her own earliest and inner experience, in order to
find the basis for faith.

As Rahner writes "to lead to [explicit)

faith, is always to assist understanding what has already been
experienced in the depths of human reality as grace" (quoted by McDargh,
1983, p. 47).
Rahner's approach contrasts with the position of Niebhur for
instance, a well known and respected interpreter of the Protestant
tradition, whose basic question is "whom shall I trust?" a question that
arises from a vision of the human condition as haunted by brokenness and
alienation (cf. McDargh, 1983, pp. 27ff.).

The Catholic position, one

shared by Shea, operates with a sense that faith operates out of a
"plenum," a fullness of life, which of its very nature is pointing
beyond itself to the "fullness of life" of which Jesus speaks in John

81
10:10.

It is concerned to show that the human person is invited,

called, impelled or persuaded to reach out to the "yet more" that is the
Ultimate.

We have seen Shea espouse a theory of knowledge which

accounts for faith as a very powerful form of human knowing, and have
heard him protest against any effort which would set knowing over
against faith.

This knowing is of course, not just an intellectual

activity, rather it is a mode of "perception through feeling," that
knows through participation in its object.
knowing that has biblical support.

This is a way of viewing

Scripture views knowing as a total

human activity, in which one enters a relationship which participates in
the reality of that which we desire to know.

What we desire to know is

reality, that which is real and ultimately true.

Within the Catholic

tradition "the primal human question which is the beginning of faith,
might then best be put 'What is the real?"' "(McDargh, 1983, p. 48).
Right from the beginning of psychic life, there is a desire to know that
assumes that there is a horizon of intelligibility that holds out the
promise that the quest for the real will not ultimately be in vain, even
if it will have to face severe obstacles.

Let Michael Buckley comment

on this:
The drive of the mind is towards the real. The drive of the
intellectual search is for more inclusive contexts, in which the
real, either understood or simply encountered, exists. Even the
drive for meaning is not for abstract formulae which bear no
relationship to existence, whether possible or actual, but towards
those which provide an understanding of, and a context for
everything affirmed as real. Human inquiry takes place within a
primordial grasp of the real, and is an effort to deepen and extend
that grasp. The real is found--or rather speaks to me--right from
the beginning of rationality. (Quoted McDargh, 1983, p. 49)
In this philosophical context, the "endlessly intelligible or -infinitely
rational" horizon of all knowing is identified as Mystery, the
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Transcendent.

When rationality meets Mystery, it is not the case that

it has run into a limiting and impenetrable wall, rather it has touched
a loving Reality, which fascinates and draws one into every deepening
levels of personal engagement and knowledge.

It is this absolute

Mystery "present to consciousness as the asymptotic horizon of its
transcendence" (Buckley, as in McDargh, 1983, p. 49) that this tradition
identifies as the experience of God.

People like Rahner or Shea do not

necessarily imply that God is immediately and always present, as a
thematized and conscious reality, at the level of ordinary knowing, or
at every moment of one's life.

What they wish to assert is that Mystery

or God is there, as the direction or horizon of our consciousness.
The "To Where of Faith" for John Shea and the
Tradition of Which He Is a Part
We have looked at how this tradition has understood the "from
whence" of faith, but we have said nothing about what it perceives as
the goal of faith, its "to where."

Shea leaves us in no doubt but that

he sees our ability to use our sacramental imagination as severely
impeded by emergence of what he calls the envious and rejected hearts,
by sin in other words.

The net result of all this is that the drive to

know, and to become involved in the fullness of life, is experienced in
its fragility and in its wounded form as much as in its free exercise
and completeness.

This explains why it is that human beings are unable

to enter fully into many of their moral acts and especially many of
those acts by which one intends one's relationship with Mystery.
Thus in many, or maybe even most, efforts to know, each person
is limited by that which is in her that does not want to know.
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In all our efforts to meet and be met by that which is real and
lasting, at some level of our being something is reserved from that
meeting, some part of ourselves holds back in fear, in doubt, in the
sheer inertia of old ways of knowing and relating, which however
unsatisfying they are, are at least familiar. The "from whence of
faith" by this analysis is not only the conatus towards Divine
Reality, it is also the resistance to that pull. (McDargh, 19834,
p. 51)
If this is congruent with what Shea says about the envious and the
rejected heart, then perhaps we can see what he suggests as the "to
where" of faith:

it is a personally shaped world, a meaningful world

where people tell stories of "Hope and Justice," of "Trust and Freedom,"
in such a way that "faith vanquishes anxiety, freedom wins out over
slavery, and hope banish.es fear" (Shea, 1978, p. 42).

In this world, a

person finds fulfillment as her imagination is increasingly peopled by
images that are more and more in tune with the Kingdom-Images of Jesus.
These images ground the values and the attitudes which govern the
person's life, more and more, until they become beatitudes.

In turn

these attitudes motivate and inspire behavior that is self-affirmative,
that promotes mutuality and begets compassion.
These are the very characteristics, I submit, that we find
present in the cohesive self, described as the end of the developmental
process in Object Relations Theory.

Before we turn to a consideration

of the psychological aspects of faith development, just let us keep in
mind something that is vitally important for John Shea and for the
tradition of which he is a part:

while the transformation of human

consciousness, which is the term of the faith journey does involve the
psychological processes of growth or impairment and integration, leading
to a discovery of one's self, it is not to be reduced simply to these
processes.

The transformed consciousness of faith is incomprehensible
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apart from the content of what faith grasps:

one's relationship with

Mystery, a relationship whose model is that of Jesus with "Abba," his
Father, who not only sustained him in life, but who was faithful to him
in death and raised him from the dead.

CHAPTER II
MEANING AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH
Listed by John Shea as one member of the set of environments in
which each person necessarily participates, is the environment of the
"Self."

This chapter will try to understand this "environment," using

Object Relations Psychoanalytic Theory.

In this chapter we will pose

the same questions to Object Relations sources as we posed to the Shea
tests:

What are the contours of a meaningful human world? and How does

a person create a meaningful world?
It is fitting to begin with a review of the work of Sigmund
Freud and acknowledge this man's genius in struggling towards the
development of an Object Relational conceptualization of experience.
Though he was never quite at ease in acknowledging the pure
psychological strand in his own thinking as distinct from the
psychobiological strand (cf. Guntrip, 1971, p. 81) others carried on
from where he left off.

I will then move on to the developmental

paradigm suggested by Margaret Mahler.

I will use that as an organizing

schema for the material I will present about Object Relations Theory,
though I shall modify or complement her insights with those of
researchers and of other Object Relations theorists as the need for a
more complete picture, or one which mitigates the Freudian view of the

85

86

role of instincts as an explanatory principle in human experience,
emerges.
Freud postulated the existence of two fundamental urges or
"instincts" in the depths of the unconscious (cf. Wulff, 1991, pp.
264ff.).

The first, which he termed Eros, the life instinct, seeks to

preserve the unity and harmony of life; the second Thanatos, the death
instinct, seeks to sever connections between the person and reality and
to return life to an inorganic state.
of people.

Eros grounds the sexual interests

Thanatos is accountable for the aggressive, destructive

dimensions of human existence.

It is the mutual opposing pull of these

two instincts which explain the multiple vicissitudes of life.

"Yet

they are only the first, though also the most fundamental, of the
antinomies that constitute the human drama" (p. 264).
Immediately after birth, according to Freud, the neonate is
governed completely by the Pleasure Principle.

His (Freud's choice of

pronoun) world has little or nothing of the clarity that adults take for
granted.

He vaguely apprehends that he is in a general state of

excitation.

If there is an increase in tension the child experiences

unpleasure.

When tension is reduced he experiences pleasure.

Gradually, the infant becomes able to imagine states or object which
bring him relief and consolation.

These imaginings are incapable of

satisfying his biological needs.

This bad situation is made worse by

the fact that the nursing adults do not appreciate that the infant
considers them at his beck and call.

Only gradually does the child

relinquish his total dependence on "the autistic and illogical laws of
the infantile psyche, laws in their totality that Freud called primary
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process" (Wulff, 1991, p. 265).

As long as the child is influenced by

primary process thinking, he demands instant gratification of his
wishes, and he does not mind where this satisfaction comes from, he is
polymorphously perverse.

Once he finds an object that yields pleasures,

he invests sexual energy or libido in it, a process termed cathexis.
The mother is the first target of this cathexis, and the parts of her
body which gratify the child's desires are especially cathected.

The

child also invests part of his own body, which in the early stages is
scarcely differentiated from that of the mother, with libido, and so the
child is described as existing in a narcissistic condition--after the
Greek hero, Narcissus, who fell in love with his own reflection.

But

reality impinges before long on this condition, and the child must
withdraw his cathexis of many satisfying objects.

Primary process

thinking yields to secondary process thinking, the logical thinking of
conscious awareness, and the pleasure principle cedes to the reality
principle, which eventually permits the person to effect a compromise
between the demands of outer reality and inner instinctual drives.
These new capacities that the individual develops, are the achievements
of the young Ego.

The psychological province from which the ego grows

is termed the Id, which remains unconscious, in eternum, and retains the
character of the infantile psyche.

The Id continues to be the home of

primary process and the pleasure principle, but these are now controlled
by unconscious parts of the ego, whose task it is to decide which
impulses can be safely satisfied and which may not.
The Ego, Freud claimed, is forever the servant of the Id.

It

seeks to find gratification for Id impulses, in ways that avoid anxiety,
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which signals imminent danger of unpleasure.

It is responsible for

sublimation, an unconscious process through which strongly conflicting

impulses are transformed and expressed as socially acceptable
activities.

The Ego is also responsible for dream work, the complex

mental operations that change unconscious thoughts and wishes into well
disguised dream fantasies.
wishes.

These dreams represent fulfillment of latent

By interpreting dreams, Freud endeavored to bypass the Ego's

unconscious defense mechanisms and uncover the repressed psychic
contents that cause mental illness.
The development of the infant from an irrational pleasurecentered organism to a mature, reality-oriented adult, is a pilgrimage
through several clearly defined, though overlapping stages.

The first

three stages are identified in terms of different body zones, erotogenic
zones, that serve as the first source of "sexual" excitement.

Libido

flows in turn towards each of these zones and the pleasure giving object
associated with them.

The first stage of the developmental sequence is

that of the Oral Stage, when the mouth is the principal source of
pleasure.

Through the mouth comes food, but much more, too:

utter

satisfaction and blissful fulfillment, which Freud dubs as the prototype
of adult sexual satisfaction.

Even after being fed, an infant seeks

this satisfaction and hence the practice of thumbsucking.

In adulthood

the same pursuit of pleasure is seen in the practice of gum-chewing or
smoking.

The later oral period is characterized by a new behavioral

item--biting and chewing.

This indicates the appearance of sadistic

impulses to find pleasure in inflicting pain on another, and illustrates
how sexual and destructive impulses interpenetrate.

The child is marked
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forever by what happens to him in the oral stage.

If he has been

caringly nurtured he will enjoy unconscious blissful memories and
develop an optimistic outlook on life.
will be fearful and pessimistic.

If he is disappointed then he

Over indulgence is likely to encourage

an attitude of passive expectation that there will always be someone
there to look after his needs.

Neglect, on the other hand, breeds

impatience, a tendency to cling, or a demanding, aggressive social
attitude.
During the Anal Stage (anal-sadistic, as Freud referred to it),
the libido relates to feces and processes of control.

Retention of

feces, and then, its' sudden expulstion, is intensely pleasurable, and
maybe, sometimes suffused with pain.

Initially the child views his

feces as a detachable, interesting, and valuable part of his own body.
He shares neither adult disgust for it, nor dislike of its odor.
are the child's first gift to external reality:

Feces

by producing them he

complies with external authority, by withholding them he can defy it.
Thus, fecal matter is a means of producing pleasure and expressing his
relationships to his caretaker.

Freud viewed the attitudes associated

with learning bowel control as have far-reaching consequences for later
values and tendencies.

Intense anal eroticism frequently finds later

expression in qualities of miserliness, obstinacy, and orderliness.

A

broad range of traits from sadistic cruelty to creative productivity are
considered by some, to be rooted in this developmental stage.
Around the beginning of the third year a new stage is begun, at
the end of which boys and girls will be very different.
this stage the Phallic Stage.

Freud named

Already, the child has achieved a
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considerable degree of psychological integration and objects,
particularly the mother, have become stable.

The child develops a keen

interest in his genitals at this stage, which are a mystery to him, but
the sensations which he associates with them, are somehow connected to
his mother.

He intensely wants exclusive rights to her love, and, at

the same time, experiences jealousy and rage towards any rivals,
especially his father.

Freud names this pattern of object relations the

Oedipus Complex, after another Greek hero, who unwittingly murdered his

father and married his mother.
but inevitable, affair.

The Oedipus Complex is a tempestuous,

As long as family pathology does not get in the

way, the complex is brought to an end by the tormented ego.

On the one

hand, there is the simultaneous hate and love of the same sex parent.
The father is indeed the cherished protector, as well as the hated
rival.

The mother may excite intense jealousy, when she spurns her

would be lover--her son--in favor of her husband.

On the other hand

there is fear of castration--the revenge of the father because the son
covets the mother.

Three factors encourage the child to be aware of the

possibility of castration.

He has already experienced the loss of two

things which he initially considered as parts of his own body--his feces
and the mother's breast.

He may have been threatened with the loss of

his penis when an adult caught him manipulating his genitals.

Thirdly,

he may have seen human beings who lacked the prized organ, not because
they are female, but, he reasons, because they too had forbidden
desires, and got punished for them.

Eventually, the narcissistic

interest in his sex organ is sufficiently strong to encourage him to
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withdraw the libinal cathexis of the mother, and thus the Ego finally
renounces Oedipal desires.
The foregoing of the cathexis to the mother opens the way for
the child to identify with the father.

Instead of trying to displace

him, he identifies with his authority and values.

In this process, he

either desexualized the libido towards the mother, or inhibits their
aim, changing them into bonds of affection.

The ideal outcome is that

the Oedipus complex is totally resolved--which Freud thought to be a
rare occurrence--or the complex is repressed, and thereby becomes a
pathogenic element in the id.
We now come to the third structure in Freud's account of the
psyche--the Superego.

The parental attitudes and values which are

introjected, form the nucleus of this structure.

These introjects take

over the function of parental authority, and often function in a manner
far more severe than do the parents.

The excessive severity of the

superego is the consequence of the strength of the defenses used against
the temptations of the Oedipus Complex.

Though the superego will

normally undergo further development, thanks to further identifications
in later childhood, adolescence and adulthood, the original nucleus
always remains the firmest and most active part.
Like her brother, the young girl starts out by cathecting her
mother.

She too interprets sex differences as the result of castration.

But instead of the fear which her brother experiences, she is enraged,
envious and jealous.

She blames her mother for the castration, and

turns to her father for consolation.

The unconscious logic of the

primary process takes over, and she hopes to be comforted for the loss
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of her penis, by identifying with her mother, and in her mother's place,
wishes to receive a baby from her father.

Even after she learns that

she shares the fate of all females, she still retains the fruitless hope
of having her father's baby and is still plagued with feelings of
inferiority.

Because females do not abandon the Oedipal triangle as

effectively as males do, they have a less developed superego--according
to Freud.
origins.

It is less strong and more dependent on its emotional
Not many men attain the ideal of masculine maturity and all

human beings, thanks to their bisexual disposition and cross
inheritance, combine in their person, both masculine and feminine
characteristics.
With the resolution of the Oedipus complex, children enter into
the Latency Period, a time when they are relatively free of the crude
sexual interests of infancy.

Thanks to sublimation and reaction

formation, libinal activity is directed into new activities and objects
in the environment, many of them in school and peer friendships.
The fourth, called the Genital Stage, emerges as the child
enters puberty.

Thanks to physiological sexual maturation, the person

has to organize the revivified cathexes of early childhood, and
subordinate them to the primacy of the genitals.
these early cathexes had a variety of fates:

Freud understood that

some are maintained as

they initially developed; others have a secondary role in the
preliminary stages of sexual intercourse; still others remain outside
the organization, either to be suppressed or to be transformed into
character traits, or into sublimation with new aims~

Since the process

of development is so complex and subject to some many difficulties, in
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childhood, it is likely that this process is frequently aborted or
seriously inhibited.

Libido may be fixated at an early stage of

development, and thus the precondition for sexual deviation is
established.

A different scenario emerges when genital organization is

incompletely attained, which leaves earlier pregenital cathexes intact.
When faced with stress, this individual is likely to regress when there
is unsatisfactory genital stage experience.
If a person successfully attains genital stage organization,
then the pilgrimage from the stage of being a narcissistic pleasureseeking infant to becoming a well socialized, reality oriented, adult is
completed, and he is capable of mature heterosexual relationships.

The

crass, self-seeking interests of the earlier period are replaced with
altruistic, morally enhancing and culture-appreciative motives.
is a cost to this transformation:

There

high motives are won only if there is

a large measure of instinctual renunciation--civilization depends on
this.

Yet even this assures only a partial victory, for each generation

must begin anew.

The victory is precarious in each person's life, for

the loftiest achievements of instinctual transformation retain the marks
of their original in the irrational demands of the Id.
From a Freudian Psychobiolo~ical Theory
to Object Relations Tbeory
Freud's concern to have his new science accepted within the
nineteenth-century scientific community precluded him from following
through the distinction he made
between psychoanalysis as the psychodynamic science of our
subjective life as persons in relationships, and physical or natural
science as the science of the material basis and setting of our
personal life. (Guntrip, 1971, p. 80)
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Up to the end of his life, he never wavered, in his theoretical
reconstructions, from giving the drives the prime place in his view of
human functioning.

He insisted on the instincts, their innate nature,

and on the earliest state of the child as being narcissistic libidinally
cathecting his own ego.

All of this leaves the child, in the Freudian

world, without a preordained tie to other people.

The drives precede

the object, and even "create" the object by the experiences of
satisfaction and frustration.

They are the determinants of the quality

of relationships, and object relations are simp1y a function of them.
Yet it is clear that that is not the whole story.

Guntrip is prompted

to say
Freud's ideas fall into two main groups: i) the id plus egocontrol apparatus and ii) the Oedipus complex of family object
relationship situations. The first group of ideas tend to picture
the psy~he as a mechanism, an impersonal arrangement for securing
de-tensioning, a homeostatic organization. The second group tends
toward a personal psychology of the influence people have on each
other's lives, particularly parents on children. (1971, p. 28)
The second group of Freudian ideas that cluster around the notion of the
Oedipus complex of family Object Relationships, is the object-relational
strand, and gives us Freud's view of the individual as located at the
heart of his relational situation with external reality.
From an Object Relations perspective, the way a person relates
to people in the external world is determined by the intrapsychic
structures, or object relations, that he or she has developed.

These

structures are the residue of the person's relationships with those in
his or her environment, who, in the days of infant-dependence, and early
stages of maturation, nurtured and cared for him or her.

Here is the
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part of the Freudian legacy that has been maintained.

In 1914, Freud

could write
The nature and quality of the human child's relations to people of
his own and the opposite sex have been laid down in the first six
years of his life. He may afterwards develop and transform them in
certain directions, but he can no longer get rid of them. The
people to whom he is in this way fixed, are his parents and his
brothers and sisters. All of those whom he gets to know later
become substitute figures for these first objects of his feelings.
. . . These substitute figures can be classified from his point of
view according as they are derived from what we call "imagos" of his
father, his mother, his brothers and sisters, and so on . . . . All
his later choices of friendships and love follow upon the basis of
the memory traces left behind by these first prototypes . . . the
imagos--no longer remembered. (1914, p. 243).
This passage suggests the main features of a theory of Object
Relations, toward which Freud was ambivalent (cf. McDargh, 1983, p.
119):

(1) that our earliest involvement with parents and family members

has a lasting influence on later relationships; (2) that this influence
is mediated by the "imagos" or representations of the earlier
personages, which may be transformed and changed, but which (3) can
never be destroyed, and hence are, in the psychic sense at least,
"immortal" (Schafer, 1968, p. 220).

There are two other features added

to this list by Rizzuto, an author who is of special interest to us.
include them here, and will return to them later.

I

She adds that (4) the

process of object internalization ceases with the end of childhood and
(5) the final internalization is that of the divinity, in whatever form
it may take (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 29).

She quotes (p. 30) a 1924 study of

Freud to illustrate these features.
The course of childhood development leads to an ever increasing
detachment from parents, and their personal significance for the
superego recedes into the background. To the imagos they leave
behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and
authorities, self-chosen models and publicly recognised heroes,
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whose figures need no longer be introjected by an ego which has
become more resistant. (Freud, 1924, p. 168, as quoted by Rizzuto)
And again for point number (5)
The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the
dark power of Destiny, which only the fewest of us are able to look
upon as impersonal . . . . All who transfer the guidance of the world
to Providence, to God, and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they
still look upon these ultimate and remotest powers as the parental
couple, in a mythological sense, and believe themselves linked to
them by libidinal ties. (Freud, 1924, p. 168)
What is new with Object Relations theorists, and very different
from Freud's theoretical assumptions, is the way that they explain how
the psyche evolves and comes to be structured.

In the quotation from

Freud's 1914 paper, he is describing the evolution of the superego, the
third of his psychic structures, alongside the Id and the Ego.

The

Freudian psychic structure and the explanation of its origin, are
challenged by Object Relations theorists.

They explain the formation of

the Ego in a way that resembles Freud's account of the superego.

Their

focus is on the influence of external objects (parents and significant
others) for the building up of the whole internal psychic structure.
Internalization is the process through which this is achieved.

This has.

been defined by Schaf er as
those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined
regulatory interactions with his environment, or real or imaginary
characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and
characteristics. (1968, p. 8)
In the case of Object Relations theorists, the Freudian emphasis on
drives, and their repression, has been emphatically replaced by an
interest in relationships.

Structural formation involves a process by

which an aspect of the external world has been abandoned as an external
object, and taken into the Ego through identification, thus becoming a
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part of the infant's internal world.

This internal agency now carries

on the same functions that had been provided by the people, or abandoned
objects, in the external world.
Like Freud, Object Relations Theorists propose a developmental .
theory.

Unlike him, and his focus on the Oedipal conflict in the

Phallic Stage, their interest focuses on earlier developmental stages
and processes.

They see as crucial the infant's move from a state of

fusion and dependence on the nurturing person to a state of increased
independence and differentiation.
Object relations theory links the emergence of the self with the
increasing maturity of relationships with objects.

Theorists discuss

the timing of the formation of the various psychic structures,
especially the Ego, by closely observing the processes and interactions
that go on within the child-mother dyad.

They are also keenly

interested in the quality of the relationships that these psychic
structures have with their objects.
In the (1914) quotation above from Freud, if we pay attention to
the metaphors and languages he uses, we shall see that they tend to
~mply

that object representations or imagos are "things," concrete and

discrete entities, which can attract desires, both sexual and
aggressive, and in turn, exert a powerful influence over us.

This

static character to the notion of representation was picked up by later
theorists as well, and little attention has been paid to the question of
how these change throughout the life cycle.
a profound truth lurks here as well.

Though this is a criticism,

When clients report the experience

of their flow of consciousness, they often speak of processes which are
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genuinely in interaction with what Schafer calls "primary process
presences" (1968, p. 220).

There is an important sense in which it is

true "to speak of object representations as consoling or persecuting,
comforting and confronting, provoking anxiety and demanding restitution"
(McDargh, 1983, p. 120).

What we must realize, when we talk like this,

is that we are engaging in a phenomenology and not speaking of
metapsychological entities (cf. Rizzuto, 1979, pp. 60-64).
Before we conclude this section on the move from Drive Theory to
Object Relations Theory, a word on how pathology is conceptualized in
each approach.

The traditional Freudian model understands pathological

disturbance as conflict between instinctual demands and the demands of
reality, and conflict between the Id, Ego and Superego.

The unresolved

conflicts of childhood, especially those involved in the Oedipal
Complex, can continue to unconsciously emerge in adulthood.

The Ego

then defensively responds to threatening thoughts and libinal feelings,
and thus, the person begins to manifest neurotic symptoms.

The task of

the Freudian Analyst is to uncover these conflicts and seek the
unconscious causes of these neurotic symptoms.
The Object Relations Theorists see things differently.
Pathology arises because of damage to the self and the psychic
structures.

Early deficits in development hinder the formation of a

cohesive self and prevent the integration of psychic structures.

These

deficits may result in narcissistic and borderline personality
disorders, which are more serious than the classical Freudian neurosis
(cf. St. Clair, 1986, pp. 13-17).
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Margreat Mahler's Developmental Paradigm
As I indicated earlier, I will use Mahler's developmental
paradigm as the organizing schema, to account for the ways in which the
human person organizes her experience, and creates meaning in the world
which she inhabits.

Althea Horner (1984, p. 26) presents the stages and

processes of Mahler's developmental paradigm in this manner:
Stage I

Normal Autism
Process A

Stage II

Attachment
Normal Symbiosis

Process B
Stage III

Separation-Individuation
Identity, Object Constancy, and healthy selfesteem.
Normal Autism

The period of normal autism begins at birth, and lasts until the
baby is about a month old.

During this time, the periods of sleeplike

states far outnumber the states of arousal.

The neonate seemingly is in

a state of primitive hallucinatory disorientation.

Echoing Freud,

Mahler uses the image of a bird's egg as a metaphor for the child's
closed psychological system:
A neat example of a physical system shut off from the stimuli of the
external world, and able to satisfy its nutritional requirements
autistically . . . is afforded by a bird's egg with its food supply
enclosed in its shell; for it, the care provided by its mother is
limited to the provision of warmth. (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 41)
By way of mothering, the infant is gradually brought out of the
inborn tendency towards vegetative regression, into sensory awareness
of, and contact with, the environment.

The task of this phase is for

the newborn to achieve a balance of homeostatic equilibrium of the
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organism outside the womb, "by predominantly somatopsychic,
physiological mechanisms" (Mahler, 1975, p. 43).
impressive strengths at birth.

The infant has

Though her condition at birth is one of

"mental and psychological non-organisation and non-integration" (Horner,
1984, p. 9) she is endowed with a central nervous system, which grounds
her capacity for mental activity, and thanks to which, she can at birth,
or soon thereafter, set about the task of organizing the world of
experience.

She is ready to receive, and to respond to, stimuli and

patterns in the environment.
Sensation occurs when a sensory system responds to a particular
stimulus. Perception occurs when the brain recognises that response
so that the individual becomes aware of it.
·
At birth, both sensation and perception are apparent. Newborns
see, hear, smell and taste and they respond to pressure, motion,
temperature and pain. Most of these sensory abilities are immature,
becoming more acute as the child develops.
The perception demonstrated by newborns is very selective.
Neonates pay attention to bright lights, loud noises and objects
within a foot of their eyes and usually screen out everything else.
Their perceived world is very simple--not at all the "great,
booming, buzzing confusion" psychologists once believe it to be.
(Berger, 1983, p. 108)
In what concerns motor abilities, the newborn has several important
reflexes which may be essential for life itself--as for instance, the
breathing reflex, the sucking reflex, or the rooting reflex.

In the

process of using these abilities the infant begins to organize
experience.

In so doing, he initiates the process that eventually leads

to the formation of character structure, that gives ·rise to egostructures, and establishes a sense of self.

While this is true, in

terms of Object Relations Theory this first stage is "objectless."
Mahler retained the Freudian term of primary narcissism, and dubbed this
stage as one of absolute primary narcissism.

She hypothesized that
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towards the fourth and fifth week, there develops a stage of
dim awareness that need satisfaction cannot be provided by oneself,
but comes from somewhere outside the self (primary narcissism in the
beginning symbiotic phase) . . . . We might term this stage of
primary narcissism the conditional hallucinatory omnipotence.
(Mahler, 1975, p. 42.)
Mahler's findings indicate however that this stage is truly one
of undifferentiation.

The infant cannot differentiate between its own

attempts to reduce tension (by urinating, vomiting, squirming) and the
actions of the mother to reduce hunger, and other tensions and needs.
As we can see from the foregoing, Mahler is a theorist who
accords an important role to the mother.

I would like to round out

Mahler's picture of the infant by reviewing Winnicott's understanding of
the importance of mothering, because he, more than anyone else, has been
able to clarify the conditions that make possible an infant's emerging
awareness of being a person separate from others.

The infant will

flourish, says Winnicott, if he or she is surrounded by a facilitating
environment.

The mother is this facilitating environment, because after

delivering her baby, the predominant feature of her life
may be a willingness, as well as an ability
. to drain interest
from her own self on to the baby. I have referred to this aspect of
a mother's attitude as primary maternal preoccupation. (Winnicott,
1960, p. 15)
It is this preoccupation which will enable her to be the "good enough
mother" who can provide the highly specialized conditions necessary for
development in the infant.

Good enough mothering in its earliest phases

involved three functions:

(1) holding, (2) handling (which we will deal

with when we come to Mahler's symbiotic phase, later in this chapter),
and (3) object presenting or realizing (cf. p. 128 of present chapter).
Holding includes the whole routine of care throughout the day,
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especially the physical holding of the child.

Its main task is to

reduce to a minimum impingements that the infant cannot manage, and
which cause the infant, in Michael St. Clair's words to "shut down or
feel annihilated" (1986, p. 76).

A successful holding environment

builds up the positive feelings of being actual and in existence, in the
infant.

It promotes psychic integration.

Also vital for the creation

of a "perfect environment" is a responsive maternal face that, like a
mirror, faithfully reflects back to the child what the concerned mother
sees in him or her.

Mirroring is preeminently a matter of eye contact.

Eye contact is the first indication of that exclusive human capacity to
symbolize.

In this experience, two human beings respond to each other

beyond the boundaries of need satisfaction, and through it enter the
area of play and transitional space, which we shall have occasion to
reflect on later (cf. Rizzuto, 1979, p. 184).

As the child's eyes meets

her mothers, in the healthy situation, she discovers her own beauty and
value mirrored in the eyes of the caretaker; she knows herself to be an
appealing, wonderful and powerful person.

Kohut and Winnicott describe

this phenomenon of need for reflection by the other, as a core
experience in the process of becoming human.

Mirroring is a phenomenon

that is not restricted to Mahler's Normal Autistic stage--it extends far
beyond it to the phase of object constancy and into adult life.

When

mirroring is successful, the child will have seen her own grandiose
self-representation in the magnifying mirror of her maternal aggrandized
imago, and will be ready to emancipate her own representation from the
maternal one.

More of that anon.

A third characteristic of the

mother's presence to the child is that it is non-demanding--it allows
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him to develop the capacity to experience the state of "formless being"
typical of the early post-natal period.
Fortunately, the infant's need for such an idyllic milieu soon
diminishes, at the same time as the mother begins to become preoccupied
again with her own life concerns.

It is essential that the mother

gradually introduce the child to the hard realities of the
uncontrollable world, by progressively "failing" in her adaptation to
the infant's needs.

Supported, as we will see, by the growth of ego

functions, and an emergent urge towards separation, the child grown in
his perception of the reality of objects, and learns to express a
variety of needs through gestures and other expressions (cf. Wulff,
1991, p. 339).
If the holding is faulty, then the infant manifests extreme
distress, which Winnicott believes grounds a later sense of
disintegration, a feeling that external reality cannot be used for
reassurance and many other reactions, that have been commonly called
"psychotic" (1960, p. 18).

Rizzuto gives a graphic description of the

situation of the person for whom holding and mirroring are aborted.

If

holding and mirroring
[have] not sufficed to assure the child that for his mother he is a
wonderful creature, the individual may suffer partial arrest of his
development and remain fixated to a narcissistic need for psychic
mirroring as well as to an actual need for mirrors. Bewilderment,
narcissistic rage, vengeful, grandiose wishes (hidden in fantasy or
enacted in adaptive or maladaptive behavior) and identification with
God are the common adaptional reactions to make the painful state of
not being mirrored as oneself, tolerable (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 186)
A little earlier I referred to Horner's judgment that at birth
the human infant is born in a state of mental and psychological nonorganization, but that she very quickly sets about organizing her
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experience.
functions:

Horner (1984, p. 6) quoting Beres lists seven ego(1) Relation to reality; (2) regulation and control of

instinctual drives; (3) object relations; (4) thought processes; (5)
defense functions; (6) autonomous functions; (7) synthetic function.
Horner concedes priority to the synthetic function as it is
responsible for the assimilation, organization and integration of
experiences that are carried out by the Ego.

She then acknowledges the

value of the work of Piaget in gaining an understanding of the processes
or organization, and in demystifying some of the metapsychological
concepts of Object Relations Theory.

We follow her example here and

briefly present Piaget's work as it bears on some of the major
conceptualizations of Object Relations Theory, and on the early stages
of development.
Intelligence, in Piaget's view comprises two interrelated
processes:

organization and adaptation.

that they make sense.

We organize our thoughts so

We separate the more important ones from the less

important, and we establish links between one thought and another.

In

learning about animals for instance, a child may organize them mentally
in clusters, according to whether they are birds, animals or fishes.

At

the same time, people adapt their thinking to include new ideas, as
experience provides further information.
ways:

This adaptation occurs in two

through assimilation and accommodation.

In the process of

assimilation, information is simply added to the cognitive organization
already there--in everyday life we interpret reality in the light of
what we already know.

In the process of accommodation, the organization

has to adjust to a new idea--a child looking at a nature movie may
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discover whales for the first time and has to rearrange his prior schema
on mammals--there are some which look like, and live like, fish (Berger
1983, pp. 49-50).

These cognitive processes are at work in the child

from the earliest stages of development "during which the infant
organises its experiences into patterns and then into patterns of
patterns.

Eventually meaning is ascribed to these patterns, which

Piaget designates "schemas" (Horner, 1984, p. 10).

There are three

other processes connected with the schemas which are important.

First

there is the process of generalization, by which the schema becomes
representative of a class of events or experience.

Secondly through the

process of differentiation, a global schema comes to be divided in
several new ones.

Thirdly, integration:

as individual schemas develop,

they begin to form more complete and interlocking relationships with
other schemas.

Two schemas may enjoy parallel development up to a

certain point, and then integrate, to form a single "supraordinate"
schema.

Horner cites the example of the gradual integration of good and

bad object representations into a single, ambivalently experienced
representation (1984, p. 10).
Piaget's discussion of the Sensorimotor Developmental stage is
helpful in enlarging the picture Mahler draws for us of the infant's
development and will help us clarify her thinking at several points as
we proceed.

The Sensorimotor Development stage, is Piaget's first stage

of cognitive development.
is two years.

It begins at birth and lasts until the child

Unlike his parents, the child thinks exclusively with her

senses and her mot'or skills.

If she is given a rattle, a baby will

106
stare at it, suck it, shake it or bang in on the floor.

One author

describes it this way:
[The infant] exhibits a wholly practical, perceiving-and-doing,
action-bound kind of intellectual functioning; he does not exhibit
the more contemplative, reflective, symbol manipulating kind we
usually think of in connection with cognition. (Flavell, as in
Berger, 1983, p. 122)
Calling this stage the Sensorimotor stage is an acknowledgment of the
fact that the child learns about her world, and expresses this learning,
chiefly through her senses and motor skills.

Piaget subdivides this

stage into six stages, each characterized by a somewhat different way of
understanding the world.

We confine our remarks here to those aspects

of Piaget's work that have direct bearing on Object Relations Theory.
The following diagram illustrates Piaget's understanding of the
Sensorimotor Stage.
The Six Stages of Sensorimotor Development
To get an overview of the stages of sensorimotor thought, it helps to
group the six stages in pairs.
The first two involve the infant's own body.
I. Birth to 1 month Reflexes--sucking, staring, listening.
II. 1 to 4 months

Tbe first acguired adaptations--accommodation and
coordination of reflexes--sucking a pacifier
different from a nipple; grabbing a bottle to suck
it.

The next two involve objects and people.
III. 4 to 8 months
IV. 8 to 12 months

Procedures for making interesting sights last-responding to people and objects
New adaptations and anticipation--becoming more
deliberative and purposeful in responding to
people and objects.

The last two are the most creative, first with action and then with
ideas.
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V. 12 to 18 months

New means throu~h active experimentation-experimentation and creativity in the actions of
"the little scientist"

VI. 18 to 24 months

New means throu~h mental combinations--thinking
before doing provides the child with new ways of
achieving a goal without resorting to trial and
error experiments.

Stage Four--New Adaptations and Anticipations
The major intellectual achievement that marks the onset of stage
four is the child's dawning understanding that objects continue to exist
even if they cannot be perceived.

This recognition is called object

permanence, a phenomenon we shall return to later when we deal with

object constancy.

With the neonate, "out of sight is out of mind."

a three-month-old drops a toy, she will not look for it.
had completely disappeared from her consciousness.

If

It is as if it

From approximately

eight months on, babies begin to show evidence of realizing that just
because a thing cannot be seen does not mean that it has ceased to exist
for them.

If they loose something, they search for it.

a simple test for object permanence.

He showed his daughter an

interesting toy, then covered it up with a blanket.
she made no effort to search for it, once he hid it.
the story was completely different:

Piaget designed

At seven months,
At eight months,

she immediately searched for it and

found it.
Between eight and twelve months, as infants become more
knowledgeable about their environment, they also become more deliberate
and purposeful in what they do with what they meet.

Instead of merely

applying one schema to a variety of objects, now they apply a.variety.
They suck a toy, for example, but then they will rattle it, shake it,
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drop it, throw it and be very satisfied when they have used their whole
repertoire.
Stage four babies can also anticipate events.

If they enjoy

splashing in water, they will squeal with delight when they hear the
water turned on.

If they see the mother putting on her coat, they may

anticipate separation and begin to cry.

Younger babies may spit out

food that is not to their liking after they have taken it into their
mouths.

A year old will keep her lips firmly closed when she sees the

dreaded porridge on the spoon.
Stage Five--New Means Through Active
Experimentation
As the toddler begins to anticipate, she contributes to the
onset of the next stage, which is a time of active exploration and
experimentation, in which the child often seems hell-bent on discovering
every possibility that may exist in her world.

Because he noticed so

much experimentation at this stage, Piaget called the stage-5 child "the
little scientist."

Once one possibility is discovered with an object,

it is as if the toddler then went on to ask:
this?"

Through trial and error

"What else can I do with

~xperimentation,

a toddler can discover

that by pulling the table cloth the jar of cookies on the table comes
within reach.
Stage Six--New Means Through Mental
Combinations
At this point, toddlers begin to anticipate and solve simple
problems by using mental combinations before they act.

That is, before

they do something, they can rehearse them before they do them.

Thus the
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child can invent new ways to achieve a goal without resorting to trial
and error experiments.
The key to understanding the mental combinations a child makes
is to appreciate the nature of representations--of the emerging ability
to create mental images of things and actions that are not currently in
view.

Representation is a primitive form of symbolic thought.

allows the child to reproduce behavior she has seen in the past.

It also
For

example a quiet child sees her neighbor throw a tantrum, screaming and
threshing about.

She has never manifested such behavior untii the day

after seeing it.

Piaget named such behavior of acting out of a mental

image, deferred imitation.
It is at this stage that a child develops the ability to
pretend.

Pretending involves not only deferred imitation (a child digs

the soil with her toy spade in imitation of her mother) but also mental
combinations, as an action from one context (riding a car) is mentally
combined with another (pushing a toy car around a table).
At stage six, there is full object permanence.
stage four, a child will search for a hidden object.
the child's search becomes more prolonged and earnest.
can still make a striking mistake.

As we saw, at

As time passes,
But this child

If a ball rolls under a chair, and

the child sees it, she will follow it and retrieve it.

But if the ball

rolls away a second time, but this time under a couch, and is not found
quickly, the stage four will look where is was previously found--under
the chair.
A stage five baby will not make that mistake.
sees the ball disappear, she will retrieve it.

As long as she

However, the stage five
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child is unable to imagine "invisible" displacements, that is, places
that she has not seen used as hiding places.
When a child arrives at stage six, she will look in the places she has
seen used, in order to hide the object, but then she will turn to places
she has not seen used.

Her ability to use mental combinations, helps

her imaging where the object might be, without having seen it hidden.
At this point full object permanence is attained, according to Piaget.
We have followed Piaget to a stage that goes far beyond that
with which Mahler deals in her Normal Autistic Stage, but it would be
ungainly to try to split up the presentation of Piaget's work on the
sensorimotor stage.

The limitations of the nature of Piaget's work,

from an Object Relations point of view should be noted.

As Horner has

it, Piaget is concerned to describe the "how" of organization.

The

central focus of Object Relations Theory is not really the "how," but
the "what" that is being organized--the ego.

We can put this in another

perspective if we look at the functions of the ego that we listed
earlier.

We have dealt with the development of the synthetic and

thinking functions, but with none of the others.

We now turn to the

second of Mahler's stages and see how further functions of the ego are
said to evolve during the process of Symbiosis.
The Symbiotic Phase
As we have seen, Freud postulated that during the phase of
primary narcissism, the infant exists in a world where all libido is
cateched by the child's inner reality--there is no connection with
external reality.

In the history of Psychoanalysis (cf. Greenberg &

Mitchell, 1983, pp. 281ff.), Hartmann is the figure who tentatively
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begins to alter this understanding when he talks of the human organism
being brought into contact with the environment, through adaptation to
"the average expectable environment."

Mahler fields this ball that

Hartmann threw, and specifies what the "average expectable environment"
is.

It is the mother, who in response to the affecto-motor discharges

of the infant, functions as "an auxiliary ego."

The human infant, at

birth, is at a severe disadvantage for two reasons:

(1) she is

physically immature and (2) in Freudian language, her instincts of selfpreservation have decayed substantially.

Mahler proposes that human

beings are rescued from this predicament,
by the evolution of "species specific social symbiosis," which
provides for the survival needs of the child. The neonates
rudimentary ego is helpless against the world at large, but it is
uniquely suited to_ deal with the environment as it is redefined by
Mahler: it can illicit the aid of the mother who, in the capacity
of the auxiliary ego, supplements the infant's abilities. (p. 283)
Mahler thus not only specifies what adaptation means, but spells
out how adaptation occurs--through the establishment of a specific mode
of object relationship with the mother, "the ordinary devoted mother,"
which she calls symbiosis.

In passing, let us note that what is denoted

by "mother" is an interpersonal reality.

A person of either gender

could, conceivably, fulfill that role.
There are two characteristics of symbiosis that are particularly
important.

If symbiosis is to occur, the mother must be willingly

available to the infant, caring for him, for only then can the symbiotic
object be created.

Symbiosis is essentially a dyadic phenomenon, which

ensures survival within a field of interpersonal relationships.
Mahler's claim is that specific human objects and a relationship to them
are essential to respond to the child's need for survival.

Second,
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Mahler's emphasis falls on the child's innate ability to adapt to the
caring environment:

"What impressed us . . . was the great extent to

which it is the normal infant who actively takes on the task of
adaptation in the mother-infant interaction.

(Quoted by Mitchell &

Greenberg, 1983, p. 284).
We pass now to a description of the symbiotic phase as Mahler
conceptualizes it.

Round the second month of life, the autistic

envelope that has surrounded the neonate begins to dissolve and a new,
more positive psychological membrane develops. The child experiences
herself, not as a differentiated, experiencing self, but as a "dual
unity" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 48).

From this time, Mahler and her

associates postulated that the infant has an increased "perceptual and
affective investment" in external stimuli (which the observer sees as
coming from outside) but that the infant does not recognize as having an
external origin (the observer theorizes).

This is the beginning of the

normal symbiotic phrase, during which the neonate behaves and functions
as though she and her mother were an omnipotent system, a dual entity.
They propose that within this dual unity, the infant experiences a
boundless oceanic feeling, a sense of omnipotence and perfection,
precisely because she is merged with the mother.
experience "primary narcissism."

Kohut called this

Thus, the discriminating quality of

this phase is the hallucinatory or delusional omnipotent fusion with the
representation of the mother, and in particular, the delusion of a
common boundary joining the two.

The average mother functions like a

magnet for the child, pulling her from the tendency to regress to
autism, to an increasing sensory awareness of the environment.

There is
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a movement of libidinal investment from inside the body (centered on
those body-parts associated with urinating, vomiting, etc.) to the bodysurface which permits tactile, visual, and auditory awareness.
Gradually, the child begins to differentiate between pleasure,
and therefore good experiences, and experiences which are painful, and
therefore bad.

The child is oriented to distinguish between the good-

pleasurable, and the bad-painful experiences of extra-uterine life.
is exposed to a rhythmic pattern of need, tension and hunger.

She

Only an

outside agency can satisfactorily answer these needs.
It is the repeated experience of a need satisfying, good outside
source that eventually conveys a vague affective discrimination
between th~ self and non-self. To the bad stimuli coming from
outside or inside, the infant reacts with aggression and by ridding
and ejective mechanisms. To the "good" stimuli coming from inside
or outside, the baby reacts with bliss and reaching out. (St.
Clair, 1986, p. 109)
Mahler proposes to account for a nascent sense of self by
suggesting that the autonomous ego function of memory begins to play an
important role in the child's life.

Predominantly good memory islands

become allocated to the self and predominantly bad memory segments get
associated with the non-self.

Mother is linked to both pleasure-giving

and paining-inflicting qualities.

Memory also plays it part in the

evolution of an image of the child's own body, since sensations of
pleasure and pain from within the body are also stored.
of this as "personalization."

Winnicott talks

As memories of a parent touching and

gently handling the baby are accumulated, the baby's person becomes
grounded in its own body and the signs of this are good muscle tone and
reflex coordination (cf. 1960, p. 19).

This marks a movement from the
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birth-situation, when the child's soma and psyche are not closely bound
together.
When a reasonable degree of adaptation to the needs of the infant is
provided, this gives the best possible chance for an early
establishment of a firm relationship between psyche and soma. Where
there is a failure of adaptation, so there is a tendency for the
psyche to develop an existence that is only loosely related to
bodily experience. (1958, p. 6.)
Let us return to Mahler:

with the accumulation of memory traces of

pleasurable (good) and unpleasurable (bad) instinctual and emotional
experiences, images of the love object, of body image, and psychic self,
begin to emerge.

The ground is prepared for the emergence for a sense

of a core self, around which a sense of identity--"that I am"--will
form.

We shall have more to say about this later on.
During this phase, no clear differentiation of "inner" and

"outer," of self and non-self is possible.

Mahler terms the level of

object relations "preobjectal," but she stresses that it is thanks to
the capacity to invest in, and connect with, the dual unity of childmother, that further development in the ability to relate becomes
possible.

Moreover, during the symbiotic phase, the primal soil out of

which all subsequent relationships will grow, is laid down.

Mahler

believes that the vestiges of this stage remain with us for life.
Whether as toddler or adult, the representations of the symbiotic phase
remain with us to lend power and confidence to life, through the
feelings of being part of the omnipotent other.

Helplessness is

manageable, because one feels merged with someone who is able to provide
(cf. Garanzini, 1988, pp. 81-82).
The symbiotic phase is a time when the infant thoroughly
familiarizes herself with the mothering half of the symbiotic self, as
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indicated by the unspecific, social smile.

"The smile gradually becomes

the specific (preferential) smiling response to the mother, which is the
grucial si&n that a specific bond between the infant and his mother has
been established" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 52).

Mahler acknowledges her

dependence on the work of John Bowlby for this insight.

Familiarization

with his work on the vicissitudes of attachment and bonding that emerge
as critical, at this point in a human being's life, will help us to add
a balance to the emphasis placed on cognitive development by Jean
Piaget.
Attachment Theory, as developed by Bowlby, conceptualizes the
state of the mature person as being one in which the individual has
built up "a representation model of himself as being both able to help
himself and as worthy of being helped should difficulties arise"
(Bowlby, 1976, p. 136).
"basic trust."
world.

Erikson talks of such a person as showing

Bowlby stresses the interpersonal nature of the neonates

If the child is to grow up healthily, he needs caregivers who

fulfill the crucial role of being responsive to the cues for care that
the child gives, as and when he gives them, and who intervene
judiciously when the child is heading for trouble.

Bowlby singles out

three patterns of behavior as prime examples of the kind of behaviors
emitted by the child, which he calls attachment behavior.

The child

cries and calls, behavior which elicits care; he follows and clings; and
he protests when he is left alone, or in the presence of strangers.

He

defines attachment behavior in this way:
[It is] . . . conceived as any form of behavior that results in a
person attaining or retaining proximity to some other differentiated
or preferred individual, who is usually conceived as stronger and/or
wiser. (Bowlby, 1976, p. 129)
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Such behavior is emitted most intensely and frequently during childhood,
but does in fact perdure throughout the life cycle.

Bowlby rejects any

suggestion that such behavior has anything intrinsically childish or
immature about it.

Attachment theory emphasizes seven features of

attachment behavior:
a)

Specificity.

Attachment behavior is directed towards one or a

few intended persons, usually in a hierarchical order of
preference.
b)

Duration.

An attachment is often life-long, though at different

phases in the life cycle old attachments bay be attenuated, or
die, to be replaced by new ones.

However, early attachments are

abandoned only with great difficulty, and commonly persist.
c)

En~a~ement

of emotion.

The deepest and most significant human

emotions are roused during the formation, maintenance,
disruption and renewal of attachment relationships.

People

describe the formation of the attachment bond as falling in
love, sustaining the bond as loving someone, and losing the
object of the bond as grieving.

When the threat of loss of the

object arises there is anxiety, and its actual loss induces
sorrow.

In all of these situations anger is never far away.

As

long as the bond is firmly established a person feels a great
sense of security and overflowing joy when an attachment is
renewed.
d)

Onto~eny.

The critical period for the development of

affectional bonds is the first nine months of life.

Newman and

Newman, after their review of the pertinent literature, conclude

117
their answer to the question of whether there is a specific
time, during infancy when the child develops a strong, welldifferentiated liking for one person in this way:
We can say that the onset of a critical period for attachment must
begin some time after about the age of 6 months of age. This does
not mean that the first six months play no role in the establishment
of a strong bond between the child and the caregiver. On the
contrary, these early months provide the background experiences of
consistency, warmth, and familiarity upon which the specific
attachment is built. (Newman & Newman, 1987, p. 171)
The more frequent contact a child has with a particular person,
the more likely that person is to become the attachment figure-normally this will be the mother.

Attachment behavior continues

to be easily activated until the end of the third year.

When a

person has not successfully completed his or her developmental
tasks up to that point, it becomes less readily activated after
that.
e)

Learning.

Conditioning may account for some part of the

attachment process, but only for a small part.

Attachment is

still likely to develop despite repeated punishment from the
attachment figure.
f)

Organization.

In the initial stages of attachment, behavior is

mediated through the reflexes and capacities with which the
infant is endowed.

From the latter part of the first year it is

mediated by "increasingly sophisticated behavioral systems
organised cybernetically and incorporating representational
models of the environment and self" (Bowlby, 1976, p. 131).
Certain conditions activate and terminate these systems, as for
example, strangeness, hunger, or tiredness.

Terminating
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conditions would include such things as the reappearance of the
mother and soothing interaction with her.

In instances where

there is a strong arousal of attachment behavior, it may not
cease until the child is hugged and has had the opportunity for
extended tactile contact and clinging.

Once soothing has

occurred the child becomes free to explore his environment.
g)

Bowlby suggests that the biological function served by
attachment behavior is survival, especially protection from
predators.
Before leaving Bowlby there is one other point that deserves a

little more attention than the sentence we have devoted to it in (f)
above.

There we referred to the child exploring the environment, once

soothing has taken place.

Exploratory behavior is now recognized as

being crucial in its own right.

Because of it, a person is able to

build up a coherent picture of the world into which she is inserted.

It

may even be vital for survival to have such information.
Children . . . are notoriously curious and inquiring, which commonly
leads them to move away from their attachment figure. In this sense
exploratory behavior is antithetical to attachment behavior. In
healthy individuals the two kinds of behavior normally alternate.
(Bowlby, 1976, p. 133)
Mahler's most significant contributions to object relations
theory are precisely in this area of attachment and autonomy.

She

postulates that as internal tensions are felt to be reduced, thanks to
safe anchorage in the symbiotic unity, and as pleasure in maturationally
increasing sensory perception invites cathexis of external reality, the
child is empowered to leave this ideal symbiotic state and to embark on
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the next developmental task--that of differentiation and separation
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 53).
The Process of Separation and
Individuation
After the achievement of symbiosis, there are two parallel
tracks that the child embarks upon.

One is the track of individuation,

"the evolution of intrapsychic autonomy, perception, memory, cognition
and reality testing" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 63).

The second is the

intrapsychic developmental track of separation "that runs along
differentiation, distancing, boundary formation and disengagement from
mother" (p. 63.)
These two processes of separation and individuation issue in the
child's capacity to function separately, but yet in the presence, and
with the support, of the mother.

One of the challenges that the child

needs to navigate, at this time, is that of separation anxiety, which
arises as he takes distance for the first time, from mother.

This phase

will have reached a successful term when the child has achieved an
awareness of the separateness of the self from others, which coincides
with the emergence of a sense of self, of true object

relations~ips

and

an awareness of external reality (St. Clair, 1986, p. 110).
The First Sub-Phase: Differentiation and the
Development of Body Image. Also Called "Hatching"
The unfolding cognitive development of the child, as Piaget
understands it, will have reached stage III, which he calls "procedures
for making interesting sights last," when the child has reached four or
five months, which in Mahler's terms, is the high period of symbiosis.
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In the language of attachment theory, this is the time when the
background experiences "of consistency, warmth and familiarity_upon
which specific attachment is built," are facilitated.

Mahler, like

Piaget notes how outward perceptual engagement is increasing, at this
time, and how, when awake, the child is observed to have "a more
permanently alert sensorium"--the perceptual conscious system (Mahler et
al., 1975, p. 54).
Mahler estimates that at about six months, the child begins his
first experiments in separation-individuation.

She and her associates

have noted how the infant begins pulling at the mother's hair, nose or
ears, and putting food into her mouth; how he begins to arch his body
away from her, so to gain a better perspective of her.
scan her and her environment.

He attempts to

The contrast here is with the baby just

molding her body to that of the mother.
There are definite signs that the baby begins to differentiate his
own from his mother's body. Six to seven months is the peak of
manual, tactile, and visual exploration of the mother's face, as
well as of the covered and unclad parts of the mother's body; these
are the weeks during which the infant discovers, with fascination, a
brooch, a pair of eyeglasses or a pendant worn by the mother.
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 54)
A new characteristic of the child's behavior at this phase,
emerges at the seventh to eighth month--what Mahler calls "the visual
pattern of 'checking back to mother'"

(Mahler~

1975, p. 55).

She judges

this to be "the most important regular sign of beginning somatopsychic
differentiation."

The baby seems to visually scan others and to compare

mother with others, the familiar with the unfamiliar.

In doing this,

the child, in the first instance, seems to be familiarizing himself more
thoroughly "with what is mother, what feels, tastes, smells, looks like,
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or has the 'clang' of mother" (p. 56).

His continuing explorations,

begun in the earlier days of this phase continue, and deepen his
appreciation of what does, or does not belong to mother's body.
Many psychoanalytic writers have commented on the "stranger
anxiety" which begins to manifest itself at around eight months.

While

not denying it, Mahler would like to situate such behaviors in a wider
context, one of wonderment and exploration--a context which Bowlby would
appreciate.
Once the infant has become sufficiently individuated to recognise
the mother's face . . . and once he familiarizes himself with the
general mood and "feel" of his partner in the symbiotic dyad, he
then turns with more or less wonderment and apprehension to a
prolonged visual and tactile exploration and study of the faces and
gestalt of others. He studies them from afar or at close range. He
appears to be comparing and checking the features of the stranger's
face with his mother's face, as well as whatever inner image he may
have of his mother (not necessarily or even predominantly visual).
He also seems to check back to his mother's gestalt, particularly to
her face, in relation to other interesting, new experiences.
(Mahler et al., 1975, p. 57)
The child who has a strong ability to·approach a widening world,
is the one for whom the symbiotic phase has been optimal, and who has
emerged from it with "confident expectation":
such that he can rely on

~eality

his experience of life is

to respond to his needs.

In the

· hatching phase this "confident expectation" encourages curiosity and
wonderment in the child, which manifest themselves in the "checking
back" pattern.

To the degree that the development of basic trust has

been inhibited, stranger anxiety is likely to be present.
Hatching, or the emergence of the child from inward directed
attention to outward-directed attention and alertness, can be seriously
interfered with in many ways.

Hatching may be delayed or

pre~ature.

Mahler cites the case of Peter, a boy whose symbiotic experience was
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intense, but unsatisfactory.

He moved early to the phase of

differentiation, extricating himself from the uncomfortable symbiosis.
He manifested severe levels of stranger anxiety, and later this pattern
of anxiety would reoccur whenever Peter was under stress.

Mahler

comments:
It seems as if the unsatisfactory symbiotic phase had prevented
Peter from accumulating a sufficient reservoir of basic trust, of
that normal narcissism, which provides the solid base from which to
reach out confidently into the "other-than-mother" world. (Mahler
et al., 1975, p. 59)
Mahler also describes the case of a little boy who did not get
sufficient emotional supplies from his mother, because of her depressed
condition.

His specific smiling response to her came late.

He was late

in using his visual modality, to keep distance-perceptual contact.

He

apparently "prolonged the period of symbiosis as if to give himself and
his mother time to catch up" (p. 59).

In another case, where the

child's mother was symbiotically too enveloping, the child learned to
push her away, and was more comfortable in the arms of other people.
There are thus a wide range of factors that can disturb the hatching
proces·s, and among them Mahler ranks indifference, depression,
unpredictability, as well as too intense or intrusive mother, as being
of special significance.
Object and Self-Representations
We have referred in the foregoing pages, among other things, to
the child's delusional omnipotent fusion with the representation of the
mother, to how his representation of himself is a source of comfort and
valuation.

We have spoken of how a sense of self begins to

memory traces are established.

e~erge

as

At this point we need to inquire into
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the nature and function of these representations.
As we saw when we dealt with Piaget, the eighteen-month-old
child reaches the stage of object permanency, and has the capacity to
retain mental images of things and actions not currently in view.
Thanks to this ability, the child can engage in such symbolic activities
as deferred imitation and pretend play.

Piaget is of course concerned

with establishing the objectivity of perceived objects "out there."

His

use contrasts with that of clinicians like Anna Freud, for example, who
talks, not of objected permanency but object constancy and who is quoted
by Selma Fraiberg as saying:
What we mean by object constancy is the child's capacity to keep up
object cathexis irrespective of frustration or satisfaction. At the
time before object constancy the child withdraws cathexis from the
unsatisfactory . . . object . . . . After object constancy has been
established the person representing the object keeps his place for
the child whether he satisfies or frustrates. (1969, p. 14)
Object Relations Theorists would not talk of the cathexis of libidinal
drives, but their concerns too, would be different from those of Piaget.
His concern is not with what psychoanalysts call the libidinal
investment in objects, or the nature of the attachment bonds between a
child and her caretakers, or the mothering dyad.

From within the

psychoanalytic tradition, Rene Spitz, who used the criterion of stranger
anxiety, spoke of the child has having achieved object constancy, at
eight months.

His rationale for this is that stranger anxiety implies

the capacity to evoke the image of the mother in her absence.

Others,

Negara, for instance, spoke of the attainment of object constancy as
being a gradual process which starts at three or four months and reaches
its full development at eighteen months.

For her part, Mahler envisages

the attainment of object constancy at around twenty-four months.
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Selma Fraiberg illustrates how the term object constancy
acquired different meanings, and explains why different authors suggest
widely varying ages for the attainment of object constancy.
The writers who ascribe object constancy to the middle of the first
year, are using "constancy" only in the sense of attachment to the
love object. The writers who give a range from eight to eighteen
months are adding some form of mental representation to the criteria
for libinal cathexis of the object; those who place object constancy
at eighteen months appear to be following Piaget's criteria for
mental representation and object concept. [Mahler] . . . who placed
object constancy at twenty-four months was using a still more
restrictive criteria, in which mental representation of the mother
had attained a high level of stability. (1969, p. 19)
Fraiberg goes on to suggest that some of the ambiguities
evaporate if we distinguish between "recognition memory" and evocative
memory," following the example of Piaget.
Thus a memory trace or a mental image of the mother does not in
itself imply the capacity to evoke the image of the mother
independently of the presenting stimulus of her face or voice.
Recognition can take place when the person or thing perceived has
the characteristics or signs which revive mnemonic traces laid down
through previous experience. The test for evocative memory is the
demonstrated capacity to evoke the image without the presenting
stimulus. (1969, p. 22)
A simple example from everyday experience illustrates the
difference between these two types of memory.

If one thinks back to

one's undergraduate class of three hundred students, one might be able
to image the face of twenty of them.

Should one meet one of the other

two hundred and eighty in an airport, one might recognize her face
immediately.

This means that the presentation of the forgotten face

revived the image stored in memory; the face acted as a sign, the image
was "compared by means of this sign, and recognition occurred."
matching of images by means of signs, is what Fraiberg intends by
"recognition memory."

She reserves "evocative memory" for those

This
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instances like the first one mentioned above, where the image can be
produced without the mediation of signs.
The question now is:
memory?"

"At what age can the child use evocative

Is it at around six months, when the baby smiles

preferentially for the mother?

Is it during the eight to twelve month

period when manifestations of stranger anxiety are at their highest
levels?

Fraiberg suggests that it is not necessary to claim that

evocative memory is already developed at this stage.

When the eight-

month-old child demonstrates stranger anxiety, he certainly displays the
ability to make perceptual discriminations between the familiar and
unfamiliar, but "the act of recognition may only tell us that
recognition memory has progressed to a certain level of complexity"
(Fraiberg, 1969, p. 23).

Mahler's explanation for stranger anxiety, as

we have seen, is that the "confident expectation" which should be
awakened in the symbiotic phase, has failed to occur.

From Fraiberg's

viewpoint, what stranger anxiety indicates is that the mental image of
the mother is unstable, and still dependent on affirmation derived from
visual perception.
Recognition memory.stabilizes itself through repetition. The
appearance in the perceptual field of the mother's face elicits the
joy of recognition . . . . In this transitional period for the baby,
when mental operations begin to take into account the objective
attributes of persons and things, we may suppose a kind of
"expectation" in the baby that people and things in his world should
have resonance in memory. At the eight month level of cognitive
development, is it possible that the face that cannot be affirmed,
"p;aced" through memory, is momentarily disruptive to the child's
sense of the "real," that expectations are not confirmed. (1969, p.
24)
Fraiberg's contention is that the unfulfillment of the child's
"expectation" of a familiar face does not require us to suppose the
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intervention of evocative memory.

If evocative memory were indeed at

work, then the evoked image of the mother would soothe the child, and
eliminate the anxiety.

While Fraiberg is willing to admit that the

image of the mother, provided by evocative memory is available to an
infant sooner than an evoked image of a thing--since libidinal
investment is much greater in the mother--she is not prepared to argue
that the time lapse between the occurrence of an evoked person-memory,
and that of a thing-memory i~ great.
Fraiberg's reflections, and the use she makes of Piaget's work,
have helped us, I suggest, to understand those "representations," in the
psychoanalytic meaning of the word, which are formed at the later stages
of infant development.
Now let us consider the following vignettes taken from chapter
four of Ana-Marie Rizzuto's 1979 work, Ihe Birth of the Livin& God.
A Visceral Memory
A 26-year-old woman comes to Rizzuto's clinic.
fast and shallow.

Her breathing is

Her mouth is wide open, her eyes bulging.

She talks

of her mother who has told her that she and her father will be cremated.
In the telling of this story she recalls having had pneumonia when she
was seven.
human touch.

She remembers no one held her, and the longing she had for
Her mother had not touched her, even when she was in an

oxygen tent, though she could remember her mother's concern for her on
that occasion--the only childhood memory she had of such care or
closeness with mother.

The patient was hesitant about seeing the

therapist, because of her wish (the patient) for closeness with her.
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Rizzuto called attention to the pattern of the patient's breathing--it
was as if she had pneumonia.
The wish for closeness, the representation of the mother as caring
and the feeling of having been "touched in the lungs" by her mother
during her illness, became a compound object relation in connection
with me as the caring therapist. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 58)
A Sensorimotor Memory
As Rizzuto rose from her chair to welcome her next client, she
was struck by his unusual posture.

His knees were bent, his hips were

flexed forward, his back and shoulders hunched, his head berit and
slightly turned away from her.

He squinted at her from the corner of

his eye, and began to tell his story of how his wife was uncaring and
bad for him, how she refused him sex.
affair.

He admitted to an extramarital

Then he remembered his mother, and how she used to get mad at

him, yell at him, and hit him.

His fantasy was, at that moment, that

the therapist would hit him.
The patient was not aware of his posture, when he entered the room,
but he was aware of having acted out. The memory of his mother
hitting him became conscious; it had been already present in his
posture when he entered the room. I call this a sensorimotor
representation of the object. (1979, p. 58)
An Auditory Memory
A female client has great difficulty in talking during sessions.
At last she blurts out that she cannot talk.

She feels as if her mother

is in the room repeating an order she gave to her child repeated:
"Never tell anyone about us.

Don't betray your family."

taboo caused this woman great guilt.

Breaking this
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An Iconic Memory
This anorexic patient feels that her mother's presence invades
every space she enters, although the mother lives on the other side of
the world.
free.

The woman feels that only her mother's death will set her

She fantasizes splitting her mother with an axe.

will not go away, she clings to the daughter.
her a second time.

But the mother

She fantasizes hitting

She became convinced that only the actual demise of

her mother would bring her freedom.

"The visual--nonhallucinatory--

presence of the mother was the object representation that made this
patient's life quite unbearable" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 59).
A Conceptual Memory
A 27-year-old patiently repeatedly insisted that she was
shameful, because she was not as "sophisticated" as her mother.

In the

eyes of this woman, her mother was a cosmopolitan, poised proper woman
of the world.
mother was.

The word "sophisticated" captured for her all that her
In fact this was a word that the mother used as a self-

description, and used too, in her instructions to the patient.

Every

time the patient felt "unsophisticated," she felt shame for not being
like her mother.

As a child develops, her interactions with the significant
others in her life are codified, and then throughout the life cycle are
retrieved, as representations, "in which multiple, and even
contradictory aspects of the object are simultaneously included"
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 57).

We have just seen five levels which may

contribute to the content and tone of a representation.

The
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representation may involve physical sensation, either the remembrance of
past sensations, or their actual physical enactment in the body of the
person--visceral and sensorimotor memories.

The object representation

may also take the form of a sense of presence, visual or auditory that
is not hallucinated, but experiences as real--perceptual or iconic.
Finally, the object representation may operate at a certain level of
abstraction and secondary process elaboration, and survive in the
association of certain sentiments and sensations evoked by certain ideas
and words.
In her review of psychoanalytic literature, Rizzuto briefly
refers to the work of Sandler and Rosenblatt (The Representational World
of the Child, 1962), where they underline the active role of the child
in creating the internal world of representations.

She approves of

their view that this "means that in order to know what is 'outside,' the
child has to create a representation of that 'outside' as part of his
representational world" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 68).

In their account, a

representation is an "existence," more or less enduring, an organization
or schema, which is constructed out of a multitude of impressions.

"On

the basis of these, [the child] gradually creates a whole range of
mother images, all of which bear the label 'mother'" (quoted by Rizzuto,
p. 68).

To understand what is meant by saying that the child actively

contributes to the creation of a representation of the external world it
is helpful to recall what Winnicott says about the third function of the
good enough mothering, that we referred to earlier in this chapter.
There we saw that the mother has to be "object-presenting, or
realizing," that is, she presents to the child, what the child needs, at
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the right time, and thus initiates his or her capacity to relate to
external objects.

For example, the mother has a breast with milk, and

she would like the infant to nurse at her breast.

The mother needs to

shape how the infant deals with this external object.

There needs to be

the illusion that the child can either experience the breast as its own
hallucination or as a thing belonging to external reality.

The infant

needs to come to the nipple excited and ready, so that when the actual
nipple appears, it is the nipple that the infant has hallucinated.

And

so the infant begins to build up the capacity to conjure up what is
actually available.

The mother needs to continue providing this type of

experience, where the child seems to create the object, and actively
participates in his or her own instinctual satisfactions, rather than
having them imposed from without.

Winnicott wrote:

Each infant must recreate the world, but this is possible only if,
bit by bit the world arrives at the moments of the infant's creative
activity. The infant reaches out, and the breast is there, and the
breast is created. The success of this operation depends on the
sensitive adaptation the mother is making to her infant's needs,
especially at the beginning.· From this there is a natural
progression to the individual infant's creation of the whole world
of external reality. (1958, p. 12)
Rizzuto's quotation of Sandler and Rosenblatt supports what
Winnicott emphasizes.

They note three aspects of the

"representational": " (i) the child (his ego indeed) constructs or
creates the representation; (ii) he does this in an active way and (iii)
he does it to organise his world in a meaningful way" (Rizzuto, 1979, p.
132).

Then they say

The representations which the child constructs enable him to
perceive sensations arising from various sources, to organise and
structure them in a meaningful way., We know that perception is an
active process, by means of which the ego transforms raw sensory
data into meaningful percepts. From this is follows that the child
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creates, within its perceptual or representational world, images of
his internal as well as his external environment. (1979, p. 132)
In an article written in 1970, by Beres and Joseph, entitled The
Concept of Mental Representation in Psychoanalysis, the authors point
out the failure of many writers to consider the unconscious components
of representations.

To take account of both the conscious and

unconscious elements, Beres and Joseph propose a working definition of
the representation as "a postulated, unconscious psychic organization
capable of evocation in consciousness as a symbol, image, fantasy,
thought or actions" (quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 71).

Rizzuto is

critical of the attempt by these authors to differentiate representation
from memory, when they point out that perceptual experience is changed
by the human capacity to transform the perception of a stimulus into a
more complex mental representation.
true.

In itself, such an observation is

But, says Rizzuto, all that amounts to saying is that animal and

human memory are different.

The latter never deals with facts as facts,

but with the meaning of facts, and when it does so, it "transforms a
memory into a memory with intrapsychic and interpersonal meaning that is
a representation" (p. 71).
We might summarize Rizzuto as saying that object representations
are the actual perceptual memories, of the original interpersonal
experience, at whatever level of cognitive development they occurred.
But, as yet, we have made no reference to the ways in which the
defensive and adaptive distortions of that perception, which were
historically needed at the time the memory was registered, or which are
active dynamic factors in the present.

Rizzuto quotes Jacobsqn on this

(from Tbe Self and the Object World, 1964, p. 21):
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The cutting out of a considerable sector of unpleasurable memories
by infantile repression eliminates a large amount of unacceptable
aspects of both the self and the outside world. The defects caused
by the work of repression, may be filled in by screen elements, by
distortions and embellishments, produced by elaborate maneuvers of
the ego's defence system. (Quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 69)
All defensive maneuvers prevent the maturation of self-awareness and an
awareness of the historical process through which we have come.

Where

there is massive repression of objects and their corresponding selfrepresentations, then, says Rizzuto "the individual may experience
loneliness, emptiness, a fear of losing oneself, a feeling of being
abandoned, or when it is expressed in bodily metaphors, of having a hole
where objects supposedly belong" (p. 81).
I appreciate McDargh's concrete illustration of how an
individual's object representations of his parents might have been
formed under the influence of the defensive need to idealize one and
devalue the second.

In the historical present, as long as the need for

the idealization and devaluation continues, such an object
representation would persist.

But supposing, says McDargh, that such a

defensive need diminished with time, either because the person's
relationship to the parents has improved, or because of maturational
factors, where the sense of self does not depend on such distortions-what then?

There may be a reconstruction of the representation of the

parents, which may well resemble their actual characters, in a more
realistic fashion.
This transformation of object representations is another factor
to which Rizzuto calls attention.

She refers to an article by

Kestenberg--which is marked, in its vocabulary, by the psychobiological
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strain in the Freudian heritage--From Or&an-Object Ima&ery to Self and
Qbject Representation (1971, pp. 76-77):
Each developmental phase is distinguished by a heightened cathexis
of a dominant organ by a zone specific pleasure and a phase specific
contact with the drive object from which a united organ-image
emerges. At the end of each phase, new shapes of self and object
representation differentiate from the global imagery of a united
organ-object.
. Through successive phases of separationindividuation the child forms self and object representations from
the images of his own and his mother's satisfying bodies.
Kestenberg's reference, not only to object representation, but
to self-representation affords the opportunity to turn specifically to
the relationship between these two inseparable aspects of
representational activity.

The formation of self-representations is

always concurrent with the formation of an object relationship.

In

other words, we form memories, not only of significant others in our
life, but also of how we felt, sense ourselves to be, as we engaged
another person in a relationship.

At this point, Rizzuto turns to the

work of Kernberg; for whom the prototypic internalized object relation
is that with the mother.

This internalized relation is unit with three

parts (1) an image of the object in the environment, (2) an image of the
self in interaction with the object and (3) a feeling that colors the
object image, under the influence of whatever drive was present at the
time of the interaction (St. Clair, 1986, p. 127).

Without getting into

an expose of Kernberg's theory, I just remark that the process of the
formation of self and object representations takes place in the service
of the child beginning to make the discrimination between self and
other.

Throughout the life cycle, self and object relations are in

continual dynamic interaction.

Growth experiences, which result in

changes in the one, will introduce a sense of incongruence and conflict
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that induces the modification or reelaboration of the other.

The

pattern of change-conflict-change lies at the heart of the process of
the maintenance of the self.

As Rizzuto expresses this insight,

The richness, the complexity, the dialectical connection which
object representations have with our self-representations, is what
gives the constantly reworked memories their paramount importance in
mental life (1979, p. 78)
The Practicing Subphase
Mahler defines this period as the time when toddlers invest much
of their libido in their own autonomous functions, and in expanding
reality testing.

Three developmental events occur which contribute to

the child's awareness of being separate.

There is (1) rapid body

differentiation from the mother; (2) the establishment of the specific
affectional bond; (3) and the rapid development of the autonomous ego
functions while in proximity to mother (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 65).
It is these developments which pave the way for the interest in
reality, personified in the mother, to spill over into interest in a
still wider world.
subphase:

Mahler distinguishes two distinct periods in this

early and late practicing.

hatching phase.

The early period overlaps the

Practicing, the child's ability to move physically away

from mother, is exemplified, in the early period, by crawling and
standing up, but while holding on.

As the child wanders from mother,

Mahler notices how absorbed she seemed, how oblivious of the mother's
presence.

But accompanying this movement away from the mother, the

observers also noticed how the child would return periodically to
reestablish contact with the parent.

Mahler reports Furer as calling

this "emotional refueling" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 69).

In
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reestablishing contact, Mahler notes how the wilting infant "perks up"
and immediately afterwards sallies forth, once more, to explore.

Some

mothers and their children, who value independent functioning, like to
refuel at a distance.

Such children are reassured if they can just look

and see the mother or hear her voice (p. 67).
The condition necessary for the successful emergence of the
early practicing period seems to be the acquisition of the "confident
expectation," during the symbiotic stage, that mothers will be available
to relieve distress and emotional closeness--when the child needs it,
and not merely when mother is ready to be available or because such
availability answers her needs.

When mother is available in an optimal

way, the condition is present wherein the child can "separate out and
differentiate the self-representation from the previously fused
selfobject representation: (St. Clair, 1986, p. 111).

Selfobject is

Kohut's term for the object representation formed during the symbiotic,
"dual unity," phase.

During the practicing phase the child's self-

representation is not yet firmly established and integrated as a whole
representation.

The ability to crawl, and then the facility for upright

locomotion, play a crucial role in the development of a clear psychic
representation of the self.
Once he can walk upright (a stable capacity at eighteen months),
a point which marks the beginning of the later period of the practicing
phase, the child begins "his love affair with the world," and takes his
greatest step in human individuation.

From his new bipedal position, he

has a new vantage point on the world, which brings unspeakable pleasures
--and equally as powerful frustrations (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 71).
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Characteristic of children during this period is the narcissistic
investment in their own functioning, in exploring the world and their
obliviousness to danger and falling.
fusion and engulfment with mother.

They delight in escaping from
Running away, but then to be swooped

up, seems to be the toddler's way of working out autonomy and a way to
get reassurance that the mother is still available (p. 71).

Toddlers at

this period are at the peak of their belief in their own omnipotence,
which is derived from their sense of sharing in the mother's magical
powers (St. Clair, 1986, p. 112).
idealized, sense of self.

The child lives out of grandiose,

Still possessed of a maternal selfobject, the

child is exhilarated by her developing autonomous functions, which
permit her to believe in the magic of her own powers.
"No" is a word readily on the lips of the toddler.

This is the

behavioral accompaniment to the process of distancing from the childmother symbiosis.

The child seems to fear reengulfment, just when the

process of differentiation has begun.
seems in order.

A special word about mothers

Late in their study Mahler and associates noticed that

it is the rule rather than the exception that the child's first, unaided
steps are in a direction away from the mother, rather .than toward her,
or she takes them while the mother is absent.

This only underlines the

crucial role of the mother in helping the normal child to feel
encouraged and to gradually relinquish symbiotic omnipotertce and to
delight in a more interpersonal form of functioning.

This period is

especially significant for those who have had an intense form of
symbiosis.

There are classic traps in which mothers may fall.

Some get

nostalgic for the symbiotic days, and become intrusive in the child's
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life.

Others are relieved that the child can function on his own, and

behave towards him, as if he were already grown up.

This makes it

difficult for the child to grow apart and, not surprisingly, he will
often demand closeness.

Other mothers fail their "fledgling" because

they find it difficult to balance being supportive and merely watching
from a distance.
Transitional Objects
Some of D. W. Winnicott's contributions have already helped us
in trying to understand how to conceptualize the structuring of
experience, in an object relations mode.

There is a further aspect of

his work that deserves our appreciation--his understanding of the nature
and role of transitional objects.
The classic exposition of Winnicott's thoughts on this matter,
is found in his article Transitional Objects and Traditional Phenoma. a
Study of the First Not-Me Possession.

In this article, Winnicott is

concerned to draw attention to what he calls a "third part of the life
of a human being," an intermediate area of experiencing, to which both
inner reality and outer life both contribute" (1951, p. 4).

The

transition from the hallucinatory omnipotence of the child's fantasy
life, to the recognition and acceptance of objective reality--a
transition for which good enough mothering is a sine gua non--is eased
by the transitional object, the child's first "not-me possession."
Whether it is the soft and shapeless blanket that is cathechted around
six months or the stuffed cuddly animal adopted during the second year
of life, the transitional object occupies "the intermediate area between
the subjective and that which is objectively perceived" (p. 4).
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The transitional object and the transitional phenomena start each
human being off with what will always be important for them, i.e., a
neutral area of experience which will not be challenged. Of the
transitional object it can be said that it is a matter of a~reement
between us and the baby that we will never ask the question "Did you
conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?" The
important point is that on this point no decision is expected. (p.
12)
Thus the child is accorded certain rights over the self-chosen object,
and no one shall raise questions about its source or nature.

In this

way, the transitional object is preserved relatively free of
disillusionment, and it affords relief from the strain of bringing
together the inner and outer worlds.

In this capacity, Winnicott

affirms "The transitional object stands for the breast, or the object of
the first relationship" (p. 11).

Evidence for this interpretation says

Wulff, is found in the blanket's being typically brought to the mouth at
bedtime, or in moments of crisis (1991, p. 338).

Although widely

assumed to be symbolic of the mother and her nurturing, the transitional
object gains an autonomy of its own.

Should it be mislaid, even the

mother may be unable to console her offspring.
Winnicott assures us that no one completes once and for all the
difficult transition from "primary creativity" or hallucinatory
omnipotence, to full reality acceptance.

Hence every person stands in

need of an intermediate area of experience, of illusion and transitional
phenomena, which are present in the whole of human culture, but which
are particularly prevalent in art and religion.

As long as we are not

over insistent that others accept our "illusory experience," as being
objectively real, we are free to enjoy it, and even gather with others
to share and deepen such experiences.

However if an adult "make(s)

claims on us for our acceptance of the objectivity of his subjective
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phenomena, we discern or diagnose madness" (1951, p. 13).
Mahler has occasion to make use of the concept of transitional
objects in her description of her third subphase, the consideration of
which, we now turn.
The Rapprochement Phase
Mahler calls the ability for upright, free locomotion, and the
attainment of the beginnings of representational intelligence the
midwives of the child's psychological birth.

By the middle of the

second half of the second year these are in place.

The maturity they

bring enables the child to recognize both her separateness from the
mother, as well as her inability to function without her.

Because the

infant no longer feels omnipotent, but on the contrary dependent, she
turns back to the mother.

Mahler and her associates witnessed an

increased level of separation anxiety, which they interpreted as fear of
object loss, and which was manifested in many types of behavior, but
especially in restlessness and hyperactivity--a defensive activity to
ward off the painful effects of sadness that separation entails.

They

showed a concern with the mother's whereabouts and active-approach
behavior toward her.

Children at this stage constantly "shadowed" the

mother--incessantly watched her and followed her, and also "darted" from
her, with the expectation of being chased and swept into her arms-symptoms, says Mahler, of the child's wish for reunion with the mother,
but also of a fear of reengulfment.

On the one hand the toddler is

sensitive to disapproval of the mother, but on the other hand, shows
increased aggression, by her incessant "No."

By fifteen months, the

toddler has discovered that the world is not his "oyster," that he is
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relatively helpless and unable to command assistance, just by feeling
the need for it.

Thus he has an increased need to seek the closeness

with his mother, which, during the practicing subphase, he held in
abeyance.
From their intense observational study of nine toddlers, Mahler
and her associates found that the rapprochement subphase could be
divided into three periods:

(1) the beginning rapprochement period; (2)

the rapprochement crisis; and (3) the individual solutions of this
crisis (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 89).
Beginning Rapprochement
Up to about fifteen months, the child returns to mother for
refueling, but does not seem to recognize her as a separate person.
it is different.

Now

The toddler seems to want to share everything with

her.

She continually brings things to the mother, and puts them on her

lap.

The emotionally important issue seems to be the child's need to

share with the mother, she wants the mother to enjoy her discoveries
with her.

Along with the dawning awareness of separateness, comes the

realization that mother's wishes are not always identical with her own.
This is a major blow to the child's sense of grandeur and omnipotence-gone is the symbiotic sense of unity.

The shock of this dampens the

child's preoccupation with locomotion, and her greatest source of
pleasure now becomes social interaction, especially with other children,
but with adults who may enter her world.

This is the time too, when the

child's desire for extended autonomy finds expression in a reaching out
to include father.

He is a figure who has not been quite

ou~side

the
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symbiotic dual unity, but never fully a part of it either (Mahler et
al., 1975, p. 91).
Early rapprochement culminates at around seventeen to eighteen
months, with what Mahler calls "a temporary consolidation and acceptance
of separateness" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 93).

This goes along with

great pleasure in sharing possessions and activities, not only with
mother but with father, other adults and younger or older children.
However, the increasing frequency of temper tantrums, signs of
helplessness, of impotent rage, greater vulnerability, and bouts of
stranger "shyness," are all harbingers of difficulties yet to come in
the individuation process.
Tbe Rapprochement Crisis
At around eighteen months, there is the onset of the
rapprochement crisis, a phrase Mahler uses to describe the conflicts the
child experiences in trying to work out her increased need for mother,
at the same time as she asserts her autonomy, by refusing to acknowledge
the need for external help.

This may last until the child's second

birthday.
In more cases than not, the prevalent mood changed to that of
dissatisfaction, insatiability, a proneness to rapid swings of mood,
and to temper tantrums. The period was thus characterized by the
rapidly alternating desire to push mother away and to cling to her-a behavior sequence described most accurately by the word
"ambitendency." (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 95)
The observers noted how at this stage the child uses the mother
as an extension of self--a process which diminished the pain of
separation.

The child uses, for example, the mother's hand as a tool

for picking up an object.

A strange phenomenon also appeared:

the
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child's anxiety that the mother had left, when she was all the time
sitting in her chair--a precursor, Mahler says, to projection of
negative feelings, and an indication of the stress of having to function
separately.
The range of affect experienced by the toddler seems to widen.
The variety of the children's behavior, during observation, suggests the
presence of sadness, anger, disappointment with mother, and frustration
at one's helplessness.

Children in this period were noticed, for the

first time, fighting their tears, and suppressing the need to cry.
Children develop an early form of the capacity to identify with others
and to empathize with them.
Teddy . . . could not bear to see another child cry. This seemed to
stimulate his aggressive defensiveness; unprovoked he would attack
other children. His undeniable awareness of separateness . . .
seemed to have given rise to a capacity for empathy which was
expressed in positive ways . . . . For example he would bring his
bottle to Mark, when Mark was crying. We saw, at this stage many
signs of identification with the attitudes of others, especially
those of mother and father. (Mahler et al., 1975, pp. 97-98)
The great danger for children at this period, who have a
disturbed relationship with mother, is that of "splitting."

Mahler

illustrates what she means by citing at length (1975, pp. 82-84) the
case of one of their subjects, a verbally precocious little girl.

When

left with one of the observers in her mother's absence, the observer
became "the bad mother."

She could do nothing right.

crankiness descended upon her.
seemed to exist only in fantasy.

A mood of

She craved for the "good mother" who
On the mother's return there was no

greeting, no delight in seeing her, just a grumpy "what did you bring
me?" followed by a series of angry, disappointed, and negative.
reactions.

Sometimes, the observer was treated as the "good symbiotic
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mother" and the toddler would sit on her lap and eat cookies, like an
infant.

On the mother's return there might be an impulse to run to her

and at the same time, another to withdraw, rejecting the mother's
overtures, as if to spare herself further disappointments.

In the

latter instances, it would seem that the absent mother had become the
"bad" mother, and thus was avoided.
Another mechanism observed for dealing with separation was that
of the use of transitional objects.

One little girl for instance,

transferred the demand for exclusive possession of mother to mother's
chair (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 100).

The repertoire of coping

mechanisms also included symbolic play, through which they betrayed
their identification with mother or father, in the way they held on to
the teddy or the doll; and internalization of the object representation
(p. 92).

Tbe Individual Patternin& of Rapprochement
By twenty-one months the toddler is able to find an optimal
distance from mother, which enables her to function at her best.
factors make growing individuation possible:

Three

(1) the development of

language; (2) the internalization process, inferred from acts of
identification with the "good" father and mother and from the
internalization of rules and demands (the beginning superego); and (3)
progress in the ability to express wishes and fantasies through symbolic
play.

Mahler's observation of the children at this period led her to

believe that it is very difficult to group toddlers in accordance with
the kind of general criteria they had been using up till now. - Each
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child's progress was very distinct, "different from one child to the
next: (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 102)
By the children's twenty-third month, it seemed that the ability to
cope with separateness, as well as physical separation, was
dependent in each case, on the history of the mother-child
relationship, as well as on its present state . . . . We found it
hard to pinpoint just what it was in the individual cases that
produced more anxiety in some and an ability to cope in others.
Each child, had by this time, developed his own characteristic way
of coping. (Mahler, p. 103)
She also reports that boys seem to develop with less difficulty than
girls, the crucial factor being the realization of sex differences (pp.
102-3).
A key factor in the child's development at this subphase is the
attitude of the mother toward the toddler (cf. St. Clair, 1986, p. 115
for the following).
demandingness.

Some mothers are unable to accept the child's

On the other hand, others are unable to face the child's

gradual separateness.

Anxious because of their own symbiotic and

parasitic needs, a third group hover over, and shadow the child.

In

response to this, the toddler is likely to become more determined in his
drive toward separateness.
Maternal unavailability can make practicing and exploratory
activities brief and subdued.

A child who is concerned with mother's

availability, is unable to invest energy in his or her environment, in
the development of other important skills, and often returns to her in
an effort to engage her.

The child may even become insistent and

desperate in attempts to woo her.

This depletes energy from the ego,

and the child may revert to earlier splitting mechanisms.
serious pathology have their roots in the developmental
period (cf. Garanzani, 1988, pp. 86-87).

Two forms of

arres~s

of this

In narcissistic disorders,
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while separation and a sense of a cohesive self have been attained,
autonomy has not.

Thus, others are needed to shore up self-esteem, due

to a growing, and all pervasive, fear of an ability to survive outside
of the symbiotic pattern.

Making demands, and refusing to accept

limits, become part of the relational style of such persons, especially
when it comes to important caretakers.

Borderline disorders are typical

of those who have not been able to rely on transitional objects as aids
for separating from, or internalizing the mother.

Such persons have not

achieved a cohesive self, and so are unable to differentiate a self from
important others.

In the case of borderline parents, they find it

almost impossible to differentiate themselves from their children.

The

loss of the object results in a dangerous threat to the regulation of
self-esteem, and threatens the very organization of the personality.
Both borderline and narcissistically wounded people try to
assert control over their milieu (especially over people) in order to
maintain a vulnerable self-esteem.

When these people have a family of

their own, the children are pawns of parental psychopathology.

One

therapist, S. Slipp, quoted by Garanzani says
Lacking internal tension-relieving mechanisms for sustaining
narcissistic equilibrium in their psychic structures, they remain
excessively sensitive to environmental self-objects to relieve
tension and modulate self-esteem. (1988, p. 86)
Success or failure then, in negotiating separation from the
mother at this subphase has a crucial impact on the success or failure
of later attachments and separations, because it determines the relative
ease of difficulty in handling anxiety in relationships.
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Emotional Object Constancy and Individuality
This fourth subphase of the separation-individuation period,
occupies mainly the third year of life, without a distinct ending point.
There are two main tasks which have to be accomplished in this phase:
(1) the attainment of some degree of object constancy and (2) the
consolidation of individuality.
We have already discussed the achievement of object constancy at
length.

Mahler sees object constancy as quite a late achievement--

"according to our conceptualization it does not seem to occur before the
third year" (Mahler et al., 1975, p. 110).

'We have seen how, once

object constancy has been achieved, a child is able to function
separately, despite moderate degrees of tension and longing.

Mahler

sees the conditions necessary for object constancy are many.

She

includes object permanence, in the Piagetian sense, as a necessary but
not sufficient, prerequisite for object constancy.

Chief among the

other conditions is the unification of the "good" and "bad" part object
representations into one whole representation.

"This fosters the fusion

of the aggressive drives and tempers the hatred for the object when
aggression is intense" (p. 110).
with Mahler:

As we saw with Anna Freud, so also

in the state of object constancy, the love object will not

be rejected or exchanged for another, even if it proves to be
unsatisfactory; even with frustration, the object is still sought after,
and not rejected or hated as unsatisfactory just because it is absent.
The second task of this fourth subphase is the consolidation of
individuality.

The unfolding of such complex cognitive functions such

as verbal communications, fantasy and reality testing, witness to the
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child's self-identity formation.

An important part of the process of

working towards her own individuality consists in the struggle with
aggression.

In those situations where the selfobject of the symbiotic

phase was experienced as "good," but where the caregiver was experienced
as unpredictable or intrusive, then there is a strong possibility that
the object becomes "bad."

The effort to "eject" this bad object focuses

aggression, and there is a strong inclination to confuse the selfobject
with the bad introject.

Aggression may become so powerful that it

sweeps away the "good" object and with it the good self-representation.
The signs of this are intense temper tantrums, and efforts to force
caregivers to function as auxiliary egos.
We have almost reached the term of this effort to understand,
using the conceptualizations of Object Relations Theory, how human
experience is structured.

In order to·highlight the most important

aspects of the terrain we have crossed, I suggest that we try to work
out a tentative definition of The Self.
Object Relations and the Quest for Meanin&
At the conclusion of this chapter, we are in a position to
answer the questions with which we started.

The heart of the

contribution that Object Relations Theorist make to our understanding of
the psychological basis for meaning, lies in the Freudian insight that
the nature and quality of the human child's relation to people . .
have been laid down in the first six years of life . . . . All
[one's] later choices of friendship and love follow upon the basis
of the memory traces left behind by these first prototypes . . . the
imagos--no longer remembered. (Freud, 1914, p. 243)
Winnicott, Mahler and the rest, have tried to clarify for us,. the ways
in which human experience is structured, and thus made meaningful, by
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talking about the representations of self and others, that each person
forms.

Mahler's developmental paradigm might be likened to a light-

source which allows us to see the details of the various representations
in the succeeding phases of their evolution, or, if the representations
are already formed, to understand the vicissitudes of the process that
has led up to their present shape.

Let us try to draw together some of

the insights this chapter has generated about the human quest for
meaning and the ways in which that quest is either thwarted or
satisfied.
Meaning is a description of a quality that attaches itself to
the experience of the person whose process of separation-individuation
has reached a healthy term.
healthy self.

Such a person has attained an integrated or

To the degree that one's self is healthy, to that degree,

one experiences meaningfulness.

The following paragraphs try to lay

bare the nucleus of the process through which the "self" passes as it
evolves towards integration, and hence towards meaning.
The Healthy Self
The variety of good and bad selfobjects, experienced throughout
the duration of the autistic, symbiotic and separation-individuation
processes established and develops an inner organization of wholeness,
cohesion, continuity, goals and values.
self (cf. Garanzani, 1988, pp. 100-3).

This inner organization is the
When we talk of the development

of the self, the suggestion is not that it is set over and against
others, rather the self is envisioned as being in relation to others.
In terms of Object Relations Theory, the more mature a relati?nship is,
the more it involves two differentiated selves, and the less it is
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characterized by "primary identification," that is the internalized
other.

The uniqueness of this relatedness is such that it is its own

reality, an independent entity.
The 'Wounded Self
If a relationship is characterized by a symbiotic-like
intensity, then there is really a failure to differentiate between the
self and the object; it is a failure in separation-individuation.

When,

and to the extent that such a state persists, there is a driven quality
to the relationship.

In the language of Melanie Klein, such a

relationship is typical of the "schizoid position"--a state of affairs
where a person is actually withdrawn from object-relations.

Garanzani

says that this belongs to a pre-moral stage of self-development and
psychic life.

The second Kleinian position, the depressive, is one

where a person has overcome the difficulties of the schizoid position,
and is able to enter more fully into whole-object relations, only to be
exposed to guilt and depression over the discovery that he can hurt
those whom he has become capable of loving.

In Garanzani's words again,

"the depressive problem exists on the level of psychic life and belongs
to the pathological moral level" (Garanzini, 1988, p. 101).

All this is

a way of illustrating how the self may be poorly evolved, even ill.
There is a degree to which each person has within the self a "split,"
due to the failure of "good-enough" parenting or less than adequate
biological endowment or the combination of both.
person experiences meaninglessness.

To this degree, the

This "wound" within can only be

healed through adequate relating to another or to others.

Pathology,

and especially severe pathology, represents the extreme wound to the
self.

This happens when the caregivers, given to the child, or
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individual, are not up to the task of helping to heal the wounded self,
due perhaps to their own inadequate and fragile selves.

There can be no

doubt about the primacy that Object Relations Theorists accord to
relating in the struggle to create a meaningful world.
In the next chapter, still using the key concept of
"representation," and by suggesting a process of transformation which it
undergoes, we will see how Object Relations Theorists offer an
explanation of the psychological resources for a living relationship
with Mystery, or with God, if one prefers that language.

CHAPTER III
FAITH RESOURCES IN A PSYCHOLOGICAL KEY
Lessons from Freud
We turn our attention now to the task of trying to understand
the psychological resources that a person employs in his or her
breakthrough to Mystery, as these resources can be understood in the
context of Object Relations Theory.

We are following a tradition

established in Freud's own writings, when we turn to the ways in which
God is represented in the human psyche, and from our understanding of
this process. to discern the function of the God-human relationship
within the psychological economy.

For Freud, gods and demons "are the

creations of the human mind" (1913) and are based on "revivals and
restorations of the young child's ideas" of his father and mother (1910,
p. 123).

Ana-Marie Rizzuto concludes "What Freud calls 'revivals and

restorations of the young child's ideas of them' is what psychoanalytic
theory would later call object relations" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 15).
Freud was bitterly anti-religion, especially of the Roman
Catholic nineteenth-century Viennese variety, but he did not reserve his
contempt for Catholicism only.
spared either.

His own tradition of Judaism was not

It might seem strange then, to attempt to bring

psychoanalysis into a conversation of the sort that interests us here.
However, as other have said before, the outcome of applying
151
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psychoanalytic theory to religious phenomena is dependent above all on
the interpreter's fundamental attitude toward religion (Wulff, 1991, p.
271).

If one is a Freud, then one will conclude that religious

experience, ritual, and ideas, are simply the product of human needs and
desires.

But if instead, one perceives a larger reality behind the

panoply of religious phenomena, then psychoanalysis may be used as a
means to comprehend the extraordinary responses to the transcendent,
whether positive or negative.

It can become a factor in the

purification of religious faith.
Freud set out to examine religion in the context of his general
theory (Wulff, 1991, chap. 6).

His presupposition was that "religion is

nothing but psychology projected into the external world" (Freud, 1901,
pp. 258-59) and on the basis of this assumption declared his ability to
explain the myths of paradise, the Fall, of God, and of good and evil.
In his study of Leonardo da Vinci (1910), he was able to demonstrate his
theory.

Leonardo, an illegitimate child, lived for the first few years

of his life, without a father figure in his home.

In later life he

found himself exceptionally free of the fetters of authority, including
those of religion, and was exposed to several charges of apostasy.
Leonardo illustrates the fundamental claim of Freud's psychology, namely
that religiousness in all its manifestations is ultimately rooted in the
Oedipus complex.
A personal God, is psychologically, nothing other than an exalted
father . . . . The almighty and just God, and kindly Nature, appear
to us as grand sublimations of father and mother . . . . Biologically
speaking, religiousness is to be traced to the small human child's
long-drawn-out helplessness and need of help; and when at a later
date he perceives how truly forlorn and weak he is when confronted
with the great forces of life, he feels his condition as he did in
childhood, and attempts to deny his own despondency by a regressive
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revival of the forces which protected his childhood.
p. 123)

(Freud, 1910,

A person's longing for father, Freud said, which is the ground of all
religion, inevitably reverberates with echoes of the Oedipus complex,
including the affects of fear and guilt.

Obedient submission to the

all-powerful father of childhood, introjected as the ego-ideal and
projected as God, restores the long lost relationship, although it may
well continue to be tinged with ambivalence.
Although many of Freud's patients brought problems tinged with
religious dimensions, to his consulting room, it was the cultural
process of religion's origin and function in the human race that was of
major concern to him.
Reli~ious

In 1907, he published Obsessive Actions and

Practices, and pointed out the parallel between neurotic

ceremonials and religious ritual.

In both cases scrupulous attention is

given to every detail; they are executed in isolation from every other
action and no interruption of them is tolerated; if they are neglected,
the individual is torn by guilt feelings.
course:

There are differences of

ritual occurs in a community setting, in contrast to the

solitariness of neurotic ceremonies; religious practices are meaningful
in each detail--but, says Freud, most devotees are completely
unconscious of these meanings, not unlike the neurotic, who is unaware
of the meaning of his rituals.

From his clinical work, Freud had

developed an understanding of the compulsive rituals of neurotics.
These were performed as a defense against the temptation to commit a
forbidden act and also as a protection against some unknown punishment
which the neurotic fears.

Obsessive actions also involve a compromise:

they afford, to some degree, the pleasure they are designed to
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forestall.

"The formation of a religion too, seems to be based on the

suppression, the renunciation, of certain instinctual impulses" (1907,
p. 125, quoted by Wulff, 1991, p. 273).
As in the case of neurotic suppression, so in the case of
religion, suppression is always unsuccessful.
required.

Periodic penance is

Freud drew the momentous conclusion:

religion is a Universal

Obsessional Neurosis.
Freud's interest in religion found further expression in his
1913 publication, Totem and Taboo.

Freud set to examining two practices

that he thought exceptional among "primitive" peoples.

In the first

place, the tribe and its members came to be symbolized by means of some
object, frequently an animal.

This animal, called a totem, is regarded

as sacred and may not be killed.

Second, these people establish a

number of taboos, significant among these being the prohibition against
intermarriage between group members.

Freud found traces of obsessional

neurosis here too, especially in submission to inexplicable
prohibitions, accompanied by an unshakable conviction that violation of
them would bring the direst of consequences.

The chief prohibition of

both obsessional neurosis and taboo, is against touching, either
literally, or in the form of any contact whatsoever.

Displacement

operates in both cases:

the prohibition extends from one object to the

next, like a contagion.

Following on both, comes a set of rituals

designed to expiate, purify or to achieve reconciliation.
The parallels between neuroses and religion prompted Freud to
look deeper for connections between the two.

He was struck by the

correspondence between the basic prohibitions of totemism--against
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killing the animal and the taboo against incest--and two dominant
aspects of the Oedipus complex--the desire to kill the father and the
wish to possess the mother.
Freud next launches into a brave explanation of the origins of
totemism.

Drawing on highly speculative scientific hypothesis of the

day, Freud proposed the following scenario.

The setting is a Darwinian

one, of the primitive "horde" in which early humans were supposed to
have lived.

The horde was under the control of one dominant and jealous

male, who had total control of the harem, having driven off his sons as
they challenged him and killed off all other rivals.
One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed
and devoured their father and so made an end of the patriarchal
horde. United, they had the courage to do, and succeeded in doing,
what had been impossible for them individually . . . . Cannibal
savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured
their victim as well as killing him. The primal violent father had
doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the
company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they
accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them
acquired a portion of his strength. (Freud, 1913, pp. 141-42)
Having slain their father, the brothers were gripped by remorse and
guilt, for they had loved their father as well as hated him.

Besides,

once their father was dead, there was violent competition among
themselves for the harem.

Prey to guilt, and amid social anarchy, "they

revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the
substitute for their father; and they renounced its fruits by resigning
their claim to the women who had now been set free" (p. 143).
born the basic taboos of totemism.

Thus were

Contemporaneous with these events,

Freud postulates that a gynecocracy emerged along with the
acknowledgments of mother deities (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 17).
The sons did not forget their terrible deed, rather they
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remembered it and commemorated, symbolically, in the yearly totem feast.
In Freud's view, the totem feast represents a temporary suspension of
guilty obedience to the father, and a renewed effort to appropriate his
power.

Freud further opines that each succeeding generation, down to

our own day, has inherited the sense of guilt resulting from having
killed, and eaten, the primal father.

While he admits that his evidence

for this claim is rather sparse, he says that such a theory is necessary
to account for the survival of religious practice through the centuries.
In 1939, Freud eventually published Moses and Monotheism.
themes are continuous with those of the 1913, Totem and Taboo.

Its

Freud,

in this book, asserts once again his view that totemism, the earliest
form of religious tradition, gradually ceded place, to other forms, as
"the return of the repressed" made its influence felt, until eventually
the totem animal was replaced by a single anthropomorphic deity.

"Thus

while the totem may be the first form of father surrogate, the god will
be a later one, in which the father has regained his human shape" (1913,
p. 148).

Men, on initially recovering the primal father, were

rapturously devoted and filled with awe and thankfulness.

Before long

however, the flames of old feelings of hostility were fanned.

Freud

drew the consequences of this process for Judaism, in particular, and to
a lesser degree for Christianity.
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud sets out to explain how the Jews
have a single non-representable God.
Moses.

He speculates about the origins of

He claims the biblical account of Moses' rescue from the reeds

is an effort to cover up his real identity.

In reality Moses was an

aristocratic Egyptian, perhaps even a priest from the followers of
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Ikhnaton, the Pharaoh who had promulgated a religious monotheism,
focused on the sun god Aten.

When the Pharaoh died, the people returned

to their traditional religion, and Moses, in disgust turned to the
Hebrews, and adopted them as his proteges.

He instructed them in the

ways of his faith, introduced them to the custom of circumcision, and
successfully led them out of Egypt.

Freud is clear, at least in his own

mind, that the God whom Moses presented to the people coincided with the
representation of the father of the primal horde, and its concomitant
feelings (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 20).

Moses' tyrannical rule over the

Hebrews was deeply resented and eventually they rebelled against him and
killed him.

Many generations later, during which time the Levites

maintained the memory of Moses and his teaching, the Hebrews came under
the influence of another religion, whose focus was Yahweh, a
bloodthirsty and demonic volcano god.

The mediator in this religion was

the son-in-law of Jethro, a Midianite priest, whose name was also Moses.
The outcome was a compromise.
retained.

The practice of circumcision was

Yahweh was credited with the liberation from Egypt.

To make

it appear that Yahweh had been the god of the Hebrews, the legends of
Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were introduced.
Like repressed childhood traumas, the disavowed facts and ideas
that did not fit into the new ideology lived on in the descendants of
those who had followed Moses out of Egypt.

Like repressed events, the

religion of the Egyptian Moses gradually crept back, until it dominated
once more.

The Jews owe to this religion their conception of a single,

Almighty God; their sense of being a chosen people; and their great
intellectual advances and instinctual renouncement, which are the result
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of the taboo against images.

Yet they are burdened with the guilt of

patricide, which itself harks back to a far earlier one, in the totemic
past.

Remorse for having killed Moses, stimulates the wish for the

return of the Messiah, the return of the murdered father.
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud also touches on the origin of the
Devil representation.

Mosaic religion was acquainted with only positive

affect toward the father-god.

But it was incapable of absorbing the

complexities of the representation of the primal father.

Hence there

was the need of a new character--the Devil--to account for the hate,
fear and envy, of the primeval brothers.
theme.
origin.

In 1923, he returned to the

He clearly states here, that God and the Devil have a common
However he had another explanation for the origins of the Devil

representation:

as far back as the 1890s he cited aspects of the self-

representation as the source of the devil representation.
Rizzuto then summarizes the review of the evidence and writes
From the point of view of mental representation, the psychic
mechanism involved in the formation of the Devil representation is,
in both cases, splitting, although in one case it is splitting of
the ambivalent father image and in the other of the good-bad selfrepresentation. (1979, p. 21)
Thus while the splitting of the primeval representation of the father
created the Devil representation, this is a process that repeats itself
in each individual.

If the God-representation is a reflection of the

benevolent aspects of a man's relationship to his father, then it is no
surprise that his Satanic representation reflects the hate, envy and
fear he feels toward him.
Rizzuto lauds Freud's achievement of being able to begin to
think of these issues in object-relational terms, rather than in the
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mechanistic terms of id-ego control apparatus, the predominant model for
Freud's thinking, as we saw.

She calls it

one of his major contributions to the understanding of man-particularly of man as an object-related being, of man's lifelong
use of early imagos and object representations, his dependence on
object relations and not least his religiosity as an object-related
activity. (1979, p. 28)
She summarizes the significant object-relational findings of Freud in
eleven propositions.

Primeval man was thought to be capable of:

1. having a fully developed and internalized representation of the
paternal image.
2. experiencing intense ambivalent feelings in relation to the
father and his representation.
3. acting out of his ambivalence and murdering the father
4. experiencing object guilt for killing the father
5. but in spite of this, splitting the wished for aspect (strength)
of the object representation from the rest of the paternal
representation.
6. identifying partially with the split off part of the
representation.
7. projecting that split off partial representation on to an animal
8. symbolic reactivation of the primary identification by means of
the ritualistic killing and eating of the totem animal
9. repressing the rest of the parental representation, which
remained latent until the arrival of monotheism.
10. transmitting the repressed representation of the primal father-and the corresponding guilt and longing--to every male child.
11. transmitting the split-off partial representation symbolically
reactivated in the totem sacrifice and meal. (p. 23)
Further elements of the object relational stand are found in Freud's
reflections on the superego which we dealt with earlier.

There, we saw

that the final imago to be internalized was that of God, which says
Rizzuto, may be understood, in part, in the way Freud suggested--as a
transformation of the paternal imago.

At the resolution of the Oedipus

Complex, for Freud, "the paternal representation--exalted, sublimated
and merged with the memory traces of the primeval father--becomes the
representation of God" (p. 30).
is more nuanced.

As we will see, Rizzuto's own position

Before we turn to her, let us ask another question:
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"What is the exalted father and the process of exaltation?"
two answers to that question.
quotation.

Freud gives

Answer one is already given in the last

The original imago of the father merges with the imago of

the primal father.

In other places Freud claims that the original

paternal imago undergoes important changes--either transfiguration or
sublimation--which means that the God image is different from that of
the original paternal one.

Rizzuto points out that both the ancestral

and the individual paternal imagos should be unconscious, because both
are linked to powerful emotions incompatible with the resolution of the
Oedipus complex.

In the effort to explain a conscious God, Freud

therefore has to resort to the twin ideas of exaltation of the paternal
imago and the sublimation of the child's libidinal attachment to it.
She quotes him:
transformation of object libido into narcissistic libido, which
thus takes place, implies an abandonment of sexual aims, a
desexualization--a kind of sublimation, therefore. (Freud, 1923b,
p. 30, quoted by Rizzuto, 1979, p. 32)
th~

Hence, at the term of the Oedipal crisis, the boy would identify with
his real father, repress the earlier paternal imago (which is tinged
with intense feelings) and then sublimate the libidinal attachments to
that representation, so that it becomes transformed into a nonsexual
image of God.

While forgetting about the hateful feelings a child may

have toward the father at the time of the crisis, Freud is satisfied
that he has explained that
it is the sublimated, aim-inhibited, parental imago that permits the
appearance of religiosity and pious devotion to God, which can now
be not only conscious, but even become a source of self-esteem, love
and feelings of security. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 32)
God representations are often unstable and subject to change.
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For our purposes it is sufficient to note how a person's dealings with
God may vary according as his relationship with his father in the flesh
changes.

Freud says himself that "young people lose their religious

beliefs as soon as their father's authority breaks down" (1910, p. 123).
Rizzuto culls these further thoughts on the matter from his writings:
(1) the appearance of a real fatherly object may change the relation to
God or make it vanish; (2) the coming of the father to his proper
proportion in the young person's life, makes him forget about his imago
sublimated into God; (3) the attachment to the father persists, and so
does the one to God, and when one diminishes, so does the other; (4) the
individual, for various reasons, drops his relation to God, but
preserves the representation unchanged.

Freud's own ideal, is of

course, that these God representations be left behind entirely--selfconfessed atheist that he claimed to be.

But he failed to give an

account of why, unlike theists, that he, and people like him, did not
have recourse to the "regressive revival" of God imagos when under
stress and faced with overwhelming impotence.
parental imagos are immortal.

Freud is quite clear that

The question remained unanswered:

"What

use of parental imagos does the unbeliever make, when the realities of
life replicate the emotional situation of childhood?"
Beyond Freud
Freud is basically correct when he traces the origin of the God
representation to early parental relations.
position.

Such is Ana-Marie Rizzuto's

Yet he underestimated the complex way in which the

representation is derived.

Her complaint centers on the fact, that he

neglected the role of the mother and forgot the contribution of
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siblings.

"My study, and present knowledge of the complexities of

object relations, make it impossible for me to accept that the paternal
imago is the only one used to form representations of God" (Rizzuto,
1979, p. 44).

She made a study of twenty Jews and Christians, who were

her patients, by means of questionnaires, interviews and drawings of
their families and God.

Her findings are reported in her 1979 study,

Ihe Birth of the Livin& God.

Although she grants the importance of the

Oedipal phase, she challenges Freud's exclusive focus on this crisis.
As for the developmental level from which the image originates,
persons whose oedipal conflicts are minimal but whose preoedipal
processes are prominent have as much an image of God as those who
have reached the oedipal crisis. I therefore conclude that
formation of the image of God does not depend on the oedipal
conflict. (p. 44)
Her main, and substantial disagreement with Freud lies deeper than this,
however.

It centers on his claim that the God image is nothing but the

father-image, exalted and cathected with desexualized and aim-inhibited
libido.

Such an explanation freezes the representation.

It is not the

type of energy that cathects the image that is significant, but rather
"the many complex sexual and nonsexual, as well as representational,
ideational components, present in the child which contribute to the
genuine creation of an imaginary being" (p. 46).

She reports that she

has found God images belonging to every stage of the developmental
itinerary.

The formation of a God image is an object related

representational process,
marked by the emotional configuration of the individual prevailing
at the moment he forms the representation--at any developmental
stage. The clinical cases show God belonging to each level of
development, from anal to oedipal" (p. 44).
What are the conditions that prepare the child to form a God
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representation?

By the age of three, Rizzuto suggests, a child is

deeply concerned with "animistic notions of causality" (p. 44).

She is

an implicit philosopher, possessed by an urge to know the why and
wherefore of everything, and inevitably the harried caregivers end up
telling the child that God stands behind everything as cause.

There is

a remarkable fit between this answer and the readiness of the child's
mind, who at precisely this stage, is in awe at the "superior beings,"
of great size and power whom she needs to look after her.

It seems true

to claim that the image of God "is developmentally necessary to ground
our earliest awareness of the existence of things" (Jones, 1991, p. 43).
In psychoanalytic terms, the child is dealing with the idealized
representations of his parents, to whom he attributes great
perfection and power. He is also struggling with his own grandiose
wishes for power of his own. (p. 44)
The child has before her the example of the parents who pay homage to
this great being they talk about and this impresses her immensely.

In

Rizzuto's own words:
The fact that the parents mention [God] frequently to the child,
send the child to Sunday School . . . and beyond that, worship such
a being themselves, produces a profound impression on the child, for
whom the parents are the biggest visible beings. All of these
factors contribut~ to the creation of a sense of God's reality which
inevitably becomes linked to the reality of the parents and their
personalities. (1979, p. 50)
She also describes the circumstances that will shape the nature of the
God-representation, its content, in other words.
The type of God each individual produces as a first representation
is the compounded image resulting from all these contributing
factors--the preoedipal psychic situation, the beginning stages of
the oedipal complex, the characteristics of the parents, the
predicament of the child with each of his parents and siblings, the
general intellectual and social background of the household. As
though all these antecedents were not complex enough, the·
circumstances·of the moment in which the question of God emerges may
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color the God representation with insubstantial coincidences that
become linked to it by primary processes. (p. 45).
A child does not, obviously, create his or her object
representation of God because of encounters with a perceptual object
with the concreteness of a parent or a sibling.

The representation of

God is produced later than the first representation of the caregiver(s),
but it can and does draw upon the resources of those parental imagos,
though not necessarily in the straightforward way that Freud suggested.
Rizzuto postulates that
constant dialectic processes between primary object representations
and the sense of self, bring the preoedipal child to form some
representation of a being "like" the parents (mother and father),
who is "above all" and bigger and mightier than anyone else. This
being becomes a living, invisible reality in the child's mind. (p.
50)

Furthermore, as we have seen in the last paragraph, the Godrepresentation is influenced by a multitude of cultural, social,
familial phenomena, and we might add from previous reflection on
representation-formation, by the deepest levels of biological
experiencing as well as the highest spiritual strivings.

The task of

integrating such a range of human experiencing, involves an
understanding of the nature of the human capacity to represent and
symbolize.

Rizzuto does not want to enter into a detailed discussion of

these capacities but does venture to say that
all representations originate in multiple sources of experience
(from proprioceptive to conceptual) and have potential for multiple
meanings. All representations can be used dynamically for selfintegration under the never-ceasing synthetic functions of the
psyche. The level of meaning as well as the shape and aspects of a
given representation depend on the intrapsychic context of the
synthetic moment when the representation is being used. From this
point of view, very early representational components (as, tactile or
sensory elements) may serve in the context of a much later and more
mature level of meaning (e.g., the subjective experience of a
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priest's consecrating hands) as a constant process of selfintegration in which all developmental moments may be present
simultaneously. (p. 182).
Hence, the God-representation is a new, original representation and is
possessed of potential to "soothe and comfort, provide courage and
inspiration--or terror or dread" away and beyond anything that the
actual parents could hope to engender (p. 46).

This contradicts Freud's

claim that the believing person is inescapably neurotic and immature.
Pointing out, that just as a mature relationship with parents is
possible, so may a relationship with God be also, does not exhaust the
significance of what Rizzuto is driving at.

She looks to the way in

which a person continually reworks and transforms his psychic balance at
each stage of the life cycle.
Those who are capable of mature religious belief renew their God
representation to make it compatible with their emotional, conscious
and unconscious situation, as well as with their cognitive and
object related development. (p. 46)
Reli~ion

as Illusion

Winnicott's reflections on the nature and function of
"transitional objects" offer critical help in mapping the creative
process through which the formation of the God representation occurs.
In the situation of "good enough mothering" where effective mirroring is
available to the child, a sense of basic trust is born, a "resting
place" is inaugurated, from which a creative reaching out to reality can
occur, while both mother and child enter the area of play and
transitional space.

When the God-representation is first formed, like

other transitional phenomena it enjoys an unchallenged status.

By that

is meant that it is regarded by the child, neither solely as a creation

166
of his or her fantasy, and hence under magical control, nor wholly
external to the self, like the caregiver.

Before I go on to say more

about the origin of the God representation as a transitional object let
us listen to Rizzuto, echoing Fraiberg, 1969, sing the praises of "the
fictive creations of our mind," which are as influential in our lives as
the flesh and blood people among whom we live.
We have forgotten the impressive power of muses, guardian angels,
heroes, Miss Liberty, Ears and Thanatos, devils, the Devil and God
Himself. Human life is impoverished when these immaterial
characters made out of innumerable experiences, vanish under the
repression of a psychic realism that does violence to the ceaseless
creativity of the human mind . . . . In this sense at least religion
is not an illusion. It is an integral part of being human, truly
human in our capacity to create nonvisible but meaningful realities
capable of containing our potential for imaginative expansion beyond
the boundaries of the senses. Without these fictive realities human
life becomes a dull animal existence. (p. 47)
Religion as an illusion!

Have we returned to Freud's negativism

and pejorative judgments on religion?

Nothing could be further from the

truth, and Paul Pruyser is someone who can tell us why this is not so.
In what follows, I am indebted to Wulff's presentation, of Pruyser's
position in Between Belief and Unbelief (Wulff, 1991, p. 338).
Illusion, Pruyser says, is etymologically derived from the latin word
ludere, to play.

So when we say that cultural phenomena, like religion

or art, are illusionistic, we are referring to their origin in the play
of the human imagination.

While Pruyser agrees with Freud that such

illusions are wish fulfilling, he insists that· they serve as ideals,
uncovering a person's shortcomings, but at the same time, affording
direction and impetus for the attainment of loftier goals.
Pruyser's illusionistic world is Winnicott's world of
transitional objects, a third world between the private inner world of
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autistic fantasy, and the public, outer world of realistic, senseperceived data.

In contrast to these two worlds the illusionistic world

is, in Pruyser's words,
the world of play, of creative imagination, in which feelings are
not antagonistic to thinking, in which skills and talents are used
to the utmost, and where pleasure is found without categorical
abrogation of the reality principle. (Quoted by Wulff, 1991, p. 399
from The Seamy Side of Current Reli~ious Beliefs, p. 334)
The distinctive character of this third world is clear in the following
diagram Wulff, 1991, p. 339).

Pruyser's Scheme of the Three Worlds
Autistic World
untutored fantasy
omnipotent thinking
utter whimsicality
free associations
ineffable images
hallucinatory events/
entities
private needs
symptoms
dreaming
sterility
internal object, imago

Realistic World

Illusionistic World
tutored fantasy
adventurous thinking
orderly imagination
inspired connections
verbalizable images
imaginative events/
entities
cultural needs
symbols
playing
creativeness
transcendent objects
prefigured by the
child's transitional
object

sense perception
reality testing
hard undeniable facts
logical connections
look-see-references
actual events/
entities
factual needs
signs, indices
working
resourcefulness
external object

Religious language is particularly apt to describe the contents
of the transitional or illusionistic world.

As Pruyser sees it, the

child's transitional object has a sacred quality about it.

It functions

as a kind of ritual object, subject to the reverent and ceremonial
attention of all the family.

Yet it is also "transcendent," in that it

falls neither into the category of the autistic world nor
realistic.

tha~

of the

Furthermore, we can reverse the equation "the transitional
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the transcendent."

Deities, ideal human virtues, and states of

spiritual ultimacy are "all elaborations of the transitional sphere,"
symbols, about whose meanings there is communal agreement.

It is

Pruyser's thesis that religion finds its home in the transitional world,
because
the transcendent, the Holy, and Mystery, are not recognizable in the
external world by plain realistic viewing and hearing, nor do they
arise directly in the mind as pleasurable fictions. They arise from
an intermediate zone of reality that is also an intermediate human
activity--neither purely subjective, nor objective. (Quoted by
Wulff, 1991, p. 340)
The child encounters the raw material for the object
representation of God in the same place, and in the same way, as the
material for the imaginary companion (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 191) for the
monster, the superhero, and the devil.

The child brings to each of

these the same vital agenda; the problem of becoming a self which means
"the trauma of negotiating the terrors and the traumas of achieving a
sense of self that is both separate and securely related" (McDargh,
1983, p. 123).

McDargh, like Rizzuto, refers to Bruno Bettleheim's

illustration of how the characters of classical fairy stories can be
used by the developing child for the purpose of working through the
assaults on his or her narcissism, inevitably sustained in the process
of growing up (Bettelheim, 1976, pp. 24-25).

And yet there is a

significant difference between the transitional object, God, and other
transitional objects.

The others are eventually outgrown.

As every

parent knows, throughout childhood, the toy-closet eventually overflows
with discarded transitional objects--teddies, bits of blankets and
favored outfits.

But, says Rizzuto, God is not among their ntµ11ber.

In

the normal course of events,·the psychic history of God is the reverse
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of other transitional objects:
becomes heightened.

instead of losing meaning, God's meaning

Because God is a "nonexperiential" object, and the

God-representation, unlike teddies and a blanket is infinite plastic,
the person can throughout life, "create" a God according to his needs
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 179).
James Jones questions whether that is a sufficient explanation
of the differences between God and the rest of the inhabitants of the
transitional world (1991, p. 45).

He notes how Winnicott, Rizzuto's

source of inspiration in this matter, argues in a different way.

When

speaking about transitional objects, Winnicott is really talking about a
certain capacity for experience, insisting that transitional phenomena
point to "an intermediate area of
external reality contribute."

experiencin~

to which both inner and

Teddy bears and security blankets are

left behind, but the capacity to transcend the dichotomies of inner and
outer, subjective and objective, continues to grow and blossoms into the
talent to create, in the arts and the sciences.

Winnicott's conviction

is that the transitional object
is not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning, and this
is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have
become spread over the whole intermediary territory between inner
psychic reality and the external world . . . that is to say over the
whole cultural field. (Winnicott, 1953, p. 5)
Imagination represents more than the world of ghosts and goblins and
fairy tales; it is the source of a "Hamlet" or Einstein's theory of
relativity.
According to Jones, Rizzuto's misunderstanding of Winnicott,
which leads her to focus on transitional objects, rather than on
transitional experience, leaves her with the pseudo problem, with which
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we have just seen her grapple.

Jones notes how she often makes God

sound like a supernatural version of the teddy bear and then speculates
on why God is not discarded like other such "objects."

What is crucial,

then, is not the object, but the capacity for experience.

He proposes

that a person's "God" is not discarded, because it is the carrier, par
excellence, of the capacity to experience in the "third way," where the
subjective and the objective are both transcended.
The

Epi~enetic Ori~ins

of the
God-Representation

I have mentioned how Rizzuto considers mirroring and holding as
an important moment in the process of the creation of the Godrepresentation; and how ghosts and goblins brush shoulders with God in
the child's imagination; but I have not yet described how she sees these
two realities as part of an epigenetic process.

Rizzuto spends three

pages, 185-88, describing how a mirroring transference, and a selfobject
bond, explain the creation of the God-representation out of the
experience with the primary caretaker, normally the mother.

She is

convinced that our earliest sense of self, grows from sensing ourselves
mirrored in our mother's reactions.

If the mirroring is hesitant, or

not there, our sense of self will be distorted.

The experience of

mirroring lies at the basis not only of our sense of cohesive self, but
also at the root of the God-representation.

All other images that are

joined to it, in the elaboration of our private God-representation are
colored by that core mirroring experience, or the failure to be
mirrored.
A second moment in the process of generating the God-
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representation lies in the achievement and stabilization of object
constancy, in the second and third year (Freud's anal phase).

At this

time, comes the procession of "imaginary companion," of monsters, and
fairies, with God drawing up the rear.

This procession helps the child

tolerate his badness, rage impulses, frustrations and deceptions, on the
one hand, and allows him to experience his grandiosity, on the other, by
controlling them.

We have seen too, how the special propensities of the

child as an implicit philosopher, the characteristics of his objectrelated developmental stage, the attitudes of the parents to God, and
the cultural "rumours" of God, all contribute to the nurturance of the
God-representation.
A third moment in the evolution of the God representation
occurs, at the point where "the child's narcissistic preoccupations
become intertwined with object-related wishes to be found attractive"
(Rizzuto, 1979, p. 195).

Rizzuto has reached the point where Freud

concentrated his efforts to understand:

the fateful moment when the

child's struggle to gain the attention of the preferred parent is about
to meet with failure, and the parental imago becomes cathected with
sublimated libidinal energy, and is transformed into the exalted fatherprotector who will not castrate the son (p. 196).
considerable distance from this understanding.

Rizzuto takes

Already, at the onset of

the Oedipal crisis, in her view, the God-image has a venerable history;
in the Oedipal crisis the child learns that he is indeed small, but is
given the hope that he or she can come to be like the preferred parent,
and marry someone similar; the self-image changes and the presence of
the powerful phallic hero or heroine, and later, the superhero, mediate
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the healing of the narcisstic frustration and object loss, and the
object-related exhibitionism and sadism that follow the defeat; the
parental object representations also change, desexualized to a tolerable
degree, and a wider knowledge of the parents becomes possible.

Her

distance from Freud is clear in a statement like the following:
The God-representation suffers transformations that keep in step
with the self- and parent-representations. The child's intellectual
maturation permits him to think about God in relation to his
enlarged experience of the world and his parents. At about the age
of five, the representation of God, parents and the child himself
become more pedestrian. (p. 196)
A second phase in post-Oedipal development occurs when the child
experiences disillusionment with parents and family.
are typically associated with this time:

Three fantasies

(1) the fantasy of the family

romance. (the child imaginatively develops a new family where experience
is wonderful, and all the wishes which were denied by the real parents
are fulfilled); (2) the fantasy of havini an animal companion; and (3)
the fantasy of havini a twin (a being like the daydreamer himself or
herself, with all the qualities he or she lacks, and from whom one
cannot be separated).

The psychodynamic interpretation of the "twin"

suggests that the twin functions as an alter-ego, which helps reshape
the self-image of the post-Oedipal child as someone whose separation
from the parents is painfully obvious.

Rizzuto proposes to see the God-

representation functioning in a similar way to relieve feelings of
isolation and loneliness (p. 98).

Contemporaneous with these

developments, the child is normally introduced to the heroes and
heroines of his or her religious tradition.

These function, says

Rizzuto, as alternative models to the family, and psychically provide a
group of

p~ople

with whom one may wish to identify, and so have one's
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worth validated.

At the end of this period, before the onset of puberty

the God-representation has achieved its "basic personality," "profoundly
enmeshed with each developmental stage of childhood" (p. 199).
The fourth moment in the evolution of the God-representation
occurs at puberty, and once again there are two phases of events here.
With puberty the person is now able to conceptualize in logicomathematical abstractions.

For the first time he or she can grasp the

concept of God beyond the limits of his or her God-representation.
Thi& concept follows principles of philosophical inference, and
though helpful for the intellectual integration of belief, it lends
itself, not to belief, but to theorizing, and to the construction of
theological or philosophical arguments. Properly integrated, it
adds a dimension to whatever God-representation the child had at the
time. Emotionally, it adds nothing. (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 200)
In later adolescence the individual has to face the challenge of
integrating a more unified and cohesive self-representation which will
empower him to make the major life-decisions that are calling for his
attention.

This developmental crisis, characterized by intense self-

searching and remaking of the self-image, in the context of forging an
identity for himself in the world of work and home-making, induces new
encounters with both old and new God-representations, which Rizzuto says
"may or may not lead to belief" (Rizzuto, 1979, p. 207).

We will have

occasion to return to this topic, in the next section, when we cite the
example of Jean-Paul Sartre.
Finally, throughout the life cycle a person develops the need to
critically assess changes in self-representation, in order to cope with
the inevitable advance of the life cycle, as well as to the everchanging encounters with peer and parental representations.

The chances

174
are that the God-representation will not escape the need to be adapted
too--right up to the moment of death.
Psycholo~ical

Resources and the
Breakthrough of Mystery

As a conclusion, we need to specifically answer the question we
posed at the beginning of Chapter II:

what, in object relational terms

are the psychological resources which facilitate a breakthrough to
"Mystery."

In a nutshell the answer is a transitional object or God-

representation, which is compatible with the object and selfrepresentations a person has evolved throughout his or her life cycle.
That needs to be expanded.
I use Jean-Paul Sartre as an example to illustrate the value of
thinking the religious quest in object relational terms.

In his

autobiography, Words, he describes how he was raised as the spoiled and
worshipped child of a multigenerational French family, of bourgeois
background.

Bereft of a father from birth, his grandiosity was never

"held" by the limitations and constraints of definite standards (cf.
McDargh, 1983, p. 130).

Thus, he suffered the confusion of a self that

was continually on parade, and which was repeatedly forced into
conformity by love, or worse as Kohut put it, "by the narcissistic needs
of both a widowed infantalized mother and an inflated but death-haunted
grandfather" (as cited by McDargh).

The God served up to young Jean-

Paul was that of the established bourgeoisie.

All this God asked for

was a polite deference, but made no real demands, nor inspired any
enthusiasm.

As we listen to the following extract from

~.

let us
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pay attention to the form of the God-representation that emerges from
the text.
Raised in the Catholic faith, I learned that the Almighty had made
me for his glory. That was more than I dared dream. But later I
did not recognize in the fashionable God, in whom I was taught to
believe, the one whom my soul was waiting. I needed a creator . .
I was given a Big Boss . . . . Good society believed in God in order
not to speak of him. How tolerant religion seemed! How comfortable
it was. In our circle, in my family, faith was merely a highsounding name for sweet French freedom.
At bottom, the whole business bored me. I was led to disbelief,
not by the conflicts of dogma, but by my grandparents' indifference.
Nevertheless, I believed. In my nightshirt, kneeling on my bed,
with my hands together, I said my prayers everyday. But I thought
of God less and less. (Sartre, 1964, pp. 97-99)
The passion of this man's life is echoed in the opening lines of
this quotation when he speaks of his learning that he was made for God's
glory, that God was Creator.

Here, Sartre is not dispassionately

referring to an idea or concept of God, rather the close interaction
between the ideas and the self-representation that Sartre beings to
those ideas is what is uppermost.

Long before Sartre was exposed to the

insipid God of his family, or the formal religious instruction of his
church, a powerful God-representation had gestated within him, and had
made him his own theologian.
with the Creator God.

The young Sartre has a powerful affinity

In his case, a God-representation which held

great promise, met with another God-representation, that of the
comfortable French middle class, and found no resonance.

The primary

creativity of the child died under the weight of social and
institutional constructions.

Rizzuto writes about this kind of

situation:
But the child brings his own God, the one he himself has put
together, to this official encounter. Now the God of rel~gion and
the God of the child-hero face each other. Reshaping, rethinking,
and endless rumination, fantasies and defensives maneuvres will come
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to the help of the child in this difficult task. This second birth
of God may decide the conscious religious future of the child. .
No child arrives at the "house of God," without his personal god
under his arm. (1979, p. 8)
"When Sartre tells his story, he recalls--more than that--he
mourns, the abortion of an object relationship with the Creator God,
which had held great potential for him.

God as creator was a

transitional object, whose presence to the young man had great promise
as a source of creative energy for the process of self-becoming.
Because they were unworthy of the object relations which he had already
developed, and in order to remain faithful to the sense of self he had
developed, Sartre chose to reject the ideas of God, and the kind of
faith that his community offered him.

For our purposes here, it is

important that we be clear that it was not merely ideas or concepts of
God that Sartre chose to reject.

Let me quote McDargh again:

It is our position that an approach to religious development as a
cognitive process and to God as a concept, while it draws attention
to some important features of the total phenomenon of human
religiousness, fails to grasp the psychological uniqueness and
developmental complexity, of an individual's relationship with his
or her God. At base, it is a failure to distinguish between the
processes whereby the child handles concepts, and the processes
whereby the child forms, and relates to, significant objects.
(1983, p. 128)
I want to insist on a point here:

Sartre rejects the beliefs of his

community as unworthy of his trust and belief, because these ideas
carried a set of object and self-representation which were totally
foreign to those that were at the heart of his own personal project as a
"separating-individuating" self, in Mahler's terms.

It was not that the

ideas themselves were illogical, or wrong, but simply foreign.
personal locus of trust--his faith--was grounded in his own

Sartre's

s~lf-

becoming, and this led him to abandon his trust--his faith--in the
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religious quest of his formal religion.

The mourning for the

possibilities of a genuine God-relationship, founded in a personal Godrepresentation can still be heard in the following paragraph:
I have just related the story of a mixed vocation: I needed God.
He was given to me, I received him without realizing that I was
seeking him. Failing to take root in my heart, he vegetated in me
for a while and then he died . . . . Whenever anyone speaks of him to
me, today, I say with the easy amusement of an old beau who meets a
former bell: "fifty years ago had it not been for that
misunderstanding, that mistake, the accident that separated us,
there might have been something between us. (~. pp. 102-3,
quoted by McDargh, 1983, p. 130)
As the aging autobiographer, Sartre adopts a Stoical attitude
and puts a brave face on the loss of his relationship with God.

He sees

no possibility of an encounter with ideas of a different God, carrying a
different set of self and object relationships, from that of the God of
middle-class French people, which would open the door to reconciliation
with the Creator God of his childhood.

Yet such a reconciliation is a

possibility, if not for Sartre, then at least for other people who might
have taken leave of their God-relationship over similar faith issues.
Exposure in later life to new sets of ideas about God, particularly at
the critical points in the life cycle, may awaken the possibility of a
renewed relationship with one's object representations of God, and be
the catalyst which initiates a reworking of those representations, so
that they are once more available for faith.
This is the heart of the matter of God-representations and faith
as far as Rizzuto is concerned.

She states her conviction in this way:

I propose that belief in God, or its absence, depends on whether or
not a conscious "identity of experience" can be established between
the God-representation of a given developmental moment, and the
object and self-representations needed to maintain a sense of self
which provides at least a minimum of relatedness and hope . . . .
[The God-representation] as a transitional object appears in
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early childhood and must undergo transformations in the course of
life if it is to keep up with the transformations of the life cycle.
If it loses its meaning, however, it can be set aside without being
forgotten. [Cf. p. 168 above, for Jones' reservations about this
way of talking.] And it can recover its meaning at the time of a
life crisis, either by a progressive new elaboration of the Godrepresentation or by a regressive return to an earlier
representation which once more lends itself to belief. (p. 202)
Examples of renewed contact with God representations are many.
From my own experience I can point to the impact that Liberation
Theology made on me.

The God who comes as Father from the future, to

heal and lift up the wounded, and who entrusts his sons and daughters
with his hopes for the world, empowering them to work for change
oppressive structures, is the image that I have found most compelling
throughout my adult life.

It deeply touches into an earlier image of

God as Father, strict but fair, powerful and somewhat remote, which in
turn, for me was a transformation of the idealized representation of my
father in the flesh.

The new representation opened up possibilities for

meaning and for sociopolitical action that I experience as exciting and
a force for reconciliation.

In my case at least, the work on the "self"

gradually rendered the predominant older God-representation obsolete,
and readied me for the ideas of Liberation Theology, which in turn
carried a God-representation that I found congenial and have attempted
to integrate.

What bears repeating here, I think, is the fact that

Liberation Theology was able to engage the very core elements of my
personality, both conscious and unconscious.

It was this appeal to my

self-, object-, and God-representations that accounts for its effects on
me, rather than the logical cogency of its discourse.

Moreover, this

transformation of my self and God-representations occurred only as the
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new ideas allowed for the reorganization of alternative memorialized
experiences. Rizzuto's way of putting this is:
Even someone who believes intellectually that there must be a God
may feel no inclination to accept him unless images of previous
interpersonal experience have fleshed out that concept with multiple
images that now coalesce in a representation that he accepts
emotionally. (1979, p. 48)
In other words no amount of talk of a God who offers the hope of a
future, where justice and reconciliation reign will make any affective
sense at all, unless the person who hears such a discourse has referents
for the experience of living in that way.

"Put more simply still, 'God

is love' can make no saving sense to a human being who has never known
what it feels like to be loved, however inadequately" (McDargh, 1983, p.
132).
I suspect that my work with the Theology of John Shea is another
step in the process of adjusting my God-representation to my changing
self and object representations.

We now turn to the task of bringing

Object Relations Theory and Shea's theology into a direct conversation.

CHAPTER IV
REPRESENTATION ENGAGES STORY AND VISA-VERSA
The moment has come to initiate the conversation between John
Shea's theology and Object Relations Theory.
process.

Conversation is a two-way

Thus, the first and major portion of this chapter, may be

described as "representation engages story," and is entitled "a
constructive-relational view of faith."

By making representation the

subject of the sentence, we want to suggest that the psychological
theory we have been working with, can sometimes expand or throw light
on, and sometimes challenge John Shea's theology.

In the second moment,

when the story-theology of John Shea engages Object Relations Theory-and we will dwell but very briefly on this part of the conversation-the attempt will be to measure the depth metaphors of the psychology
against those of the theology, and to tentatively suggest the outline of
the theory of obligation that is implied by Mahler and her colleagues in
the Object Relations "school."

This section of the chapter is entitled

"Depth Metaphors and Obligation."
If our assumption that the metaphor of self-interpretation is a
good one to express the kernel of what faith means, then we might
suspect that there could be many points of convergence between this
theological view and the views of the Object Relations Theorists we have
studied.

But before we develop these let us first say a word on the
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method we will use to facilitate the conversation between the
psychological and theological disciplines.
John McDargh uses a methodology, borrowed from William Rogers,
to guide the interdisciplinary dialogue that he conducts in his book,
fsychoanalytic Object Relations Theory and the Study of
propose to rely on that same methodology here.

Reli~ion,

we

The methodology is

called a "construction-relational model" (1983, p. 69).

Constructive Position

~

Psycholodcal Vantage

Phenomenal Data

For a constructive-relational model of interdisciplinary investigation,
the object of study is some common data of human experience, which can
be addressed from both a psychological and a theological perspective.
This is what the above diagram refers to as "phenomenal data."

In this

chapter we will look at those inter and intrapsychic processes by which
the person interprets his or her experience, unifies it, develops and
experiences a cohesive self, and then can reach out to others in
significant, "real" relationships.
which begs to be understood.

There is indeed data "out there"

Children are born into a network of

relationships, they Q.Q experience a species specific form of dependence,
they Q.Q learn to symbolize, and they Q.Q carry with them a particular set
of psychic wounds and strengths throughout their lives.

Yet why do we
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isolate this particular body of data and why link it to faith?

That

decision is based on the claim I have made about the essential core of
John Shea's theology, and on the suspected convergence I perceive from
the two perspectives we have examined--the theological and
psychological.
I shall endeavor to bring these two vantage points into
conversation and invite each one to support, or correct, or offer a
critique, of the other.
position.

The result of this will be a constructive

In this process, it is not a matter of theology subsuming

psychology, or visa-versa, but rather of allowing each one to have its
voice and adding its insights.

The arrows in the diagram are intended

to emphasize how, when this methodology is adhered to, the constructive
position is always accountable to the data itself, to the actual life
experience being studied.

One insists on referring back to the data· ·

which was the ground for both the psychological and theological
formulations.
Facilitating a dialogue between the psychological and
theological disciplines, presupposes an openness on the part of these
two areas of inquiry, and a readiness from each, to be sympathetic to
the contributions the other can make.

Rather than being contradictory,

I suggest, that when they are related to one and other, the two
perspectives may be able to convergently affirm a number of critical
insights.
psychology.

Shea's view is, I believe, open to a conversation with
This is so because he understands faith less as a graced

assent to revealed truths, and more as a universal characteristic of
human existence by which every person is oriented towards the Mystery.
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Furthermore, he sees each person empowered to respond to It, my among
other things, developing his or her life-story, through the metaphors
and concomitant values of the religious tradition.

Shea's analysis of

the human condition has highlighted some aspects of faith as crucial for
human living:

the ability to symbolize and to create meaning, the sense

of subjective and objective reality, the sense of being oriented within
the flux of life, the ability to choose values which foster loving and
enlivening interpersonal relationships.

It seems to me that many of the

developmental issues we explored in Object Relations Theory are closely
related to, if not identical with, these same theological concerns.
A Constructive-Relational View of Faith
From the foregoing discussion I would like to propose a
definition of faith, which I will develop, in the light of Object
Relations Theory, in the following pages.

Faith is a human dynamic of

knOWin~

what is real which is (1) foundational for the

humanly

meanin~ful

~rowin~

capacity for self-affirmation. mutuality and compassion.

shapin~

of a

environment and (2) finds its fulfillment in an ever-

Faith as Symbolic Knowing, the Capacity
to Construct and Know the Real
The emphasis that Shea and his tradition place on knowing as the
basis of faith, sets the course for us, in approaching the wealth of the
contributions of Object Relations Theory, for a psychological
understanding of faith.

We have seen that faith begins with the

discernment of Mystery's approach to the human person.

A person "knows"

Mystery, thanks to the capacity for sacramental imagination.

Remember
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how the windhover was a symbol of Mystery's presence to Gerard Many
Hopkins.
We might begin our examination of the contribution that Object
Relations Theory makes to our understanding of the psychological
resources for faith by recalling our discussion in Chapter II, on Object
Representations.

There (pp. 127ff.) we saw that in order to know "what

is outside" the child must create a representation of that "outside" as
part of his representational world.

We reviewed the part that

hallucination plays in this, and how

go~d-enough-mothering

if reality is to match the child's hallucinatory activity.

is crucial,
"Each infant

must recreate the world" Winnicott (1958, p. 12) told us, "but this is
possible only if, bit by bit, the world arrives at the moment of the
infant's activity.

The infant reaches out, and the breast is there, and

the· breast is created."

To begin with, meaning happens, I suggest,

because the child is involved in a symbiotic relationship.

To the

degree that this symbiosis is satisfactory, to that degree are
sensations experienced as meaningful, the self experienced as real, and
the basis for trust and a positive God-representation laid down.

By the

time the child reaches the stage of object constancy, he or she is ready
to organize his or her world without being absolutely dependent on the
caretaker, though the child still needs support and mirroring, of
course.

In Sandler and Rosenblatt's words:

the representations which the child constructs enable him to
perceive sensations coming from various sources, to organise them
and structure them in a meaningful way. We know that perception is
an active process by which the ego transforms raw sensory data in a
meaningful way. (1962, p. 89)
In the case of the lucky child, the world that he or she creates, comes
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into being because of the cooperation between him or her and the
caregiver.

An essential element of the child's knowledge is the

security of this cooperation, a sense of his inner core as safe.

This

security and safety continue to reinforce the sense of basic trust.

The

opposite may indeed happen, in which case the knowledge the child gains
is that the real is threatening and untrustworthy.

All of us, one

supposes, fall somewhere on a continuum that stretches between the lucky
and the unlucky.
At this point, there is already a convergence between Shea's
theological viewpoint and that of the Object Relations Theorists.
Knowledge and meaning are basic to both.

For Object Relations

Theorists, they are rooted in the body's experience of being held, of
being safe.

While I have not seen John Shea write anything like this,

he did affirm it in his conversations with me.
two sides of a single coin.

Trust and knowledge are

Again, Object Relations Theorists do not

restrict knowledge to sensory experience.

There is a depth in knowledge

beyond that of merely looking, sensing, smelling, etc.

That is

something that Shea would applaud.
But that is only a start.

What light does Objects Relations

Theory throw on the claim that we know Mystery in and through the
proximate environment of the self?

To find the answer to this question,

we need to return, first, to our considerations of the origin of the God
representation, which as we have seen, Object Relations Theorists credit
as a significant psychological event, which plays an honorable part in
the psychic life of an individual.

We have traced the birth of the God-

representation through its five phases in Chapter III (pp. 169-73)--the
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laying of its basis in the mirroring experiences of early infancy; the
birth of the first representations with the onset of object constancy
(when God takes his place with ghosts and goblins in a long procession
of illusory productions, which help the child cope with his badness,
rage and frustrations while allowing him space to experience his
grandiosity); the changing God-representations of the Oedipal child, who
evolves God-representations to fit the changing self and object
representations she has, and which function to relieve loneliness and
isolation; the broadening intellectual capacity of the adolescent adds
the element of a concept of God, and the capacity to build theological
systems; and finally, throughout the remainder of the life cycle, the
person critically assesses the God-representations by which he lives, to
take account of the successive challenges and crises that aging brings.
There is a striking parallel, and compatibility, between John Shea's
claim that we know Mystery in and through the proximate environment of
the self, and the Object Relations conceptualization of the processes
involved in religious knowing.

For John Shea, Mystery is not a datum of

experience, like a parent or a blade of grass.

We experience Mystery's

relationship to us, in and through our relationship to these things, as
well as in our relationship to our "self."

Object Relations provide a

psychological explanation of how this is possible.

We construct

representations of external reality, and we relate to external reality
through them.

It is one, or many, of these representations, that are

transformed in the God-representation, and it is by means of this
representation that we relate to Mystery.

Furthermore, each of these

object representations has its corresponding self-representation.

We
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saw this illustrated in the case of Jean-Paul Sartre, at the conclusion
of the last chapter.
God."

He had an early "love-affair" with "The Creator

At an early age, his knowledge of God was vitally important to

him--at least as he remembered this knowledge as an older person,

His

God-representation, which I term "The Creator God," was the
psychological element in this existential relationship with God.

This

God-representation was in deep harmony with the self and object
representations of the little boy.

God, self and world fitted together,

they were all aspects of a single project--the unfolding of Sartre's
potential.
A second way that Object Relations Theory makes sense of Shea's
claim that we know Mystery in and through our proximate environments
becomes apparent when we look at what it says about transitional objects
and experience.

In his examination of religious experience, William

Meissner acknowledges his debt to Winnicott, and accords a particular
importance to transitional objects.

His remark that "the use of symbols

takes place within the intermediate area of experience that Winnicott
designated as illusion" (Meissner, 1990, p. 105) establishes a
significant link with Shea, and opens up the possibility of
psychologically grounding "sacramental imagination."

Let us try to see

how this is so.
The initial step here, is to recall that recourse·to "illusion"
is not a flight to untutored fantasy, rather it is a necessary step in
the process of learning, and of coming to a knowledge of reality.

As we

have seen, through the use of transitional objects, a child enters a
mode of experiencing which stands at the intersection between the
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experience of external reality, and that of internal subjective reality.
Through the use of transitional objects, the dichotomy between the
objective and the subjective is transcended.

The primordial

circumstance under which this occurs is that of the nursing dyad, where
"the good-enough-mother" answers the needs of her child.

The

conjunction of the child's needs and the response of the real object,
the mother, creates a situation of illusion in the child, in which, from
the child's point of view, he has created the need satisfying object.
This is the crucial insight for us here.

Recourse to this transitional

space is not a neurotic defense, rather, Winnicott argues, that illusion
is an integral part of the developmental process whereby an individual
engages his capacity to involve himself in the world of experience, "a
human capacity that expresses itself in the creative shaping of a
humanly meaningful environment" (Meissner, 1990, p. 102).

It is an

"interpretation" of reality that involves the experience of safety, of a
proportion between the infant's self, and the external world, and of
being appropriately linked to all the elements of reality (i.e., having
one's place in reality).

Learning, accommodation to reality, is

promoted according as there is the repeated experience of being allowed
the privilege of entering into illusional space.
sense, proves to be the doorway to knowing.
again.

Illusion, in this

Recall the nursing dyad

An external observer can see, of course, that the mother's

response comes from outside, but not to the child.

With repeated

experience of "resting" in this transitional space coupled with
experiences of optimal frustration, the child's illusion of omnipotent
control over the transitional object gradually diminishes.

The child in
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Piagetian terms accommodates to reality.
movement between illusion and disillusion.

There is a constant pendulum
Thanks to Winnicott, we can

recognize, without a sense of unease, that the use of transitional
. objects, and the occurrence of transitional experience, is a normal
healthy phenomenon.

In fact, it draws the person and his surrounding

environment together; through it, reality is engaged, known, at newer
and deeper levels.

Moreover, it is not confined to the nursing-infant

or playroom child, but is a characteristic of adult life as well.
This dialectic and tension between illusion and disillusion
continues to be elaborated throughout the whole of human experience
and life. The project of gaining knowledge and acceptance of
reality is never fully completed. (Meissner, p. 103)
We take the next step in relating Shea's claims for sacramental
imagination to those of Object Relations, by turning to the insights of
Paul Pruyser.

In his terms, the realm of play, the illusionistic world

of "tutored fantasy," is the place where faith is at home.

We can quote

him again:
The Transcendent, the Holy and Mystery are not recognizable in the
external world by plain realistic viewing or hearing, nor do they
arise in the mind as pleasurable fictions. They arise from an
intermediate zone of reality that is also an intermediate human
activity--neither purely subjective, nor objective. (Quoted by
Wolff, 1991, p. 340)
How does this come about?

A moment ago, we quoted Meissner as saying

that the use of symbols takes place in Winnicott's illusory space.

The

capacity to use symbols is a development of the very early use the child
makes of the blanket or the teddy bear, to find relief from the
interminable tension arising from the task of bridging the internal and
external worlds.

Let us examine the use the child makes of a blanket.

Observers suppose that the blanket symbolizes the mother's breast, but
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its status as a transitional object is as important as its symbolic
value.

The fact is, that the blanket, while it is real, is not the

mother's breast.

That is as important as its standing for the breast,

since it is this objective dimension that prepares the human child's
capacity to become a symbol-making, and a symbol-using being.
The use of transitional objects is more a step toward the symbolic
function than itself a form of symbolism. When symbolism is
achieved, the infant has already gained the capacity to distinguish
between fantasy and fact, between internal and external objects,
between primary creativity and perception, between illusion and
reality . . . . I would argue that the use of symbols takes place
within the intermediate area of experience that Winnicott designated
as illusion. (Meissner, 1990, pp. 104-5)
Meissner then goes on to generalize from childhood to adult
life.

Entrance into the transitional mode of experiencing--recall that

this is occasioned by the coming together of external reality and
internal attributions--means that the same, sense-experienced, external
objects can become invested with subjective intentions and meanings,
time after time, and in this fashion its symbolic dimensions are
strengthened (Meissner, 1990, pp. 105-6).
Symbols do not only draw on the conscious level of psychic life,
of course.

An adult, using her capacity for symbol-making, calls on two

distinct levels of her psychic life--the conscious and the unconscious.
We are using an insight here, that we met in Chapter II, when we
referred to the Beres and Joseph article, wherein it was proposed to
define a representation as a "postulated unconscious psychic
organization capable of evocation in consciousness as a symbol, image,
fantasy, thought or action" (cf. p. 130, above).

Hence, it is possible

that a person may, on the one hand, consciously decide to invest certain
external objects with significance and power, and deliberately choose an
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object, such as a person, a cross, a story or a church building, as a
transitional object.

On the other hand, she may be led to do so

unconsciously, in which case "the meaning of the action or attribution
is not immediately evident and can only be ascertained by interpretation
within a broader social or historical context" (Meissner, 1990, p. 105).
Thus, both Shea and Object Relations Theorists hold that our
relationships to events, circumstances as well as to persons, are the
building bricks out of which we create a meaningful world.

These

relationships are not "flat," empirical realities, rather they have a
depth dimension that arises from the human capacity for transitional
experience, which is the psychic "space" wherein the ability to form and
use symbol arises.

Symbols not only draw on the conscious level of

awareness, they are rooted too in the unconscious.

When in transitional

"space," a person uses symbol, then, all the creative potential of which
he is capable begins to flow, and not only great art (Freud's one
acknowledgment of transitional space) but great scientific theory, as
well as religious ritual and story are born.
A further point of convergence is apparent, when Beres and
Joseph talk of the interpretation that needs to be done, to bring
unconscious material into consciousness.

Shea conceptualizes the

process in terms of myth-making and story-telling.

His concern is with

how the process works in the lives of adults, trying to create a
meaningful world to live in, in the present.
rise to images.

Story, as we know, gives

Images invite a conversation in order to distill values

and attitudes, which then point to the practical strategies.

Moreover,

we saw Shea taking great pains to illustrate how biblical exegesis, the
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scientific tools of contemporary western society, are powerful steps we
can take in bringing the contents of the unconscious into consciousness.
In the following quotation, used by Meissner (1990, p. 105), Andre Godin
expresses his conviction that the two disciplines, psychology and
theology, do indeed converge:
These two levels of symbolic expression, [the conscious and the
unconscious] are closely linked and complementary to one another.
The symbolic function is always exercised by an encounter between an
interior urge, which results from the whole organization of the
personality, and its actualization in exterior expressions of which
most (but not all) are modelled by the surrounding culture,
traditions, and social conventions. The symbolic act therefore
unites not only several degrees of reality (matter and spirit), but
several levels of human reality (conscious and unconscious,
individual and social).
Godin not only points to complementarity around knowing as a
phenomenon of sacramental imagination (in Shea's language) and symbolic
knowing (in Pruyser's terms) as well as the importance of the
unconscious in both, but he also speaks of the symbolic as involving the
social dimensions of a person's life.

Shea talks of an individual being

bound to her community through the world-creating tales of her people.
These tales and myths precede the individual and are a gift from his
tradition with which he may choose to structure his life and give
meaning to it.

Object Relations Theory is, of its essence, interested

in interpersonal and social phenomena--the emphasis accorded the motherchild dyad and the claims made for the immortal influence it exerts on
all subsequent phases of a person's life, is enough to illustrate that.
However, it has a relevance beyond that, for our understanding of
culture and religion.

Culture happens--and I would add religion

happens--thanks to the human capacity to make and use symbols-.

A person

exercising the symbolic function is creating the matrix within which

193
cultural experience (and religious experience) takes place.

Cultural

experience (or religious experience)
is not merely subjective (as derivative of and determined by
intrapsychic dynamics only) nor it is exclusively objective (as a
reflection of extrinsic and objectively determined qualities of the
object); it is compounded of objective qualities, as of a painting
or a statue or a piece of music, and the subjective experience that
an individual brings to it. (Meissner, 1990, p. 105)
In the case of religious experience, there is the subjective dimension
that comes from "the dynamic constituents of human understanding and
motivation" (Meissner, 1990, p. 109) combined with the external
objective dimension, which in John Shea's language is the traditional
stories we inherit, coupled with the community's ritual.

These stories,

ritual objects, and ritual actions, are combined with the subjective
element and are used in such a manner that they express meanings and
values that transcend their physical characteristics.

The symbolic

dimension, Object Relations Theorists would tell us, is not something
inherent in these stories or objects themselves.

Meaning can come about

only by the interpretative action of the believer:
Consequently, the objects as religious symbols are neither
exclusively perceived in real and objective terms, nor simply
produced by subjective creation. Rather they evolve from the
amalgamation of what is real, material and objective as it is
experienced, penetrated and creatively reshaped by the patterns of
meaning attributed to the object by the believer. (pp. 106-7)
In this first moment, I have tried to uncover the convergence
between the "from whence" of Shea's theological tradition and that of
Object Relations Theorists in what concerns the view of faith as a human
dynamic of knowing which is foundational for the shaping of a humanly
meaningful environment.

The Object Relational view has, I submit, given

a psychological plausibility to the central claim of Shea's theological
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account of faith as a form of knowing.

As yet, little or nothing has

been said concerning "the real" that is known through the form of
transitional experience that we are calling faith.

And it is to the

issue of how psychologically, we may account for the sense of knowing
reality, of being grounded in it, that is so typical of the "from
whence," the starting point, of Shea's understanding of faith.
Faith and the Developing Sense
of Being Real
In Shea's perspective, as we have seen, faith is a celebration
of one's communion with Mystery.

It is also a question, a hungering

after Mystery, which is the ground of all that is real.

In the light of

Object Relations Theory, we can make a distinction between the
subjective and the objective poles of this yearning.

In doing this we

are uncovering further dimensions of the psychological resources we
bring to the faith-enterprise.
At the subjective pole of this desire for the real is the
profound and unquenchable thirst to be real oneself, to feel, in
Erikson's phrase that one's existence has an "actuality."

Many people

can take their sense of "being" for granted, most of the time, though
for everyone there are moments when a sense of their life being
disconnected, and falling apart, rushes through consciousness.

There

are times too, when one may disassociate from one's feelings, and
experience oneself as existing in a vacuum.

Therapists frequently

describe a condition characterized by a nagging sense of unreality, of
being detached and unconnected.

Work with clients presenting these

symptoms led Harry Guntrip to suggest that "an absence, non-realization,
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or dissociation of the experience of 'being' and of the possibility of
it, and along with that, an incapacity for healthy, natural, spontaneous
'doing' is the most radical clinical phenomenon in analysis" (quoted by
McDargh, 1983, p. 77).
The sense of being self, of "being," is a developmental
achievement that grows out of the child's relationship to his or her
interpersonal world.

We have reviewed how the holding environment,

characterized by mirroring promotes psychic integration, how the child
discovers her own value, beauty and worth in her reflection in the
caretaker's eyes.

This sense of affirmation is the basis for the

realization of the potentialities given in the natural endowment of the
child, for developing as a person through interpersonal relationships.
Theistic faith--the knowledge that is experienced in the Divinehuman encounters of a person's life, such as those described by Dillard
and recounted by Shea--is active not only in the formative process, but
in all events and circumstances of the life cycle, "supporting the drive
for a sense of personal reality, which may have been compromised or lost
in the processes of the development of the self" (McDargh, 1983, p. 77).
Shea's use of the stories of "tieing up the strong man" in Mk. 3:27, the
Elisha story and the story of the Cross, to illustrate how knowledge of
Mystery's presence, thematized as "water and cake in the desert,"
illustrates faith's sustaining and enhancing presence in the quest for a
deepening and enlarged sense of participation in being, of being real.
Perhaps, it is in telling stories of Mystery being "the seductive lure,"
that the self' truest nature is experienced.

I am assuming that all we

have already said about our capacity to use symbol--and story is a
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symbol--is in our minds here.

In telling these stories, and entering

the transitional experience they promote, we engage in what John Shea
calls a "dangerous exchange":
our life from God.

we hand ourselves over, and receive back

The results of this exchange, effected through the

symbol, is that we learn to "love our finitude and battle our sin."
know we are free.

We

We are freedom, not in the sense that we can escape

all the alienating structures of existence, but in the sense that we are
funded from beyond.

We say, not, "we can do everything," but "now, in

God, all things are possible."

From Object Relations perspective, we

would say that the self has achieved integration.

At the moment of

expressing itself thus, it is a real self, a cohesive self.
Faith and a Developing Sense of Being in
Relationship to a Real and Meaningful World
The second pole we referred to in the last section was that of
the objective pole.

As we have seen, from Shea's perspective, we need

to be related to "what is."

We saw that Freud was also attentive to

"what is," and in his discussion of the reality principle he would have
us believe that our acquisition of the sense of reality is a painful
process indeed, forcing a compromise between the drive for pleasure and
the demands of an inflexible world.

McDargh points out that Hartmann

tried to soften the opposition between reality and the drive for
pleasure by suggesting that behavior under the control of the reality
principle assures a deeper, more human pleasure than that of pure
instinctual gratification--the pleasures of sublimated activities were
not to be sneered at (McDargh, 1983, p. 79).

This was at least a first

step towards stating something that Bowlby was quite impressed by,
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namely that human beings, from infancy, love to explore their
environment and to enjoy manipulating it.

Such exploratory behavior is

as common as attachment behavior and every bit as important for
development.
By exploring the "out there" the child or adult is engaging in a
behavior that Bowlby considers vital for survival.

However, if we were

to use the metaphor of the child as the "scientific utilitarian" or the
"calculating navigator" of hostile territory, who tries to make the best
deal

~ssible

with reality, we would be wide of the mark, in getting a

picture of the child's relationship to reality (cf. McDargh, 1983, p.
79).

A much better metaphor, taken from our earlier discussion of the

"practicing sub-phase" is that of the child as "the fledgling lover."
As we saw, this is the period when the child takes the great step in
individuation; when there is a powerful narcissistic investment in her
own functioning, on the part of the child; when there is exquisite
delight in exploring the world and escaping maternal fusion.
this world is supremely interpersonal.

And yet,

For the very acquisition of the

ability to "practice" depends on the "confident expectation" that needs
will be met by the mother.

It is the mother's presence, her ability to

relieve distress, and to provide emotional closeness during the
symbiotic phase, which birthed this "expectation"--and continues this
service into the succeeding one.

It is the mother's presence, and the

confident expectation that she nurtures, that soothes the child's
anxiety, and convinces her that the world is a welcoming place, that
rewards her investigations with new delights and fresh wonders.

When

the toddler first ventures forth into the world, ideally, it is in
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Michael Balint's image, with the belief that the entire cosmos is a kind
of loving mother, holding the child tenderly in her arms--that it is
solid and real.
With the onset of the rapprochement period comes disillusionment
and anxiety.
power.

The child discovers her limitations and the limits of her

The development of cognitive skills and the capacity for

conceptualization make the world increasingly available to the growing
child.

The capacity for creative engagement with "reality out there"

and for a courageous exploration of it, depends in a large measure on
the continued renewal, in age appropriate ways, of that fundamental
"expectation" which sponsored the first forays of investigation.

To the

degree that the world remains, in Balint's image, a loving mother, to
that degree is the individual exposed to the sensory experience that
will lead him or her to encounter--may be construct is a better word-reality.

To the degree that "good-enough-mothering fails--and a person

carries the corresponding self and object images with him or her,
throughout the life cycle--or to the degree that one is driven by fear
or anxiety, to that degree is one's reality subject to distortion and
untruth.
John Shea does not concern himself with the psychological
origins of the basic question "what is real."

I think that Object

Relations Theory supplies a deficit in his reflections at this point.
It is not that the issue is unimportant for him.
like:

"The paradox of theistic faith .

He can say things

is that living in a

relationship with a gracious God means living dangerously in an
ungracious world" (Shea, 1980, p. 40).

Where do the psychological
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resources for such a faith stance come from?

In the light of the

reflection in this section the answer to that question lies in the
existential knowledge a person gains, through the ministrations of
"good-enough-mothering," of the reliability, the security, the "reality"
of the "out-there-and-not-me."

Perhaps it is true to say, that

prompting the question "what is the real" as the starting point of
faith, is the experience of the "confident expectation" of the "goodenough-mothered" child, who has been encouraged to engage in "a love
affair with the world."
Faith Expressed in the Ability to
Enjoy Solitude
Stories of Faith begins with the telling of three stories.
Mystery reveals its bondedness to the three people concerned, as they
enter deeply into their experience.

Although, in the case of the

grandfather on the plane, there is a companion with him, this companion
acts principally as a sounding board, as far as the movement of the
story is concerned.

In the case of the other two characters, the

teenage girl, and the middle-aged son, their solitude is complete.
Through their relationship to what is, their bondedness to Mystery
floods their consciousness, and they are "enticed to think, feel and act
in accordance with this truth" (Shea, 1980, p. 15)

Because of their

awareness of their bondedness to Mystery, they become people of depth.
Shea describes a variety of transforming experiences which are intensely
personal and which take place in the solitude of each one's encounter
with Mystery, the ground of one's being, of one's values and one's
thinking--experiences that transform consciousness, conversion
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experiences and revelatory experiences.

Out of the encounter with

Mystery in the solitude of a person's life, flows, not only a meaning
for life--e.g., the girl listening to Mother Theresa sees that her life
can be integrated around compassionate service--but also a set of values
which give direction to her concrete behavior and which are an answer to
her deepest needs, conflicts and aspirations.
In keeping with our intention to outline a constructiverelational view of faith we turn now to what we have seen of Object
Relations Theory, and try to discern its contribution to our
understanding of the place of solitude in the life of faith.

The

conceptualization of the challenges faced by the human person as he or
she emerges from symbiosis to individuation, has exercised the
imagination of people like Mahler and Winnicott.

At a time when it

appears that the major crisis in living, centers around the capacity for
intimacy with others, and when the suffering that people most often
experience is that associated with failed intimacy, it is striking that
the capacity to be alone is hailed as a major developmental achievement.
Mahler's work has provided an outline of the complex process through
which a child must go in order to reach individuation, a state that
involves the achievement of the capacity to be alone.

We have augmented

Mahler's outline, in Chapter II of this essay, with the work of other
theorists and experimenters, and as a result, have an appreciation of
the factors involved.

The child learns to tolerate solitude only when

she or he achieves object constancy.

This capacity is the outcome of

the developmental process that we have examined:

the cognitive

development described by Piaget, the affective bonding described by
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sowlby, the use of evocative memory, internalization, as well as
initiation of exploration of the world, all of which find their place
~ithin

the paradigm outlined by Mahler.

At the time of achieving object

constancy the child has the capacity to form whole objects, by which I
lllean she recognizes that the same mother is both "good" and "bad," and
in parallel fashion, that she herself is a cohesive whole, both "good"
and "bad" too.

Thanks to the ability to evoke representations of caring

others--which concomitantly evoke good self-representations--the child
has internalized the capacity to self-sooth, to control anxiety, to
experience the "non-I" as trustworthy and real (as we have seen earlier
in this chapter) and thus to not only tolerate being alone, but to
actually value such solitude.

In terms of the lifelong project of

relating to others, it is this capacity to tolerate being alone, without
being inundated by the fear of abandonment, that empowers a person to
embark on intimate relationships with others.
Correlating Shea and Object Relations Theorists, leads me to
suggest that the psychological events which accompany the revelation
experiences of Mystery in solitude are precisely those that we have
considered in the preceding paragraph.

Revelation-faith experiences

have a psychological dimension which consists of the capacity to evoke a
basic sense of trust, that holds annihilating anxiety at bay, that
permits cognitive functioning; that involves the ability to bring
together the "good" and the "bad," both internally and externally, and
thus to tolerate the "bad."
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Faith and the Developed Capacity to
Tolerate Dependence
The storied-world that John Shea offers us, is one in which
human beings experience dependency.

They are dependent on the gracious

approach of Mystery towards them to reveal Itself as the ground of being
and of valuing and of doing.

Consequently, they depend on Mystery for

the whole meaningful world that they construct through story-telling,
image-making, value-naming and action-expressing.

Think of the paradigm

that Shea uses, taken from the writing of Annie Dillard, to illustrate
our lack of control over, as well as our readiness for, the approach of
Mystery.

When he translates this image into a biblical one his choice

is that of "Abba" the image of nurturing-fathering love, of the father,
on whom Jesus depended throughout his life and ministry.

Perhaps it is

in the vision that Shea weaves from life as lived in the light of the
creation story, that we have the clearest expression of how dependent on
Mystery we are.

The creation story is one of holiness--the holiness

that pervades all creation.

Creation can delight in itself because it

is dependent on God's intention for it.

Creation, human beings

included, has dignity, a dignity conferred on it by God's presence to
it.

This dignity is an expression of the meaning God has given to

creation.

The experience of being dependent is brought home to one on

every occasion one senses or knows oneself as related to the larger
context within which one moves and has being.

However, warns Shea,

dependence is not an absolute--except dependence on Mystery itself.

He

sets boundaries around the dependence a person may have with another, or
with a thing, when he begins to talk of the strategies of the-"panicked
heart," especially when these strategies take the track of "envy."

This
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"heart" follows the track of "self-beautification."
to please in every respect.

It fawns; it tries

The person falls into the trap of idolatry,

which leads to self-deception, and ends up in oppressing others.
It is part of our Freudian legacy that talk of being dependent
is likely to arouse a certain uneasiness in us.

People have found

Freud's penetrating analysis of the relationship between dependency and
neurosis so persuasive, that a person who speaks of any kind of
dependency--especially one that has the blessing of religion--is likely
to meet with severe suspicion, if not hostility.

We are much more at

ease talking of people being independent, coming of age, and
responsible.

Yet there is a fundamental truth about human existence

stated in what Shea--and in this he joins a long line of theologians
back to Augustine, who see creaturely dependence as a central character
of the human person as the homo reliliiosus--has to say about the
experience of being dependent.

As we come to understand more about how

the human person's journey through life and the developmental processes
involved in this journey, we can assess dependency in a very different
light from that of Freud.
Our study of Mahler and Bowlby have revealed that it is
completely normative for the child to begin life in an utterly dependent
condition.

In this context, the meaning of dependency is colored by

what these ·researchers have to say about attachment, and the intense
emotional bond that develops between the child and mother.

By virtue of

its immature state at birth, and for many months thereafter, the neonate
depends on the ministrations of others.

It is not merely the physical

needs of the child that are satisfied by the nurturing mother, but more
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importantly the person's psychic structures begin to form during this
period, thanks to what Kohut refers to as "transmuting internalizations."

In Mahler's words "the child is at first absolutely and

remains later on, 'even to the grave,' relatively dependent on the
mother."

From her perspective, Mahler defines dependence in this way:

"the need each human has, whether child, adolescent, or adult, for a
libidinal object relation in order to ensure his· optimal psychic
functioning" (quoted by McDargh, 1983, p. 84).

In the case of the

infant, dependence facilitates an important series of developmental
increments:

we saw that the child's dependence on the mothering figure

draws him out of the tendency to autistically regress, into relationship
with external reality (the mother herself); moreover, the memories of
the experiences of being touched, while still utterly dependent on the
mother, lead to "personalization," in Winnicott's term:
psyche becomes grounded in the body.

the child's

When it comes to optimal psychic

functioning in the adult we have to remember something that we said was
the enduring part of the Freudian legacy:
the way a person relates in the external world, is determined by the
intrapsychic structures, or object relations, that he or she has
developed. These structures are the residue of the person's
relationships with those in his or her environment, who in the days
of infant-dependence, and early stages of maturation, nurtured and
cared for him or her. (p. 93, above)
So our dependence as adults extends not only to those who are our
friends, lovers, nurturing figures in the present, but those
relationships from the past, which, leaving behind an internal set of
object and self-representations, preserves a sense of continuity and
"inner-sustainment."

In McDargh's view, it is this inner-sustainment

which enables us to accept the fact that we can never evade our
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indebtedness to help that comes from the world outside us, and which
impresses upon us the inevitability of the never-satisfied need we have
of the love and acceptance of others.
but empowering reality in our lives.

Dependence is an all-pervasive,
Thus, when Shea speaks to us of

faith as involving dependence, he is touching, psychologically speaking,
upon the inner sustainment which makes it possible for us to enjoy
mature dependence, on other human beings certainly, but on Mystery, as
well.
P~rhaps

we need to acknowledge that there is a continuum of age

and condition-appropriate dependence--rather than a polarity of
dependence/independence.

During the autistic and symbiotic phases it is

normative that the child emit attachment and "proximity-seeking"
behaviors.

But on a schedule, dictated by the security or insecurity of

the child's attachment to the nurturer(s), a process of internalization
begins, in the child, whereby he or she is capable of maintaining a
sense of well-being and relatedness, even when the caretaker(s), is not
present.

This is what we have seen occurs with the attainment of object

constancy.

With the attainment of object constancy, the child no longer

has to depend in a total way, on external figures for the sense of his
own goodness and that of the world--he now carries within the capacity
to not only self-soothe, but to affirm to himself, his own goodness and
that of the world.
The Object Relations view of healthy development helps us
challenge, what in some contexts, frequently passes for the height of
maturity.

I am referring to that view which holds that total

independence is the essence of maturity.

But the mishaps that can occur
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in the individuation-separation process warns us against accepting the
apparent,

clear-as~day-truth

of that position.

Poor nurturing, or over-

demanding nurturing can leave a person with an intolerable sense of
weakness and vulnerability, in which the self is continually at risk.

A

lack of the sense that one can depend on caretakers, and on the world at
large, for "goodness," may lead an individual to adopt what we have seen
Melanie Klein term "a schizoid position."

One develops a sense of self-

reliance and self-sufficiency that is a defense against the inhospitable
nature of the environment.

In this case, all need for love and support

from those (or that) beyond the person is denied, and all dependence is
suppressed.
Time after time, John Shea insists on the primacy of the
relational, and of our dependence on a greater reality.

Once again

there is a convergence of viewpoint between the theological an
psychological disciplines.

Both of

t~em

share a negative judgment of

the assertions of the independence and adequacy of the self-made
individual, as well as off the "implacable generosity of the relentless
altruist who never seems to need or ask anything for him/herself"
(McDargh, 1983, p. 87).

Both the rugged individualist and the

relentless altruist are touched by a quality of unfaith that looks on
the world as hostile and threatening to that part of themselves which
wants to acknowledge need, and which searches for relationship.
The admission of dependence would be an invitation to reexperience
disappointment and betrayal. To push the matter to its most radical
point, perhaps to admit ultimate need, one that exceeds the
resources of any finite source of strength and love, would be to
risk ultimate frustration. (p. 87)
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a_Pause for Orientation
At this point I have completed an expansion of the first part of
the definition of faith that I gave earlier.

I have attempted to show

how Object Relations Theory helps us see the implications of saying that
faith is a dynamic of human knowing, that is the foundational for the
shaping of a humanly meaningful environment.
part of the definition:

We now turn to the second

that faith finds its completion in an ever-

growing capacity for self-affirmation, mutuality and compassion.

As we

have seen, this definition is largely inspired by our review of John
Shea's theology.

If we try to translate the theological language into a

psychological register, then the fullness of faith development is
reflected in the capacity for intimate, mature, mutual, loving
relationships and self-commitment.
the "truth" that one knows.

This is what is involved in doing

This loving will take many different shapes

throughout a person's lifetime.

I may be in the form of a child's first

love affair with the primary caregiver, or that of a preschooler for her
chum, or in adult life, the meeting with a stranger who is transformed
into a lover or a spouse, or may be in the support and compassion
offered to a neighbor.

But given the fact that knowing in a "full" way

is often very difficult--Shea's account of the envious and rejected
heart reminds us of the possibilities of "missing the mark"--it is no
wonder that doing the loving thing is often a test for even the greatest
of heroes.

Mature loving calls for resources as great as those which

sustain a person in carrying the burden of solitude or coping with
dependence.

John McDargh comments in this respect:

"In loving someone

we make ourselves vulnerable to the first and gravest threat to the
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integrity of the self--being bereft, abandoned, or disappointed by the
loved one(s)" (McDargh, 1983, p. 90).

Every time we love, there is a

real possibility that the trauma associated with earlier experiences of
living and leaving or loving and losing will be reawakened.
reverse side of that scenario is no less true.

But the

All past love

experiences in a person's life have been instances of profound knowing,
of contact with reality, of encounters with Mystery.

Experiences of

caring, nurturing and mutuality, and the psychic residues they leave,
are psychological resources a person has, to call on every time the
invitation to engage in a living encounter is given in the present.
Mutuality, compassion and mature loving, are both the goal of faith, and
the source of the development which eventually empowers an individual to
receive and to give love.
Just as we spoke of the notion of faith as foundational for the
shaping of a humanly meaningful environment into five distinct, though
related aspects, so now it may prove helpful to analyze the capacity for
love, self-affirmation and compassion into two component parts, chosen
because of their relevance to faith as a dynamic process (1) faith and
the capacity to overcome splitting, or the rejected heart and (2) faith
and the development of the capacity to give oneself.
Faith and the Capacity to Overcome
Splitting or the Rejected Heart
As we saw in Chapter I, Jack Shea describes in powerful imagery,
the rejected heart and its two pronged strategies.

With the first

prong, the rejected heart stabs at everything and everybody around it:
it sees everything in its devalued form--for it, sexual love can only be
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lust, dedication must be guilt; reason becomes rationalization and
neighborliness can only be egoism.
and evil all around.

In other words, it projects badness

Freud noticed the same phenomena, and, at least

towards the end of his life, spoke of Thanatos to explain it.

With its

second prong, the rejected heart gnaws away at the integrity of its own
inner core.

It is self-loathing.

anyone or anything,

It deems itself unworthy of love from

Poignantly Shea concludes, "it makes its home in

places where life is perishing" (1983, p. 157).
In these passages Shea is dealing in theological terms with a
phenomenon the Object Relations Theorists deal with in terms of
splitting.

Shea, at this point in his reflections, does not make

mention of the fact that the very people or things that are hated, are,
at the same time, the very people and things the individual longs for
and loves.

What is hated is loved; what is bad is good and good is bad.

Ambivalence is everywhere.

As I indicated a moment ago, when Freud met

these data in experience he proposed an instinct theory, a dual instinct
theory to account for them; alongside Thanatos, the aggressive drive, he
enthroned Eros, the libinal drive.

Object Relation Theorists see a

different solution--these affects are not only resident in people, but
they are also factors that are experienced in their interpersonal
relationships.
In our review of the work of Mahler and others, we have
repeatedly seen that it is normative that the caretaker frustrate the
wishes of the infant.

This happens even in the optimal case.

less than ideal cases the frustration level is higher.

In the

From the baby's

perspective there is the alternation between satisfaction and
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frustration, between pleasure and goodness on the one hand and between
discomfort and rage against the parent, on the other.
is:

The. question then

what does the child do with these conflicting affects?

treated this issue in any depth, previously.

We have not

We hypothesize the answer

that the child either "projects," and thereby locates the undesirable
affects in the external world, or he "introjects," whereby he takes in
those aspects of the interpersonal world that are associated with what
is good and satisfying.

Thus for example the child preserves the

goodness of the mother by projecting both hatred and love, goodness and
badness.

Insofar as his experience is concerned, the "hated" mother is

a different object from that of the "loved mother."

The child, in other

words has recourse to the defense of splitting.
Almost as though there were two separate and unconnected figures in
the universe, the child identifies as good the parental
representations associated with the memory of the satisfaction of
the need for closeness, acceptance, nurturance and the alleviation
of anxiety; and as bad those representations linked to the tension
of unfilled needs. (McDargh, 1983, p. 94)
As a child matures under normal conditions, he or she gradually comes to
recognize the "bad" bother and the "good" mother as a single figure--he
recognizes that she is sometimes frustrating and sometimes satisfying.
The child relates to a "whole" object.

As we would expect from what we

saw in Chapter II, as object representations change, so do selfrepresentations.

Thus, as the child develops a "whole" representation

of the mother, so she develops a "whole" self-representation, and
recognizes that she is capable of both love and hate, love and
aggression.

It is helpful to recall what Melanie Klein suggested about

the problems the child finds herself in, as she tries to work.out her
relationships with the world.

Klein proposed that the child, at various
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times, finds herself in one of three "positions":

the schizoid, the

paranoid, or the depressive position.
In the schizoid position the infant is withdrawn from object
relations. In the paranoid position, the infant is in relationship,
but feels persecuted by his objects. In the depressive position he
has overcome these difficulties and has become able to enter more
fully into whole object relationships, only to be exposed to iY.i.14
and depression over the discovery that he can hurt those he has
become capable of loving. (Guntrip, 1971, p. 61)
There are two things in this quotation that are especially
noteworthy for our purposes:

(1) Klein is saying that the child has

become capable of loving and (2) that this loving is associated with
guilt and depression.

In the "depressive position," the child needs to

make reparation for the injury that she perceives her anger as having
caused the parent.

Here, Object Relations Theorists propose, is the

starting point of the capacity for mutual role taking and for empathy.
The drift of my argument at this point is, that we have, at a
very early age, an orientation to look on ourselves as loving and loved
creatures, who are at home in the universe and intimately connected with
it.

We assume that the universe is kindly disposed towards us and

welcomes our initiatives.

But from the beginning, before we have had

the time to form even a primitive series of affects about our world, we
come up against the unyielding character of reality, and this eventually
arouses conflicting feelings within:

love and rage.

Introjection,

projection and splitting are only three members of a defensive arsenal
we form to help sustain a hopeful perception of the universe, and of
ourselves as lovable.
maneuvers we make.

Rizzuto documents the result of the defensive

She tells us that after we repress object-

representation, we repress self-representation and we "experience
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loneliness, emptiness, a fear of losing oneself, a feeling of being
abandoned."

I want to suggest that faith is a kind of antidote against

the distortions caused by all the defensive maneuvers we make.

Faith

can be such, because as we have seen, it breaks the tyranny of the sense
perception, it frees the imagination, gives birth to symbol, and allows
the individual to give meaning to events and circumstances.

Faith can

help a person, ·not to get rid of all projections and introjections, but
to mitigate these defenses against the ambivalence that splitting gives
rise to.

Faith teaches one to restrain one's polarization of the world

and self as all good and all bad in order to preserve a sense of self as
lovable and the world as a loving place.
Let us take an example to illustrate what I mean.
celebrating the second birthday of their child.
at the party.

A family is

Grandmother is present

Midway through the afternoon they run out of pop.

Grandmother offers to go to get some.

She goes out, starts her car, but

fails to see her grandson follows her.

She reverses the car, runs over

her grandson, and kills him

Many weeks later, and each day, she sits in

her sitting room, holding a cross in her hand, rocking gently over and
back, as she says "My God, you love me, I know you do, I trust you, help
me to go on."

The cross, for this woman, functions as a transitional

object; holding it in her hands, she enters into transitional
experience, and is no longer tied down by the brute, hard facts of the
situation.

The cross frees her imagination as well as her cognitive

functions.

Her situation is reshaped in such a way that she senses that

she can trust that Love, or God, is present even in this horror, in the
guilt and shame, in the loneliness and suffering that she feels.
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Because she can experience the situation in this way, give it meaning in
the light of the symbol of the cross, she does not have to judge herself
as all bad because of what happened, or bitterly recriminate against her
daughter for not watching her child better.

She can tolerate the

badness and the goodness present in both herself and in external
reality.

She can know the "whole" and this knowledge overcomes the

ambivalence she feels, supports mature self-love as well as other-love,
and promotes genuine intimacy with her family.
A person who knows in this manner, whose faith is like this,
realizes that most of the attachments he forms throughout his lifetime
are, at their best, less than the idealizations he makes of them, and at
their worst, better than the severity of his judgments would paint them
to be.

Such a person knows his own lovableness and value in spite of

the failures that might encourage self-devaluation.

Despite his non-

attainment of the lofty ideals and expectations he places on himself, he
is good, and more adequate than his worst fears would have him believe.
Faith describes an underlying assurance of goodness and possibility
that supports an awareness that the world as the object of my love
and attention is imperfect, fallible, frustrating, and yet,
confounding of all my efforts to divide it into good and bad,
acceptable and unacceptable, us and them, mine and yours. (McDargh,
1983, p. 95)
Faith as Empowerment for Radical
Self-Giving and Compassion
The touchstone of the importance of Jesus for John Shea is found
in the answer to the question "Is contact with the graciousness of
Mystery possible for us today, through Jesus of Nazareth?"

While his

answer to that question is in the affirmative, all is not light.

The

ambiguity of the situation we find ourselves in is due to the fact that
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Jesus is absent; that contact with him depends on our hearing and
telling the stories about him in the context of being in the presence of
other people.

People who gather to hear, tell, and celebrate the Jesus

stories, are often led to a startling discovery:

that what happened in

the lives of the men and women who encountered Jesus in the flesh,
continues to happen in their lives right now--their hope is rekindled,
they experience an expansion of conscious, undergo "metanoia," and
deepen their fellowship and commitment to one another.

The passion of

Mystery, for the well-being of all reality becomes their passion too. In the shorthand of the Christian tradition, they discover that Jesus
lives among them.

To account for this experience of absence which is

really presence, they say that the Spirit of Jesus is among them.
More than any other circumstance of the life of Jesus, it is the
cross and the stories it has generated, that reveal Mystery's
graciousness and compassion to Jesus, and through him, to all human
beings.

It is the cross that rivets the attention of Christians.

The

images associated with it, powerfully attract the human imagination.
They excite attitudes and values that govern behavior.

While the cross

proclaims Mystery's sustaining presence to human beings even in the
direst of circumstances, it no less eloquently speaks of Jesus' total
response and commitment both to his Father and to the well-being of his
fellow human beings:

the cross is Mystery's finest statement, and

example of compassionate service and creative empowerment for others.
Shea speaks of the cross doing three things for Christians:

it grounds

the Christian community, it is the symbol of its realism and an ongoing principle of critique (Shea,. 1978, pp. 157-60).

As a symbol of
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realism it is a reminder that responsible caring for others will entail
risk and suffering.

As a principle of critique the Cross states that

while Jesus came, and in the Spirit still comes, to establish a genuine,
nurturing human community, the machinations of self-protecting fear can
never be underestimated.

God on the cross speaks of his total

opposition to "the facile wisdom that power is for control and muscle
makes community" (1978, p. 160).

God on the Cross unmasks the use of

abusive power as a fear of life.

It is perhaps the first function of

the cross--as grounding the Christian community--that is of most
relevance to our concern here.

The cross clearly reveals God's self-

giving love, which liberates us from egoism and exploitation of others.
Since we have handed ourselves over to God and received ourselves back
from him, entrusted with his cause, we are empowered to belong to each
other in a life-giving manner.

The God in Jesus has taken the worst

that humans can do into himself and has turned it toward the good.
The law of the cross is not that evil has been eliminated but that
it has been transformed into possibility. The power of sin and
suffering which generated the anti-community styles of domination
and manipulation and deceit have been broken. If we dwell with the
cross of Christ, the compulsion to protect ourselves at all costs
yield to the possibilities of dialogue, respect and integrity. The
funding experience which makes Christian Community possible is God
on the Cross. (1978, p. 158)
A psychological analysis of what is involved in loving,
nurturing, intimacy and compassion, offers us important insights into
the humanside of the loving, respectful, holy (in the sense of
dignified), service to which the Gospel calls all people.

Psychology

can help illumine the process by which people are led to commit
themselves to the radical life of loving that is symbolized by the
cross.

What seems to be the case is that the capacity to be mutual in
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one's relationships, to be compassionate and available for service has
its source in the experience of fullness and completion of satisfying
primary relationships.
occasions:

We are back at a point we have made on several

where one has a history of satisfying object and self-

representations, then one has a capacity for more comprehensive, more
profound, and continuous sharing and compassionate engagement with
others.
It seems reasonable to hold that the same conditions which
induce a person to withdraw from human intimacy and to avoid taking risk
in caring for others, are also at work in the resistances that same
individual offers to an approach of love from Mystery or God.

To the

degree that an individual has experienced deprivation or neglect, whose
self and object representations are negative, to that degree we can
expect reluctance to enter the world of the Christian story of the Cross
and to develop a lifestyle that is characterized by acknowledgment of
the dignity of others and a commitment to them in a nurturing and caring
way.

Without the ability to sustain a sense of one's own reality, of

the reality of the external world, without the ability to self-soothe-which

presuppos~s

the internalizations of satisfying functions performed

by another for the individual, initially--then part of the person must
always be held back, there cannot be total commitment to the welfare of
another or others.

Wholehearted giving for such a person would pose a

grave threat to her sense of self and well-being.

All this suggests

that the prerequisite for authentic mutual loving and compassion is the
prior experience(s) of receiving care and compassion oneself--it is out
of a "fullness" that compassion flows.
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I am not suggesting that Mystery's approach to human beings is
curtailed by the psychological traumas a person may have experienced-as we have seen the cross is the symbol of Mystery's intense presence in
suffering contexts--what I am saying however, is that the person's
ability to receive Mystery's approach as gracious, and to respond to It,
as well as to translate his or her experience of Mystery into concrete,
caring strategies, may well be limited.
From a theological perspective, it is totally fitting to suggest
that the encounter with Mystery is therapeutic, that Mystery functions
as a kind of self-object that holds, mirrors, affirms the individual and
invites identification to the degree that he or she can form healthpromoting ideals.

Granted this, it remains true that, psychologically,

it is difficult for someone whose self and object representations are
negative, or threatening, to be compassionate, to serve and love after
the manner of Jesus going to the cross.
John Shea offers an insight that throws a slightly different
light on this issue.

As he often repeats, it is in and through our

immediate environments that we encounter Mystery, but the fact is that
these immediate environments are often hostile and ambiguous.

In that

case, Mystery's intentions towards us are perceived as inimical or
indifferent.

Once a person makes such a discernment, then he or she

must bring himself or herself into conformity with It, has to live out
of that indifference.

We "do not twist the Mystery to graciousness for

personal benefits" (1980, p. 65).

For such a person, the truth about

himself or herself is found in the constant presence of fear and anxiety
and the moments of graciousness and harmony are ultimately deception.
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If, on the other hand, the relationship to Mystery is truly gracious,
the effort is to move with graciousness, even though one may want to act
indifferently.
Once again, I think we can see a convergence between the
psychological and the theological perspectives.

Rizzuto has shown us

how the Image of God that we create, is totally bound up with the self
and object images that we have formed.

To have a representation of God

which is gracious and benign, implies that one's self-image is positive.
This in turn depends on the "good-enough" mirroring, holding and
nurturing that an individual has received.

To be gifted with a positive

God-representation implies that an individual has the resources to
pursue the on-going task of self-integration, and of confirming one's
relationship with self-objects--people and things.

The contribution of

Object Relations makes it perfectly understandable that a person whose
image of Mystery is negative, will be unable to pursue either selfintegration or creative, healing activity in his or her world:

the

accompanying self and object images or representations means that the
person has to busy himself or herself in the task of self-defense.
Let us examine both of these scenarios--of the healthy and less
healthy person--and seek to understand further dimensions of the
dynamics, from both a theological and psychological viewpoint, which
ground radical self-giving and compassion.
healthy person first.

We will take the case of the

For Shea, behaviors flow from values and

attitudes, which in turn are shaped by images, which are part of the
legacy bequeathed by stories which are ways of explicitating the nature
of the gracious relationship with Mystery, grasped in the moment of
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knowing it.

We have seen how the great Judea-Christian images of rescue

and covenant, judgment and apocalypse, of resurrection and parousia, all
come together, to weave stories of hope and justice, which are the
source of the horizons which shape human worlds of justice and
compassion, respect and solidarity; we have seen how images of creation
and incarnation, Spirit and Church, unfold into behavior patterns, which
speak of equality and respect.

I perceive a convergence between this

point of view, and Object Relations, at the point where the latter talk
about the qualities of the healthy self (cf. p. 147, above).

When the

self develops into a healthy, cohesive self he or she enjoys a healthy
level of self-esteem, such healthy esteem expresses itself through a set
of goals and values, which in turn guide the person's use of his or her
autonomous ego-functions.

Healthy self-esteem is the source of the

values which urge a compassionate reaching out to others, and sustains
the ability for mutuality in intimate relations.
Then, there is the case of the person who has been traumatized,
who has experienced either serious or even mild and intermittent failure
in the care offered by important others in his or her life.

Elaborate

classifications have been made of the disorders that result when a
person's self has not been able to develop satisfactorily.

Clinicians

speak of psychotic conditions, borderline personality disorders,
narcissistic behavior disorders, narcissistic personality disorders as
well as of psychoneuroses.

A clinical description of these conditions

is not necessary for our purposes here.

It suffices, just to refer to

some of the behavior-patterns of people, who have not a cohesive sense
of self.

I use the description of these behavior patterns given by E.
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s.

Wolf (1988, p. 73).

~rsonality,

In the case of people who have a Mirror Hungry

they like to display themselves to attract the attention of

others, and in the attention they get, they find the counterbalance of
the worthlessness they feel.

People whose personality is what Wolf

calls the Ideal ttungry Personality can only experience self-esteem if
they have someone to whom they look up.
leads to fragmentation of the self.

Any impugning of the ideal

If one has an Alter-Ego Hungry

fersonality then one needs confirmation through association with another
self whose opinions, values and appearance one shares.

Some peoples'

behavior is intended to give them the experience of merger with another
and thus to control the other.

Often the need to control is experienced

by the other as a feeling of being oppressed, because the hungry person
cannot bear the other's independence or separation.
behavior pattern of the Merger Hungry fersonality.
Contact Sbunning fersonality.

Such is the
Finally there is the

The symptoms in this behavior pattern are

the strategies the person employs to keep others at a distance, even at
the moment when they experience an intense need for contact.

Wolf

mentions two constellations of behaviors--the schizoid and the paranoid.
There are certain in-built dangers in the efforts such people
make to appropriate the story of the Cross, in particular.

Above, we

said that the cross liberates us from egoism, and that it reminds us
that care for others entails risk and suffering.

If these two functions

of the cross are not balanced by the third function, that of critique,
whereby each person is attuned to the particular ways in which he or she
falls a victim to fear and anxiety, then a form of life may evolve that
is anything but Christian:

often a perverse lifestyle is dressed up in
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Christian clothing.

Behaviors as diverse as aggression and humiliating,

shame-provoking unassertiveness--to which people with the "hungry"
personalities, may well be addicted--are interpreted as the cost
involved in "carrying the cross," and the highest expression of "selfsacrificing love."

Shea, as usual, graphically puts it thus:

"Asking

people to stretch their skins is one thing, asking them to leave their
skins behind is another" (1984, p. 160).
that love goes wrong.

He documents the terrible ways

One of its most soul-destroying forms is that of

identification, when the lover becomes the beloved, when the self is
lost in the other.

"This total love-alchemy, turning into another does

not respect the non-fluidity of the self and definite 'not-me-ness' of
all other people" (p. 175).
There are antidotes to such perversions.

First, let the

theologian say how an abusive spirituality of the cross may be avoided.
Beyond recourse to the critical function of the cross itself, mentioned
above, there is a further remedy:

tell the Story of the Cross within

the Story of Creation and Incarnation--as John Shea does.

These

stories, as we have seen, are the celebration of God's delight--and
ours--in the goodness of all there is, and its readiness to receive and
bear God's presence.

Such being the case, one can use the category of

"dignity" as the means of regulating one's encounter with, and
appreciation of, the whole of reality--which includes the person's own
self.

As I wrote earlier,

dignity is the basis of meaning, which Shea proposes, is found when
each person senses, and knows, that he or she is related to the
larger context within which he or she moves. Once the meaning of
one's life is grasped a deeper question emerges: "Do I have worth?"
. . . God's sabbath presence speaks of that worth too. (pp. 66-67,
above)
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If a person inhabits this world shaped by the Story of the Cross within
the Story of Creation and Incarnation, then his or her life is peopled
by images which form attitudes, which in turn prompt concrete strategies
in a lifestyle that is aptly characterized as one of "trust and
freedom."

When we try to interpret this in Object Relations terms, we

are sent back to a suggestion that Rizzuto makes, which we dealt with in
Chapter III.

There we saw her looking to the characters, the heroes and

heroines of the religious stories, as complementary or alternative
models to one's family or friends (who, as we know are the source of our.
object representations, and as such impact our self and God
representations).

These figures may become people with whom we wish to

identify, and in the identification with them, have our worth validated.
Moreover, as I have said elsewhere, the stories may function as
transitional objects, facilitating transitional experience.

In this

case, the characters may function as a kind of "self-object" which holds
the self, empowering it to face life's terror, and to achieve a sense of
its own cohesiveness which experiences, simultaneously, both the fact of
separation and secure attachment to another.

When the self is in this

situation, then it can reach out to others in radical self-giving and
compassion.
Self-Sacrifice and Egual Regard
Self-sacrifice may well be something extremely unhealthy and
anti-Christian--such is the position we have outlined above.

Is there

then, no place at all for self-sacrifice, in the world of the person
with a cohesive self, who reads the stories of the Cross in a-healthy
way?

In the storied-world of creation-incarnation-cross, interpersonal
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relationships are expressions of the equality, mutuality and liberating
service to which one is committed.

Spontaneously, we want to find a

place for self-sacrifice in this world.

Shea states it plainly:

"Christian love demands a sacrifice" (1975, p. 172).

He turns to the

Christological Hymn of Phil. 2:5ff., and focuses in on the verse which
reads:

"Yet he did not cling to his equality with God."

Thus, he

concludes, the true nature of divinity is the outward movement towards
all reality.
false god.

A god who would stand on his privileges at all costs, is a
Such a god "has subordinated his true selfhood to his ego,"

which is the self determined to protect itself from suffering and
anxiety.
Only when the ego is dissolved can the self move outward in genuine
presence to the other. With this understanding, kenosis, the selfemptying of God, is also paradoxically his self-becoming.
If the love of God dissolved the ego and expanded the self to
include humankind, the Christian is urged to participate in the same
dynamic. (p. 173)
Shea has raised an important issue here, but I find his solution vague.
The only thing to be sacrificed is the ego, the self in its fearful,
protective aspects.

I turn at this point to the work of Louis Janssens

who has recovered an important part of the Christian tradition and who
helps us deal more adequately with the issue of how we should consider
self-sacrifice.

For Janssens, self-sacrifice is not the ideal of the

Christian life, as so much of the tradition would have it.
have no disagreement with this.
reflection, as in this quotation:

Shea would

Next, Janssens launches a new line of
"In short, self-sacrifice is not the

quintessence of love . . . . Self-sacrifice is justified derivatively
from other-regard" (quoted by Browning, 1988, p. 152).

By other-

regard, Janssens means a regard for the other that is rooted in the

224
dignity, equality, and mutuality that are part of the world, which in
Shea's terms, is shaped by the story of the Cross told within the story
of Creation and Incarnation.

Then, continues Janssens:

In accord with the impartiality of ~. we maintain that one is to
have equal regard for self and others, since the reason for valuing
the self are identical with those for valuing others, namely that
everyone is a human being . . . . Valuing the self, as well as others
remains a manifest obligation. (Quoted by Browning, p. 151)
Commenting on Janssens, Browning goes on to conclude that we must regard
and love the neighbor equally as ourselves, and we must do this, even if
the neighbor does not reciprocate our regard and love, or actively works
against us.

When we do this, it is not because such loving is an end in

itself, but because it is part of the fundamental obligation of
mutuality and equal regard for the self and neighbor.
As long as human beings live in a world of finitude and sin, perfect
mutuality will not prevail within the context of human affairs.
There will always be unbalance, inequality and injustice. The
Christian concept of ~. does entail an active, self-giving,
self-sacrificial effort to restore mutuality, when it has broken
down . . . . Christians should do this [be self-sacrificing] not as
an end in itself, but as a transition to the restoration and
maintenance of true equal-regard and mutuality. (pp. 152-53)
There is need to add a few clarifications to this.

The impartiality of

self-love and other regard demands that we must be quite clear on the
distinction between meeting the other's needs and submitting to
exploitation by the other.

Exploitation is to be opposed because it

turns a person into an object and robs him or her of dignity.

Moreover

we must resist exploitation not only in the name of our own dignity, but
for the sake of the other as well (p. 153).
We have seen how Object Relations Theorists have an interest in
fragmentation of the self, and the conditions which result from this,
which I have suggested are the psychological concomitants of the rather
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sickly spirituality and theology of suffering that is sometimes peddled
under the banner of "Christian."

A world created in tune with the

stories and images generated by the telling of the Crucifixion story
within the context of the Creation and Incarnation, has many affinities
with the world which clinicians, working out of Object Relations Theory,
hope to encourage.

In both these worlds, people interact with firm

boundaries drawn around their own self, yet not inflexibly so.

Neither

the rugged individualist, nor the relentless altruist, is the most
honored and welcomed citizen of this world--except insofar as they are
invited to grow strong so that neither fear nor anxiety tears them
apart.

In both these worlds, it is the quality of the interpersonal,

mutual relationships that provide the healing environment, wherein the
fragmented self (Object Relations) or the rejected heart (Shea) can
begin the process towards integration or healing.
Depth Metaphors and

Obli~ation

Both as one reads, and talks with, John Shea, one is struck by
his passion and concern for dealing with the present circumstances of
the concrete, flesh and blood people who are part of his world.

It is

the successes and failures, the joys and anxieties, loves and fears of
the present that are the raw data to which he brings the Stories, images
and values of the Christian tradition, in order to create meaning and to
empower people to transcend their present horizons.

Yes, human beings

can transcend the environments--of self, family, society, nature and
cosmos--to which each person is so

intim~tely

related, and which, at the

same time, powerfully shape the lives of every living, feeling and
knowing human being.

Out of this transcendence, flows a future for each
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person, whose contours, as a result of the stories they tell, consists
of trust, freedom, hope and justice.
On the other hand, Object Relations Theorists, have a sensitive

concern for the past, or better how the past, in the form of the living,
emotionally charged representations of parents, early caregivers,
siblings and of many significant childhood possessions, continues to
survive, and exert influence in the present.
I first became aware of these two perspectives while studying
Shea's theology and Object Relations Theory.
Don Browning generalizes this insight.

Later, I discovered that

He argues that it is the task of

theology to look forward, to think "prospectively" and to outline life's
goals.

He sees the tasks of clinical psychology as very different.

Its

genius is to be able to think "retrospectively" and to help us
understand the key connections between biology, familial and social
influences, and the formation of the self
Theology has few concepts to assist in this retrospective analysis.
With the advent of the clinical psychologies with their special
languages to accomplish this task, we have a remarkable opportunity
to forge new disciplinary alliances which will help provide both
powerful procedures for retrospective analysis and powerful
normative and prospective images of human fulfillment. (1988, p.
11)
It is my hope that the present chapter has already illustrated how one
particular modern psychology can reinforce and expand a modern
theological enterprise.

There is another set of questions that come to

mind as we work with these two disciplines.

Now it is time to put the

shoe on the other foot, as it were, and to scrutinize the psychology in
the light of the theology.
the psychology.

There are questions that need to be asked of

Is it a pure science?

Where does its metaphors of
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ultimacy cross the boundaries of pure science?

At what point does it

stop being purely concerned with health issues and become prescriptive?
Can we describe the characteristics of this ethical view, its ethical
principles--its deontology--and its ideals of the virtuous life--its
aretaic preferences?

What has theology to say about this ethics and its

funding depth metaphors which function as world creating images?
Theology, which is self-reflectively the carrier of a particular
world view and accompanying ethical values is entitled to engage
psychology, which is much less aware of the ethical and/or "religious"
(in the sense of ultimate, world-creating)

b~ggage

it implies.

Psychologists have been known to protest their innocence of either the
intention, or the fact, of crossing over the boundaries of "pure
science" into the domains of ethics, religion and philosophy.
protests are not always convincing.

Their

We turn now to the task of

delimiting the ethics that may be carried by Object Relations Theory and
practice.

We will critique it with the ethics that we have seen are

congenial to the theology of John Shea.
It is fair to say that Object Relations Theory gives a clear
view of what its practitioners think human fulfillment is.
is found in healthy existence and living.

Fulfillment

Health is the fruit of the

formation of an integrated or cohesive self.

I follow the lead taken by

Don Browning--speaking of Kohut--(1988; p. 221) and use an Eriksonian
term, generativity, as a description of the meaning of health, for the
Object Relations "school."

For them, the basic

crit~rion

of health is

"a relatively nonconflictual capacity to care for the succeeding
generations" (p. 221).

In Mahler, this criterion is met in the picture
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she draws of the mother who enters the "species specific symbiosis" in
order to provide for the survival of the child (1975, p. 77).

The

mother's capacities are fine-tuned to meet the deficits of the infant's
own abilities.

Winnicott's parental functions of holding, mirroring,

and object realizing (cf. pp. 100, 128 above) are further aspects of
this fit between mother and child, that is the sin gua non condition for
health.

Recall that the experiences generated in "good-enough-

mothering" influence the person, throughout the life-cycle, since they
become part of the primary representations of self and object that for
the person's core self.

So we are talking here of health throughout the

life-span and not merely in childhood.

Object Relations practitioners

have thus developed their criterion of health, and as such, observation
and repeated testing can show whether this criterion is adequate or not.
But the issue here for us, is whether these people move to making this
health-criterion a statement of the goal of life, including its
psychobiological dimensions.

Do they move from the isness of health to

the ou&htness of obligation?

I suggest that Winnicott is certainly one

who does.

His view is that the phenomenon that he has called "primary

maternal preoccupation" (p. 100, above) "gives the mother the ability to
do the right thing.

She knows what the baby could be feeling like.

one else does" (1960, p. 15).

He wrote an article on

Advisin~

No

Parents,

and the message to doctors and nurses was "don't" or tread like angels
if you do!

It is much safer to rely on the mother's instincts as these

come from her "primary maternal preoccupation."

A clear statement of

how the health criterion becomes an ethical statement.

Without being

able to prove conclusively that other Object Relations practitioners do
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the same thing, I suspect they do.

For instance their clinical goals of

providing an empathic, caring environment, in order to provide the
client with the opportunity to reexperience the early stages of
development, and thus integrate the split or repressed parts of the ego,
certainly points in this direction.
We have used the Eriksonian word "generative" to describe what
Object Relations Theorists propose as a criterion of health and as an
ethical imperative.

In its original context generative means, not

simply the ability to create, but the capacity to care for what one·
creates.

Erikson's own words are that care "is the widening concern for

what has been generated, by love necessity or accident; it overcomes the
ambivalence adhering to irreversible obligation" (quoted by Browning,
1988, p. 222).

Showing his reluctance to depart from his Freudian

psychobiological legacy, Erikson.maintains that there is an instinctual
basis for generativity:

"[Both animals and humans] instinctively

encourage in their young what is ready for release" (quoted from
Identity. Youth and Crisis, in Browning, 1988, p. 222).

That is not the

whole story, as Browning's amendment of Erikson states:
Really mature forms of generativity entail a subtle synthesis of
instinctual needs of various kinds, early ego-strengths and virtues,
and an artful coordination of these accrued powers with the
developmental needs of those for whom we have been assigned to care.
(p. 222)
Although I cannot remember meeting the term in the Object
Relations literature, I do not think that we are doing such people as
Winnicott and Mahler an injustice, by suggesting that they talk of a
reality that is close to what Erikson conceptualizes as generativity.
These authors, while welcoming many of Freud's insights, went beyond his
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focus on the crises of the Oedipal Complex as the unique source of
disturbed psychic functioning.

We have seen how they adopted the

insights he had developed around the formation of the Superego, to the
development of the Ego, a term that for them, describes the processes
through which the person relates and adapts to the environment.
Attachment, affection, bonding, assertiveness and exploration are their
favored concepts in describing the fundamental motivational directions
of human beings, rather than libido, aggression, Eros or Thanatos, as
was the case with Freud.

Their changed perceptions of what human

motivation consists in, gives birth to the criterion of human
fulfillment that we have seen earlier:
succeeding generations.

the capacity to care for

This criterion of fulfillment accords a vital

role to the optimal parent, a role the parent must fulfill, if the child
is to survive, or develop healthily, and if the parents, or at least the
mother, is to achieve the fulfillment for which she has the innate
potential.

Thus while Object Relations Theorists have their roots

firmly planted in Freudian soil, and make no pretense of shaking off all
traces of a psychobiological view (excluding Fairbairn and Guntrip),
they are not adverse to taking in nourishment from humanistic
psychologists like Maslow, for whom self-actualization was the supreme
aim of development, and the highest good.
We need to examine further, the role accorded to the optimal
parent if we are to understand the nature of the ethics carried by
Object Relations Theory.

Winnicott calls her the "good-enough-mother,"

a phrase taken up by Mahler.

This parent knows not only when to

satisfy, but is expert too, in optimally frustrating the child, for the
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sake of development.

Kohut catches the nature of the role of the

optimal parent when he writes:
Optimal parents--again I should rather say: optimally failing
parents--are people who, despite their stimulation by and
competition with the rising generation, are also sufficiently in
touch with the pulse of life, accept themselves as transient
participants in the on-going stream of life, to be able to
experience the growth of the next generation with unforced,
nondefensive joy. (Quoted from Tbe Restoration of the Self, p. 237,
by Browning, 1988, p. 223)
Although Kohut is a Self-Psychologist, there is nothing in this
quotation which would be offensive to the position of the broad spectrum
of Object Relations practitioners.

For Mahler, no less than Kohut, the

parent is "optimally failing," sufficiently in touch with her own
feelings, and the baby's life, that she know when to support, and when
to withdraw, when to envelop the next generation with affection, and
when to separate.
Ethically, what we have in this position is, according to
Browning, a marriage of a theory of self-actualization and a theory of
motivation that finds a place for limited altruism.

There ia. motivation

to offer care to the next generation, a biological motivation, and in
offering care, the parent attains the heights of self-actualization.
Self-actualization is the highest good towards which one may aspire.
The roots of this good are found in the biological make-up of the
mother, since it is her innate capacities, capacities triggered by cues
from the child, that push her into that psychic space that Winnicott
described as "primary maternal preoccupation."

At this point, Object

Relations Theorists join Erikson, and conflate self-actualization and
the generative care of the succeeding generation, as the deepest and
most significant of human motives.

All of these clinicians then, find
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themselves in the happy position that what they consider to be their
principle of obligation--one must care for the succeeding generation-is profoundly congruent with the deepest inclinations and motives of the
human being.

The highest good, self-actualization, is achieved by

fulfilling the obligation, which simultaneously, is the basic natural
instinct.
The result of this is that one has a moral obligation to do that
which deep down one wants to do. Or to say it differently, it is
morally justifiable to do what one is inclined to do, because what
one is inclined to do is moral. (Browning, 1988, p. 225)
If we turn to Shea's theological perspective at this point, we
can see that he would appreciate the notion of care for the next
generation.

In the world shaped by the Christian stories, people would

indeed by available as soothing, empowering self-objects for others.

In

fact we have already seen how a solid cohesive self makes compassionate
loving possible.

However, Shea and the tradition of which he is a part

would, I think, show reserve for the formulation of the fundamental·
ethical principle of Object Relations Theory:

one ought to care for the

succeeding generations, and from its choice of the highest nonmoral
good:

self-actualization.

They are too restrictive.

The experience of

life's giftedness, the sense of reconciliation with the cosmos, and with
everyone and everything in it, are more likely candidates for that
honor.

Self-actualization might well figure on a list of the nonmoral

goods available, but would not emerge on top.
As I suggested earlier, the ethical principle that comfortably
fits the theological outlook of John Shea is that enunciated by Janssens
who claims that the fundamental ethical principle is "one ought have
equal regard for others and for self."

This is based on Mystery's on-
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going self-revelation within human experience, as this is interpreted in
the light of the Incarnation-Creation stories.

We also saw, at that

point in our discussion, how this tradition makes place for the idea of
self-sacrificing love, where this does not entail the loss of dignity or
make room for exploitation.

The overall judgment then, is that while

the ethical positions are not incompatible with those of this
theological tradition, they are narrower and less all-encompassing.
Erikson, aware of the criticisms levelled against his position,
has made some bold moves to interpret the notion of generativity, and
hence the fundamental principle that goes with it, so that the latter is
broadened and approaches the theological position that we have examined
(cf. Browning, 1988, p. 227).

Since we have seen that there is a near

identity between the meaning of generativity in Object Relations circles
and in Erikson, we can admit that the ethical principle of their
position can be reinterpreted in the same direction as that of Erikson.
In an article entitled Tbe Golden Rule in the

Li~ht

of New

Insi~ht,

he

proposes a restatement of the golden rule in the light of his
understanding of the kind of mutuality that occurs in instances of real
generativity.

Thus the scriptural "Do unto others as you would have

them do unto you" becomes the Eriksonian "truly worthwhile acts enhance
a mutuality between the doer and the other--a mutuality which
strengthens the doer even as it strengthens the other" (1988, p. 227).
Hence there is a major, rapprochement, but not an identity, between his
position and that of Janssens.
In his book on Ghandi, through a fresh interpretation of the
theory of nonviolence, Erikson, not only extends his theory of
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generativity, but also his interpretation of the golden rule, to include
self-sacrifice.

He takes his start from Ghandi's own position:

"That

line of action is alone just, which does not hurt either party to the
dispute."

Erikson interprets Ghandi as saying that this meant that

truthful action (nonviolence) was governed by a readiness to get hurt
oneself, but without hurting anyone else.
Erikson sees this (i.e., Ghandi's position) as similar to his
interpretation of the golden rule, even though the form of these
statements evolves far more around not doing harm than it does
around the more expansive mutual activation seen in his version of
the golden rule. Nonetheless these statements build into his ethics
of generative mutuality a place for self-sacrifice, that is, a
readiness for getting hurt. (Browning, 1988, p. 228)
"Getting hurt" is clearly something much more than what is involved in
mutual relating.

The person involved in nonviolent action, who seeks to

help another change from nonviolent action to more just action, is
willing to suffer himself, without hurting the other.

At least,

temporarily he is willing to go beyond an ethic of mutuality.

In this

he moves towards the position of Janssens, who sees a place for selfsacrifice, as a "transitional strategy" designed to get a mutual
relationship back in place, and to restore or establish for the first
time, a regime of justice and equal regard.
Metaphors of Ultimacy
The fact that, as psychologists and disciples of a particular
school of psychology, they may unwittingly buy into a particular form of
ethics, may not be the only feature of their preferences to which
clinicians may pay scant attention.

Are they cognizant of the

fundamental metaphors which fund these ethics?
prefer?

Which Metaphors do they

As was the case with ethics, so in the case of depth metaphors:
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theology has its preferences, and is self-conscious in its use of them-after all its task is to talk of Mystery, the Transcendent, or God, and
it must have recourse to metaphors to do so.

Thus, it will be

interested to dialogue with, and critique other methodologies which use
metaphors of the ultimate, in order to test their adequacy, to learn
from them, or reject their inadequacies, when and where it discovers
them.
We begin with John Shea's theology.

Without justifying the

claim made, I propose that there are eight basic metaphors, all drawn
from the heart of the Christian theological tradition, especially in its
Catholic form, underlying his theology, and which he uses to appropriate
and make conscious the Mystery-human relationship and its consequences
for the creation of a meaningful, human, world.
in my reading of Shea is that of

~.

The central metaphor,

He repeatedly insists that

Mystery is Graciousness, Grace is God's name.
Mystery is revealed in our relationship to It.

The graciousness of
Shea uses the creation

stories to celebrate the hospitality the whole of creation extends to
the human species, and our status as Mystery's trusted friends in
creation.

Everything, of course, is not all right.

Human freedom has

given rise to the phenomenon of the panicked heart, or .§in.

It is this

which threatens, and is a source of destructiveness in everyone's life.
There are however relationships which pulls us up short, maybe
frequently in some cases, and encourage a change of heart, conversion.
Other relationships and experiences may be cause for celebration, make
life not only tolerable, but harmonious, and confirm that we are on
track--Shea talks of Metaphors of rescue and redemption.

We sell
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ourselves short, if we focus our eyes uniquely on the present, because
the present bears seeds that will flourish only in the future.

We have

hopes of fulfillment--and the metaphor of escatholo&y allows us to talk
of them.

None of us enjoy the present, hope for the future, suffer the

ill effects of freedom badly used, experience the call to change, or
rejoice in creation, all alone.

There are others around us, with whom

we may choose to form an authentic human community, hence the metaphor
of church.

The final metaphor that I see as playing a vital role in

Shea's theology, is one that is different from the others, in that it is
more philosophical, and that is the metaphor of the human person as
guestioner.

It is this metaphor which permits him to express the

transcendental nature of the human person.
Let us turn to the metaphors in Object Relations Theory, which
according to Don Browning, function in a way that is analogous to the
way metaphors operate in religious discourse.
These deep metaphors give these psychologies their images of the
fundamental possibilities of life. They convey a set of basic
beliefs about what can be expected from life and hoped for in life.
They do not necessarily dictate the content of their implicit
ethics, but they set a context that supports or constrains what
seems ethically possible or required. (Browning, 1988, p. 230)
Since I am not proposing to do an in-depth analysis of the texts of the
Object Relations Theorists, I tentatively suggest that a basic metaphor
that guides their view of the world is that of harmony.

The ultimate

aim of life is for every person to attain the highest possible selfintegration possible, and through this process, an unfolding of their
potential--biological as well as psychological--will occur.

The

unfolding of one person's potential will not interfere with that of
another.

In fact, the greater self-integration an individual achieves,
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the more he or she will contribute to the integration of other selves.
Hence harmony is promoted, when the processes of the psychological
birthing of the human person are promoted.

The ethical position which

corresponds with this best is that of ethical egoism, which Frankenna
describes in the following way:
ethical egoism holds that one is always to do what will promote the
greatest good--that an act is right if and only if it promotes at
least as great a balance of good over evil for [a person] in the
long run, as any alternative would. (1977, p. 15)
The distance between this position and that of the ethical position
compatible with Shea's theology is enough to show that if harmony were
the only or even the principle metaphor guiding Object Relations Theory,
there would be major irreconcilable differences between them.

In the

world of the ethical egoist, as Browning points out, where all
potentialities complement, the need for mutuality as the core of
morality is obscured.

Reversible thinking--of putting oneself into

another's shoes on moral issues--is not necessary.
Because there can be no conflict between my potentialities and the
potentialities of others, it is not necessary for me to reach out
and imagine how the other person feels about something and to
moderate my claims or restrict the actualization of my
potentialities in such a way as to make it possible for others to
meet their needs as well. (Browning, 1988, p. 139)
However there is another aspect of Object Relations Theory that
we need to look at.
most

cl~arly

Winnicott is possibly the one we have seen, who

typifies what I am getting at.

At the birth of her child

the mother enters into a state that he calls "primary maternal
preoccupation" and in this state she can intuit the needs of her infant
in a way no one else can.

The state gradually diminishes, and at the

appropriate time, the mother begins to optimally frustrate her child.
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In Mahler's paradigm there is a "fit" between the developmental
potential of the child .and her need, on the one hand, and the maternal
potential for care.

Some developmentalists have referred to this as

co&wheelin& between mother and child.

The potentialities which are

referred to here, are psychobiological to a large degree, but
nonetheless in the context of this psychology, this metaphor takes on
the functions which in other systems would be attributed to God.
Because of this cogwheeling the child is offered the opportunity to
experience the world as basically trustworthy, and himself as
fundamentally real--a sense of "that I am."
basic than that of harmony.

This metaphor, is more

This metaphor creates the opportunity to

introduce the notion of mutuality and equal regard.

The mother mirrors

the child, affirms him or her and in time, will recognize the look of
recognition and response in her child's eye.

The child's withdrawal

from Autism, in Mahler's phrase, is a celebration of the mother's
contribution to the child's development.

Again, Winnicott's idea of

"primary maternal preoccupation" refers to a phenomenon, that in
theological circles might well be referred to as self-sacrifice.
Winnicott says "there may be a willingness as well as an ability
to drain interest from her own self onto the baby" (1960, p. 15).

This

metaphor then, promotes considerable opportunity for agreement, between
Shea's theology and the psychology of Object Relations Theorists.
By this brief consideration of the deep metaphors that govern
both the theology and psychology we have worked with, we acknowledge the
necessity of engaging these two disciplines, at this level.
way aspires to completeness.

It in no

We see such an engagement as benefitting
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the psychology in particular, and helping it to recognize where it
leaves the frontiers of science behind, and tends to develop into a
fully fledged weltanschauun&.
Having identified the metaphor of "grace," which as I have
suggested is Mystery's name, or in traditional language, God's name, as
the central metaphor of Shea's theological efforts, I now turn to the
task of uncovering the genesis of the corresponding God-representation
which underlies it.

CHAPTER V
FALLING THROUGH DISENCHANTMENT--AND THE RETURN
The reality is the speaker, not the
spoken.
--John Shea
In this chapter I shall try to discern some characteristics of
the dominant God-representations that play a role in funding John Shea's
theology.

The data with which I will work has been gathered, not only

from the three books referred to in Chapter II, but also from a series
of five interviews which John Shea consented to do with me, between
April and August, 1991.

Each interview lasted about one and one-half

hours and was conducted in his apartment at Mundelein Seminary.
There are severe handicaps in attempting to do this,

First, the

data from both these sources is not clinical data, nor have I been John
Shea's counselor.

Therefore this data is public by nature and is not

likely to be, consistently, the most personal or dynamically significant
material in this man's life.

The second major limitation is that there

is no possibility to lend the security of anonymity to the disclosures
made in the interviews.

This means that there is a deliberate censoring

of material discussed in the interviews.

Not only did John Shea make it

clear that such would be the case in our initial interview, but I am
satisfied that ethically, this is as it should be--his personal dignity
and right to privacy demand it.

The third limitation on the collection
240
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of the data stems from the fact that it was not possible for John Shea
to complete the God-questionnaire, developed by Rizzuto, in time for me
to include the information on it here.

This was due to illness.

At the time of this study, Jack Shea if fifty years of age.

He

is at that stage in his life, which, according to the relevant
literature, we can expect that some critical assessments of the course
of his life, and its achievements will be in progress.

Typically, the

mid-life phase is experienced as a time when there is a growing
awareness of one's finitude, accompanied by an inevitable regret for
choices not made, or opportunities missed.

It is a time when people

discover an uncertainty and a danger in life, the likes of which has not
been their.companion since adolescence.

But it is a time of opportunity

too, a time when questions of ultimacy, of what is the grounding of
value, of knowing and of being, raise their heads; decisions about how
one wants to live out one's remaining allotted time of "three score and
ten" years (the psalmist says those who are lucky live this long) need
to be made.

Many people in this age bracket find that unresolved issues

in identity may suddenly burst forth into consciousness, and insistently
demand attention.

The patterns of psychological cohesion and

equilibrium which have been carefully established in the earlier lifestages begin to shatter when faced with both the new circumstances that
mid-life brings with it and the new possibilities with which one is
faced.

The way ahead often depends on how the person is open or not, to

examine, and use the personal resources that he or she has developed up
until now.
We turn now to the case of John Shea, and attempt to trace,
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albeit in a sketchy manner, one of the resources un undoubtedly brings
with him in negotiating his journey into the future.
Introduction
At this time, John Shea is dealing with a painful and
incapacitating back ailment, which has confined him to his apartment.
One would never suspect now, he says, but he once was a very
accomplished athlete, who was a skilled basketball player, and
accomplished golfer, and who was always selected for the baseball team.
This was so much the case that, as a seminarian, he was categorized as a
"jock" and was the master of sports.

John speaks about these things in

a warm, humorous way, and I was struck by the straightforwardness and
firmness of his manner of speaking.

His self-presentation communicates

an air of self-confidence coupled with a no-nonsense readiness to get
things done.

He strikes one as a man who knows how to work hard, but

who enjoys life intensely, and who can throw back his head and laugh
heartily at life's ups and downs.

This sense of self-possession, takes

on special significance against the background of a story that he tells
about his seminary days.

As we shall see, it is a story about

disenchantment, of the cracking of protective casings, which often give
rise to a complacency or even idolatry in a person's life.

Once he had

gone through this, he found an inner source of strength and resources
which continue to lend a solidity and depth to his life.

It is true to

say, that it is this sense of solidity of his own self, that gives
direction to his life, and which ground the three virtues of the
creative person:

courage, humility and the ability to laugh at oneself.
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Childhood and Family Structure
John Shea was born on Chicago's West side, in 1941, and lived
there during all his childhood and adolescence.

He is one of three

children, having a sister who is eight years his senior and a second
sister who is four years his junior.
Irish.

His family is solidly Catholic and

This part of Chicago, at that time, was home to a community of

people predominantly Catholic and Jewish.
says, "before I ever met a protestant."

"I was twenty-eight," he
Though that is something of an

exaggeration, there is a real truth to the claim.

While the Austin area

of Chicago was not exactly a Catholic "ghetto," there was a very
powerful Catholic presence there.

His family was a committed, church-

going family, who sent their children to Catholic school.

His father

was a member of the Chicago police force, whose earning power in the
fifties ranged between $5,000 to $6,000, per annum and who provided well
for his family.

His mother was a homemaker.

The Shea family lived in

the typical "Chicago-two-flat" which was owned by the maternal
grandparents, who rented the upper apartment of the building to their
daughter and son-in-law.
John used a striking metaphor to describe the relationship
between himself and his parents.

I think he uses it in a way that

speaks volumes.
They are significant to me in the way that someone who has a
butterfly in their hands and who let the butterfly fly away, is
significant. The hand doesn't make the butterfly, but it lets it
go. The hand nurtures the butterfly . . . may be that's the trick.
He insists, time and time again, on how his parents gave him "tremendous
freedom," for which he is grateful and which still prompts him-to love
them.

His father especially, encouraged independence.

John has
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recently seen a photograph of his father holding him, as a baby, on his
knee.

While he has placed his police cap on his he?d.

memories of his father are from a later time.

His earliest

His father frequently

took him to basketball games and these are perhaps the earliest memories
he has of him.

He can remember his father consoling him after he had

played a match and things had gone wrong, or again, complementing him
when things went well.

When he did an imaginative re-creation of his

home experience, he returned to a time when he was eight.
"waking-dream," he came home at lunchtime.

In this

His mother was present, but

his father was not there, which surprised him at first, until he
remembered that it was lunchtime, and his father would have been working
a nightshift, and was sleeping.
dinnertime.

Though these images were quite vivid, he did not have a

conversation with his father.
the fifties."

His father was always present at

At one point he says:

"remember this was

Balancing these remarks, one has the impression of a

father to whom John was firmly attached, who comforted and encouraged
his son well, but who, at the same time, was at a disadvantage, typical
of the father of the fifties, when it came to emotionally relating to
his son.

At a point where I suggested that his father was a powerful,

but distant, presence in his life, this is how he responded:
I don't know if he was a powerful presence
. in my memory.
I don't know if he was powerful (then quickly) but he wasn't distant
either though. Distance is not the word. The feeling was not
distance. My father took me to trials for baseball . . . we
connected through athletics. To this day he is the very same. He
encouraged you to do things . . . but it was . . . I never felt from
him--or my mother--that they ever had a major agenda for me.
His mother's presence was more immediate, constant, on-going and
tender.

I use the last adjective because it described the quality of
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the earliest memory John has of his mother.

As he remembers it, he was

still in a crib, and therefore was under two.

He recalls the details.

His mother was going out somewhere and his grandmother was babysitting.
His mother came into the room he was sharing with his

sis~er.

She stood

at the crib and had to lean over it to kiss him.
My mother had on perfume, and I remember smelling the perfume. It
was the most wonderful smell. It was so wonderful. And I remember
thinking how beautiful my mother was . . . it is making me cry . . .
that is my earliest experience.
It the same imaginative exercise that I mentioned in the last paragraph,
when in his waking dream he returned home, at the age of eight, he came
into the kitchen, where his mother was cooking.
baking waffles.

More precisely, she was

John engages his mother in conversation.

The image is

one of nurturance, the mother's activity in the kitchen being the highly
personal and caring one of feeding the family.

Other memories, from a

later time, all point to a continuing relationship of support and
nurturance.
One of the most significant dates, from the time when he was in
eighth grade, towards the end of the year.

It was a time when there was

"endless preparation for processing in and out of church, and it was
just 'U G H. . .

, " He returned home at lunchtime, and shared his

frustration with his mother, who told him that he could take the
afternoon off, and go golfing.

Moreover, he and his mother frequently

went golfing together, around this time.

These are the kinds of

memories he has of his mother--a woman who was attentive to his needs,
took time to hear about them, and was sensitive in finding solutions.
In fact, it is hard for her not to do that right now, when he is
indisposed, even though she is eighty and he is fifty.

John does not
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want her to do these things at this stage, and pushes her away.
The dominant early representations that John has of his parents,
therefore, are positive.

Here is a couple who welcomed their son, and

who nurtured and cared for him, and who "gave advice in little proverbs,
but who did not lecture."
image

was-~and

He was most intimate with his mother, whose

is--predominantly that of a caring, nurturing woman who

is sensitive to her child's needs.

The father, a working man of the

fifties, related with his son through "doing" things with him and
managed to comfort and encourage him in the doing.

But even yet, there

is a certain ambivalence, which centers around the fact that "my parents
never had an agenda for me."

He even toys with the idea of naming their

"lack of agenda," "neglect," though he rejects that as an adequate
description of what he feels.
story about his seminary days.

To illustrate what he means, he tells a
It was a time when the young men at the

seminary were under pressure from their parents to stay, even when they
themselves felt they should leave.

In their sessions together, the

students would share what this pressure was like.
turn, the seminaries would say:

When it came to his

"well what about you."

Well my parents say the same thing they always say. And they
(seminarians) would say "what's that?" "Well, do whatever you want
to do." If you want to do this, that's fine. If you want to do
that, that's fine. Just do whatever you want to do.
As John tells of this incident, his speech quickens and his tone of
voice is harder, tinged with regret.

He continues by repeating a

conversation, which dates from after ordination, with his mother, who
tells him that if he wants to leave, he should, and not ever think that
he must stay, because they want him to stay.
means for him by telling another story.

John explains what this

It relates to an incident that
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happened only a few years ago.

One day John was contacted by an ex-

priest, who was doing research on men who had left priestly ministry.
He wanted John's opinion on the difficulties of leaving ministry,
particularly difficulties associated with negotiating with families
afterwards.

John's reply, spoken in the light of his own experience

with his parents, infuriated the researcher, who accused him of being
flippant, insensitive, and cavalier.
He took me to task. Part of me was saying: "hey man, you're not
me, this is your stuff." The other part of me was saying: "Jesus,
maybe I do it all to cavalierly." Since then I have seen how
disruptive these things are. He was more correct than I. But I was
working out of my past. My parents would be disappointed, but it
just wouldn't cause that much difficulty.
Perhaps a way of interpreting all of this, is to say that John's early
self-representation was one of being responsible for himself, of having
to stand on his own two feet as soon as he was able, of being
independent, and of using his own ability and judgment to get where he
wanted.

He developed his own ambitions rather than identified with

parental ideals for him.

The cherished virtues were independence and

personal resourcefulness.

While he experienced connection and

closeness, especially to his mother, these realities were prized only in
second place.

This self-representation synchronizes with the object

representation of his father as a man who was somewhat emotionally
removed, but who nevertheless was available to do things which he liked,
with him--such as basketball.

It matches the maternal representation

less, which was tender, nurturing, even indulgent, to the point of being
over-indulgent.

This interpretation fits in well with the metaphor of

the butterfly that he used.

While they certainly did "hold" him, the
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ideal for him, on this evidence, was to be the butterfly which would fly
away.
John remembers the early manifestations of this independence,
though throughout his childhood, they were things he took entirely for
granted himself.

Already, by the fifth grade, he would go to the Loop

on his own, and see nothing extraordinary about it.

It was only when he

went to high school that he learned that other parents were not as
willing as his own, to let their offspring into the city by themselves.
However, his parents were much less permissive in the case of their
daughters, and held a much tighter rein on them.
In our review of Object Relations Theory, we have seen how all
kinds of imaginative creations are part of a child's journey towards
maturity and towards coming to terms with reality:

there are ghosts and

goblins, imaginary playmates, heroes and heroines, and then there is God
of course.

John and I conversed about his memories of these things.

While there are not many such things that he can remember, there are a
few.

John has memories of his younger sister being attached to her

blanket, but has no recollection that any such object played a part in
his own life.
lore.

He is unaware of any such stories as part of the family

Nor does he remember ever having the classical "imaginary chum."

There is just one story that his mother tells, that points to psychic
material, the function of which is similar to that of the "chum."

One

day, while she was on the porch of the "two-flat," overlooking the back
yard and garage, which had two windows,
I was in the back yard and I had
rock from the garden area, and I
window of the garage. My mother
you do that for?" And I said to

a cowboy gun on. I picked up a
threw the rock, right through the
came down and said to me "what did
her "they had me surrounded and I
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had to get out" [they being Indians]. I think it saved me from
punishment. It was such a bizarre . .
I must have been in some
imaginative world, that I had to throw a rock through the window.
Rizzuto's explanation of phenomena like this, is, as we saw
(p. 165, above) that they are imaginative productions, exactly as the
chum, the monster, the superhero, the devil, or God, are.

All of these

help the child tolerate his badness, rage impulses, frustrations and
deceptions, and allow him to experience his grandiosity in controlling
them.

They help him negotiate the vital problems he faces in the task

of becoming a self "that is both separate and securely related."
John himself recalls two episodes of sleepless nights, one when
he was in eighth grade, the other much earlier.

In the later episode,

he had a "tremendous anxiety attack" for about three nights in a row,
during which he did not sleep.
I remember thinking
lot younger. I had
younger one is very
that's very clear.
questions and stuff
thirteen.

at that time, that I had had one when I was a
sleeplessness around the question of death. The
vague. But I remember the one in eighth grade,
That was the first of existential crisis and
like that happened in my life, when I was about

The circumstances which surrounded this sleeplessness are very ordinary.
He was sleeping in his own room, the front bedroom, while his two
sisters occupied the back bedroom.

There was front porch on the house.

Suddenly, he realized he was going to die.

He was afraid of death.

His

fear was not associated with a fear of being punished, he adds, or a
fear of hell, though he "was doing the usual thirteen year old boy
things--girls and sexuality and all that."

His fear, as he reports it,

was centered on the fact that if he slept, he would not wake up.

This

lasted for two nights, after which he said to himself "what the hell!"
and got back to sleep.

John's interpretation of these events, that they
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are his first acquaintance with the major existential dilemmas that face
every human being.

I do not dispute this.

their psychological significance.

But my interest focuses on

I have not sufficient information to

suggest what they might mean, in dynamic terms.
An Early Interaction with God
The earliest account of John's interaction with God, that I have
access to comes from An Experience Named Spirit (1983, pp. 53ff.).

It

is the year 1954 and John Shea is an altar server, kneeling in adoration
before the Blessed Sacrament, in a beautiful Gothic Church in Chicago.
The location is important--a Gothic Church.

I say it is important

because of what he told me in one of our conversations.
I come back to the things that were important to me, in my early
childhood. The church building as being a very important spatial
environment for me . . . . It was a place which was tall. It did
what Gothic Architecture was supposed to do. It had high ceilings,
so you had high understandings.
Here, the Church functions as a transitional possession, which
facilitate transitional experience.

Notice the way in which he

expresses the nature of the revelation he experiences, even as a child-at least as he now expresses this revelation:

"high understandings."

The intellectual thrust of faith-revelation experience is to the fore.
In our story, there are two other characters--his fellow altar
server, a boy with big ears, and the Church, in the sense of the people.
Significantly, John is not in an immediate intense personal relationship
with either, though both are a familiar part of his life.
individual, before the Host in the Monstrance.
to him.

He understands a message from the Host:

you know."

He kneels, an

Then the Host "speaks"
"I'm not just a host,

Here is another "little proverb," not a long lecture, only
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this time the teacher is not his parents, but The Lord in the Host.

The

"you know," tagged on to the end, was the part of the message that
fascinated him the most.
him, I suggest.

It echoed his father's mode of dealing with

Just as his father trusted him to use his resources in

dealing with the difficulties of getting to the Loop, and praised his
son's talents on the basketball pitch, so now the Lord who spoke to him,
left him to his own resources to uncover just how his fellow alter
server was more than just the boy, or the trees more than just the
trees.

The fact was that he did not know yet.

The "you know" triggered

the responsibility to see the "more," or the "depth" in the fellowaltar-boy, the old ladies he met on the street, of the trees that lined
the sidewalks.

At the same time, the effort involved in doing this is

not overburdening.

The speaker of the "you know" is not really named in

the story, he remains quite unknown, yet the "Voice" is trusted, is
experienced as speaking the truth and reliable.
reciprocated.

The trust is

The parallels between this God-representation and the

paternal representation with its concomitant self-representation are
striking.
Adolescence and Early Adulthood: Social
Commitments. Vocation. and the Burstin~
of the Shell
The major themes that we have already uncovered in the childhood
phase appear in unbroken line during his adolescent period.

One of the

more significant events that John recounted from this period, was told
in the context of telling his childhood memories.
he wanted to learn to drive a stick-shift car.

When he was sixteen,

It was

Sunday·

afternoon, and his father was watching a football game on TV and did not
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want to leave the game to teach his son how to drive the stick-shift
car.
He didn't want to teach me, so he took a piece of paper and drew the
shifts of the car on a piece of paper, and them M.C. (a friend) and
I got into the car. My mother was mad, because she didn't think I
should be driving in the car, with just instructions on a piece of
paper. I was bouncing up and down the street, but I finally learned
to drive the stick-shift car.
John again recognizes the freedom he was given, and sees that freedom as
completely "natural."
We can see the confidence, the initiative, that he speaks about
to me in the interviews, shining through in the story he tells, again in

An Experience Named Spirit (1983, pp. 89ff.).
"The Kid With No Light in His Eyes."

The Story might be called

The essence of this story is this.

In the summer of sixty-one, just as he was about to begin this theology
studies, John was Camp Counselor, at a summer camp for kids, run by some
sisters.

The principal character in the story is a young boy who has

definite sociopathic tendencies.

Not only does he steal and lie, he is

not beyond sticking fishing hooks in other boys, at the first possible
opportunity.

The story centers around the relationship that develops

between the young man with no light in his eyes, and an elderly sister
who is the camp "handyperson."
storyteller himself, John Shea.

What interests us here however, is the
In this perspective two circumstances

stand out.
The first circumstance emerges as John goes to the sister-incharge to tell her about the young man with no light in his eyes and his
proclivities.
"Before you tell me about it, Mr. Shea" [she was very formal],
"I have a few problems I would like to discuss with you. About the
record."
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"Oh yes, the record," I smile. For you see I had been at many
camps, but this was the most Catholic camp of them all. Lights went
out at ten o'clock; and to waft the little darlings into dreamland,
they played Schubert's Ave Maria over the loudspeaker. I thought
this was a bit much. So on the second night of camp I substituted a
popular camp parody of the time by Alan Sherman, "Hello Mother!
Hello Father! Here I am at Camp Granada."
The head sister wanted to know if perhaps I had acted rashly and
introduced radical innovations into the life of the camp before I
had sufficiently understood its spirit. I said that this was a
possibility and that from now on I would consult her. This was good
training for dealing with Bishops.
The second event of interest to us, also involves sister-incharge, who always kept the keys of the camp truck close to her

p~rson.

She was not unjustifiably suspicious when camp counselors with a
readiness to imbibe intoxicating beverages, asked her for the car keys.
The sisters lived on the second floor of the building, in an area that
was semi-cloistered.

Access to the convent was by way of a rickety

wooden stairs, which no one was permitted to climb.

On the second day

of camp John stood at the bottom of these stairs and shouted up that he
wanted the keys.
"I'll be right down, Mr. Shea."
"That's O.K., sister, I'll come up and get them."
"Don't come up here, Mr. Shea."
"I'm coming sister."
And then I stood at the bottom of the stairs and pounded my
feet, producing the effect of climbing the stairs.
"Mr. Shea, don't you dare come up here."
And then she arrives at the top of the stairs, habit somewhat
askew and car keys in her hand. She saw that I had not moved from
the bottom step and she glowered.
"You are a very cruel young man, Mr. Shea, a very.cruel young
man."
The self-representation that underlies all these events is one
that empowers this young man to be self-assertive, initiative-taking,
independent.
confidence.

It is the course of a high level of self-regard and selfThe story of how his father presumes his competence, and
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simply takes his responsibility for granted underlies once again the
nature of the object representation that John has internalized.
The degree of John's internalization of his father is clear in a
further story, which tells of an event that occurred when John was a
senior in high school.

It also illustrates, not only his father's

confidence in him, but the direction of this young man's religious
commitment, which, as is clear from the last story, has a distinctly
social flavor.

In 1959, the year he entered seminary, the box-office

attraction was "Ben Hur," with Charlton Heston.

The young Shea hit on a

marvelous idea for a fundraiser for the missions.

He and his classmates

would hire The Michael Todd Theatre, which held 1,200 people, show the
movie, and donate the proceeds to the charity of their choice.
was a major hitch, though.

There

The downpayment for the hall was $600.

Collectively, the class did not have access to resources of that
magnitude.

He went to his father and told him the problem.

My father did not ask me one question. He just wrote the check
. . . (pause, with tears) (laughs) . . . and we made $2,000! . .
Since then I have done that for other people. I always feel that
that is something given to be given away. So I've written checks
for other people for large amounts, without asking questions . . .
It is very moving for me to remember this. It just releases so
much. Not the nostalgia. Just . . . it is so close, symbolically,
to what it is about.
Listening to this, I was struck by the confidence and trust his father
had in John, but striking also was the fact that there was no dialogue.
It illustrates, perhaps, what we saw earlier:
affectively communication with his son.

his father's gaucherie in

Clearly his representation of

his father as a generous man, is ripe for assuming the dimensions of
ultimacy.

His choice of metaphor--Mystery as Graciousness--with its

fundamental assumptions, is, psychologically speaking, closely bound up
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with his appreciation of his father's generosity.
suggestion.

Such would be my

It is useful to remind ourselves here that we are not

saying, as Freud would, that the Ultimate is nothing but the transformed
father.

What we see is the coming to be of the psychological

structures, which will be John Shea's resources for his faith journey.
I am not postulating his internalization of his father, as the cause of
faith.
It if makes sense to see his representation of his father (this
father is responsibility-evoking, emotionally maladroit in his dealings
with his

~on--distant

is not an adequate description--and yet generous)

and a corresponding self-image, playing a major role in John Shea's
developmental journey, then we can postulate, from Rizzuto's theory,
that a parallel God representation will be involved.

We can also

expect, in terms of this theory, that as an individual faces the major
life-decisions, as self-representations change, and adolescent selfcohesion disintegrates, that old God-representations will come up for
review and new ones be forged.

When and how did such an upheaval occur

in John Shea's life?
A significant series of events were set in motion when he
entered the seminary.

By the time he reached the climax of these

events, he was in his theological studies at Mundelein.
at the seminary, he made a startling discovery.

On his arrival

The magnificence of the

church buildings, which as we have seen was a powerful transitional
object for him, left him cold.

Moreover, he was put off by the monastic

silence of the seminary, as well as by the monastic regimen of the
institution.

None of it mediated "the interior person at all."

He felt
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lonely, and for the first time in his life knew what it was to be
homesick.

After the Christmas break, he was sorely tempted not to

return for the second term.

By now, all the certitudes of his faith had

all gone.

He might have been physically present in the place, but that

was all.

He did not attend class, or even mass, which carried a double

obligation on a Sunday.

Since there were 600 seminarians in the place,

he was never missed, though he adds, that he always turned up for exams,
and was clever enough to do enough prescribed reading to carry him
through.
So it was a very strange situation, here I was living in the middle
of a seminary, but I was not attending Mass, nor was I attending
classes. But I was a sort of living in the middle of the place. I
didn't feel I needed to rebel, nor was I feeling angry. I just
needed to explore why all this had become so much nonsense to me.
The theology was surely pathetic. It was the corrupt neoscholasticism that you read about and that Rabner attacks in his
early writings, against the manualists and stuff like that. It was
just terrible stuff. All the rules and the administration was
terrible, it just seemed nonsense to me. It all broke down.
There was another dimension to this breakdown, which came a little
later, but which was associated with the personal breakdown of meaning
that he had traditionally associated with Church.

This second loss of

structure in his life was associated with the· political fragmentation of
American society, because of the Vietnam war.

The pain of the memories

associated with that is still enough to make him wince.
Instead of attending class and embracing the manualists, John's
intellectual diet now included Jean Paul Sartre, and "some theologians"
but above all he read Kazanzakis and Flannery O'Connor.

At this time,

he took an extensive tour in Europe, putting some space between himself
and the Seminary.

"It was a very disconcerting time, because the

scaffolding of my life fell apart.

It was like as if I were falling--
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falling was my metaphor for it."

It is helpful to recall the work that

Erikson has done on .the Psychosocial Crisis typical of the young adult's
life at this time:

that of Individual Identity versus Identity

Confusion (cf. Newman & Newman, 1987, p. 398).

John has given us rather

a good description of the drifting and breakdown that is associated with
Identity Confusion.

At this stage, John describes a situation where he

cannot commit himself to a single view of himself; the roles he plays
are unintegrated and disconnected; the value system of his seminary is
light years removed from the value systems of a Sartre or a Kazanzakis
or an O'Connor--nor are the value systems of these "masters" congruent
among themselves either.
hardly to be expected.

In such a situation, meaningful decisions are
John, like many of his contemporaries, was in a

period of psychosocial moratorium.

The story which he tells of his

hitting the bottom, and which marked the end of his moratorium, bears
telling at length.
[The whole area of Mundelein] used to be lined with trees and they
put big whitewashed signs, X's, on the trees and cut them all down.
That's how I felt my life was. That someone had come along, and all
these pillars that I had constructed, and put a big X on them, and
chopped them all down.·
The other thing was that the lake here was filled with fish.
Carps. So the Illinois people decided to come and they would pay
half the money and kill all the fish and restock the lake. The
Seminary would pay the other half. And so, the whole student body-they poisoned all the fish--and so the whole student body had to go
out in row boats, and net all the fish and row them to shore, where
we had dug massive holes to bury them in--graves for the fish. And
we would shovel all the fish in and Oh! it was stinking. It stunk.
It took about a week. May be even more.
I was on the shore, shovelling the fish into the graves. And I
look up and we had a priest here, called . . . who was here for a
[lifetime] . . . and that was not too swift; that was a brick and
oppressive too. He was standing out there in a rowboat, with his
monsignorial cassock on, amid all these dead fish. And I'm
shovelling away and I look up and see him. And it is late.in the
afternoon. The sun is setting. Here is this guy standing in a
rowboat, in monsignorial robes, in a sea of dead fish and I thought
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"Shit, this is how this place is. This is just how I feel." It was
a symbol of this sinking . . . this disenchantment. I thought:
"there it is. There is an external picture of my inside. Right
there." That guy. If that is harsh on his memory I pray for him.
Our focus is on John's internal representational system, at this point.
It is not hard at all on the man, in the rowboat, in the monsignorial
cassock.

In a sense, it does not really concern him.

The staff, some

of whom were psychologists, and with whom John shared this, diagnosed
his problem as difficulties in adjusting, or suggested that he had an
authority problem, and was angry.

He himself felt that such diagnoses

were focusing on the symptoms rather than the cause.

His plunge into

Sartre, Camus, de Beauvoir and the rest, was an effort to find out what
was going on.

This was followed by an attempt to find religious authors

who could make sense of what he was feeling.
idea that he was losing faith.

He played around with the

"Then I realized, one day, that it was

not my faith that was going, it was faith that was coming?"

Or, in

language that he used earlier, he had fallen--and had hit bottom.
bottom was Mystery.

The Moratorium was ended at that point.

The

A new

identity was born--individual identity, in Erikson's phrase.
In Stories of God (1978), John spends four pages, thirty-two to
thirty-seven, plumbing the depths of the experience of disenchantment.
In his conversation with me, he dwelled at length on the same thing.
comparison of the two is interesting.

A

In Stories of God, he speaks from

a theological point of view.
Disenchantment is an experience of Mystery reasserting itself.
Whenever a person mistakingly equates Mystery with a finite reality,
he creates an idol. An idol is not a symbol of Mystery, but the
pretension to be Mystery itself. It insinuates a total revelation
and creates a false consciousness that Mystery has dissolved into
total availability. In the idolatrous situation Mystery does not
appear within finite reality, but is identified with some part of
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it. In this setting, disenchantment is also a process of
disengagement, a double freeing. Mystery is freed from the idol's
exclusive hold, and the idol is freed from its false identity.
Mystery is restored to its status as genuine Mystery, and finite
reality, previously idolatrous, now has the possibility of being
appropriated as a symbol, not as the usurper of the sacred but one
of its mediators. (pp. 35-36)
In his conversations with me, John was much more psychological in his
formulations.
[I am] pushed back, again and again into ultimate mystery, which you
have to relate to, in terms of an existential act of trust, that you
hand yourself over to. And this moment; when you are not holding on
to yourself but giving yourself to this Mystery, has many
consequences, when it is done again and again. It cannot be done
once, at least I cannot do it once. I'm not like that. If you do
it again and again and again, certain steady structures or
perceptions begin to develop. One of which is "this is where it is
at, so to speak." Everything else is stuff you relate to, not stuff
you relate from . . . . You don't relate from your will, you relate
to it. You are always relating to the world from some deeper
cent~e.
Therefore there is a certain freedom from external form .
. . . But you cannot mistake the external forms for the self. That
is not where person is at. Person is not capable of description.
You cannot describe person. Person is known in action, not in
description. . . . The consequences of the breakdown of my world
. . . are permanently with me in ways that I don't know. As I said
to (someone], I don't think you can be certain of anything, can you?
. . . The only thing you have is that you are part of this immanenttranscendent Mystery, which keeps throwing up life. You are one of
the throw ups.
When we try to pull all this together in terms of Object
Relations Theory and its accompanying theory of religious experience,
what fresh insights have we about John's development?

We suggested

earlier that as he approached the end of adolescence, John worked with a
self-representation that was closely linked to the object representation
he held of his father.

Thus he viewed himself as someone who was

competent, confident, able to use his talents, but who, perhaps, was
somewhat restricted in his affective responses to the world around him.
Knowing certainly featured in his experience to a much greater extent

260

than feeling.

It is this form of relating to the world that goes into

crisis as he enters young adulthood.

The resources provided by the

dominant internalizations of his father, the self-representation, and
the God representation as then constituted, were unequal to the task of
coping with the environment this young man found himself in.
When he describes the aftermath of the crisis, there is a marked
emphasis on the relational nature of human existence.

The language that

we might associate with self-representation aligned with a parental
image that evokes independence, self-reliance and astute use of talent,
has given way to a language of relationship, trusting others and of
self-integrity.

There is a sense of his having a more cohesive,

integrated self than before, and one which prizes communion rather than
independence.

To account for this I suggest that the self-

representation, more closely linked to the maternal object relation was
reawakened at the moment of the crisis.

The mother-son bond was strong.

Mother was less emotionally "maladroite" than father.

John spoke of how

he loved his mother as she bent over him, as a two-year-old; how they
went golfing together; how she was attentive to his needs in time of
anger or frustration.

The words that best describe it are connection,

mutuality and affection.

It is precisely the resources which he had

internalized, through the maternal relationship, that came to play a
more active part in John's relationship with the world, after the
crisis.

Then priest, standing in the boat in his monsignoral robes, is

a symbol, of what John found inadequate.

He himself says that.

It is a

symbol of the inadequacy of the predominant paternal representation and
all that went with it.

Letting the butterfly fly free away, without
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connection, support, ideals or direction, is not enough.
Psychologically, the crisis was about installing affect as a mode of
perception of, and communication with, all reality.

It involved the

fashioning of a self-representation that liberated the internalized
energies of certain maternal representations.

The crisis led to the

evolution of a God-representation that encouraged a contemplative rather
than a manipulative approach to all reality and that invited John to
relate to God in an affective and passionate, rather than in an
objective, rational manner.

But maybe even more important than both of

these was the way in which the new God-representation funded a vibrant
sense, of self.
[I am] pushed back, again and again into ultimate mystery, which you
have to relate to, in terms of an existential act of trust, that you
hand yourself over to, . . . giving yourself to this mystery has
many consequences . . . one of which is "this is where it is at," so
to speak . . . . You don't relate from your will, you relate to it.
You are always relating to the world from some deeper centre.
Funded from this deep center, John typically expresses insights like the
one which I include at the head of this chapter:

"The reality is the

speaker, not the spoken," by which I understand that it is the
existential knowledge of being real, of experiencing the world as real,
and as the arena in which one may interact with others in a
compassionate, mutual manner, surpasses immeasurably any ideas we may
have, in importance.

It is not clever phrases or ideas that are the

evidence that point to the deep center, or the self.

The experience of

being a real self expresses itself most of all in action, in the kind of
action that means "living creatively in a dangerous world."

The prime

example of one who did just that is Jesus of Nazareth.
Again, it is not that this representation causes John's faith.
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It becomes a resource which he can use, to respond, in his terms, to the
approach of Mystery.

The representation helps shape the way in which

Mystery is appropriated, and at the same time it contributes to his
ongoing personal task of developing an increasingly healthy, cohesive
self.
There are two dimensions of John Shea's theology which have
always seemed to me to be in tension.

On the one hand, there is the

emphasis on faith-revelation as a knowing activity.

On the other hand,

there is the profound relational aspect of all existence.
time, he insists that relating is primary.

Time after

In his conversation with me,

he made what amounts to an outright attack on ideas and mind.
More and more, I don't believe in the mind very much. If you give
it rein, it objectifies everything and chops everything up, and then
turns it into a puzzle . . . . You've got to keep the mind in its
place, not by using it. That's the oldest trick in the world, to
control the mind, with the mind. It is to dig deeper into the pit.
You don't have to make it weaker. You've just got to make it serve.
You make it serve the deeper stuff, the deeper signals that are sent
out, and these signals that are sent out are like waves, and what
the mind does is serve; what it does is like the surfer, it sits on
the waves. But when the mind gets out of control and decides not to
ride the waves, but to control them . . . . It has all sorts of
tricks to do this. One of its tricks is to say "let's look at this
and analyse it, then we'll know more about it. That the mind out of
control. As I get older, I realize that the block to spiritual
growth is in the mind and that original sin happens, and is
reinforced, as the mind splits itself off from reality and tries to
objectify, instead of living a freeflowing outpouring of life. And
when life pours out, the idea is just to go with it. To me the
quintessential story in the scripture about this, is the pouring of
the perfume over Jesus and the disciples' [objection] "give it to
the poor." There is nothing wrong with that, except that it just
stops the flow. So when I feel this tremendous welling up in me, my
question is not "why is it there?" or "where is it coming from?" but
by question is "how do I ride it?" In other words, its truth is
itself, it doesn't have to be validated by this mental thing.
This reminds me a little of the sons, who in Freud's reconstruction of
history, rise up against the Father and kill him.

John's mind has
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surely served him well--and the rest of us too.

It is true that when

its constructions are pushed to the limit--and that the limit had been
passed was symbolized for John in the ridiculous situation of the fullyvested priest in the rowboat--they end up being idolatrous.

We may well

have in the passion with which he speaks about the mind, the echoes of
the struggle to modify self-representations influenced by paternal
internalizations with those influenced by maternal ones.

I would

tentatively propose that the form of knowing, for which John so
decisively opts, that of sacramental imagination, operates for him,
psychologically as a bridge which spans the distance between the selfrepresentations that have been formed through the very different
internalizations he made of both father and mother.

Furthermore, the

God representation that harmonizes with this self-representation is one
that has two dimensions.

On the one hand, it resonates with God as the

ultimate relating Reality, who constantly invites human beings to
intimacy--in accordance with the maternal representation--and on the
other hand, it envisions God as ultimate graciousness that is to be
known--the contribution of the paternal representation.

CONCLUSION
Michigan Avenue, Chicago--and countless everyday places like
it--is the stage where the experiences of "exceeding darkness" alternate
with moments of "undeserved light."

The characters on this stage cry

and laugh, fight and make up, mutually wound each other, and have the
capacity to heal one another if they really want, despise as well as
nurture one another, ignore as well as affirm each other's beauty and
importance.

They are actors and actresses in real-life productions of

drama as well as tragedy, comedy no less than one-man shows.

The plot,

if John Shea is to be believed, is inescapably the story of Mystery's
determination to surprise the actors and actresses as they

b~~th

their

freedom through what they do, as they mourn their weakness, throw off
the chains of oppression, recognize their meanness, or come face to face
with their own beauty, the beauty of each other, and the delightfulness
of their relationship to the whole of reality.
scriptwriters to step forward--another surprise!
the actors and actresses.

When we ask the
The scriptwriters are

They are the producers and directors too.

is they who compose the melodies that are sung--and Mystery writes the
harmony.

They are the choreographers who plan the dances, and Mystery

blends with their rhythm.
Michigan Avenue.
there.

There are no spectators before the stage of

We are all involved in the action as long as we are

When the curtain falls on one act, we pass on, and become

actors, actresses, scriptwriters, producers, directors, dancers and
264
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singers, on another stage--and Mystery follows us.
Staying within the world created by this metaphor, this essay
has been an effort to become more attentive to the gifts, skills,
techniques and processes that are involved in organizing the different
acts and scenes of the human life-cycle. Having moved around
"backstage," as it were, the intricacy and fine tuning of these
processes arouse in us a sense of appreciation for what we find there.
We have tried to describe these processes from two perspectives, a
theological, and psychological, one.

We have conceptualized these

processes in terms such as symbiosis and separation, holding and
mirroring, in the psychological register.

In theological language we

have spoken of story, image, values and behavior-strategies.

Both these

forms of discourse are metaphorical languages, which develop their
insights in accordance with their fundamental metaphors.

Two of the

controlling images of Object Relations Theory, I have suggested are
those of "cogwheeling" and "harmony."

In John Shea's work, I have

claimed, the axial image is that of "graciousness."

As we have seen,

these images create worlds that blend and overlap in significant ways.
One of the reasons they do this, is that both of them carry a view of
the human person and her world, that is fundamentally optimistic and
hopeful.

In the following paragraphs, in a series of propositions, we

shall attempt to summarize the grounds for this optimism and
hopefulness.
The first proposition is that knowing is central in the process
of meaning-making.

In the introduction to this essay, we set out on an

odyssey, with the objective of gaining an understanding of the process
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through which human beings create meaning.

At journey's end, we look

back to review the terrain we have crossed and to highlight its major
features.

The beacon which casts its light on all the paths we have

travelled, is the set of insights that center around the human capacity
to know.

In the work of both John Shea and Object Relations Theorists,

the centrality of knowing stands out.

Through the activity of knowing,

human beings carve out for themselves, as it were, a meaningful
existence, from the welter of sensory stimulation emitted by a cosmos, a
society and a family that existed, long before they arrived on the
scene.

When we speak of knowing, we are .not primarily referring to an

intellectual activity--and that is true for both Shea and Object
Relations people.

Undeniably, both these psychologists and this

theologian approach knowing from their own perspectives.

Object

Relations Theorists are concerned, in the first place, to appreciate the
primary and foundational forms of knowing, a knowing that is perhaps
most adequately described as kinesthetic, in its earliest form.

This

phrase is meant to draw attention to knowing as something that is
profoundly a body phenomenon, a knowing of oneself in one's skin.

In

Rizzuto's listing of the kinds of representation--visceral,
sensorimotor, auditory, iconic and finally conceptual--we have an
indication of just how corporeal the basis of knowing is.

Knowing does

become and increasingly rich phenomenon, as the developmental process
unfolds and as memories and representations become increasingly complex.
The context of this knowing is the mother-child dyad, where such
processes as holding and mirroring, symbiosis and separation, occur.
this context too, the use of transitional objects gives birth to the

In
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capacity for symbolic knowing, and hence to religious and cultural
creations.

Winnicott, Mahler, Rizzuto, and their colleagues, are not of

course, interested in mental archaeology, when they return to the
primitive origins of knowing.

Their primary concern is to uncover how

memories of past events, and the representations generated in earlier
relationships are indeed immortal, and how they continue to exert
influence in the present.

John Shea's starting point is different.

He

is interested in how adults come to know and experience their
relationship with Mystery.

We saw how his insights are complemented and

enlarged when we bring him into conversation with Object Relations
Theorists.
The second proposition affirms the value, the legitimacy and the
inevitability of faith, as a meaning-making activity.

John Shea's

optimism and hopefulness are grounded in his appreciation for the human
capacity to know in a sacramental manner.

Object Relations Theory lends

support to his confidence, from a psychological perspective.

The first

consequence of this complementarity, is that a major obstacle, well
established since the days of Freud, to viewing faith as a normal part
of human experience, can be demolished.

Since the-beginning of this

century, the claim that faith was a form of delusion and hallucination
has been a kind of bogeyman for people whose experience led them to
affirm a relationship with the Transcendent.

John Shea's formulation of

a faith perspective, is one that makes a consistent effort to take into
account the contemporary secular experience of Western people. and to
use a faith-language that they can understand.

We have seen how his

formulations are open to, and compatible with, the conceptualizations of
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the Object Relations "school."

They both agree that there is a special

mode of experiencing, faith experience or transitional experience, which
is neither totally objective or subjective.

Certainly, this realm of

experience is that of imagination, or in Pruyser's term, illusion, but
far from being pejorative terms, they point to the creative sphere of
human functioning, out of which has poured, not only the powerful
rituals and stories of world religions, but also the great scientific
theories of all ages, as well as the monuments of artistic and cultural
genius.

Time spent in this psychic space of illusion, far from

destroying one's link with reality, enhances and promotes a person's
connection and interaction with it.
In the third proposition, the focus is on the potential of the
Judea-Christian tradition as a resource in the process of personal
development and meaning-making.

Faith-revelation experiences carry

certain ethical implications for the person's concrete situations.

The

stories of the Judea-Christian tradition offer a wealth of images which
help determine the meaning of these experiences.

These images provide a

directionality for one's attitudes and values, which in turn prompts the
concrete strategies one chooses.,

Shea describes this process as the

faith-appropriation of Mystery's gracious approach.
sheds its light on this same pro-cess.

Object Relations

The characters in these stories

function in ways that are similar to the procession of imaginative
companions that pass through a person's life--the "chum" for instance,
or the "twin," or the guardian angel, Miss Liberty, Eros and the host of
"fictive creations of the mind," whose praised were sung by Selma
Fraiberg:

269
an integral part of being human . . . [lies]
in our capacity
to create nonvisible but meaningful realities capable of containing
our potential for imaginative expansion beyond the boundaries of the
senses. Without these fictive realities human life becomes a dull
animal existence. (Fraiberg, 1969, p. 25)
The heroes and heroines of these stories function as figures with whom
the reader or listener can identify and form object and selfrepresentations congruent with them.

Moreover, a person who uses the

stories and rituals of the Christian tradition as transitional objects,
enters into a relationship with a reality that functions as a nurturing,
holding, selfobject, who mirrors him or her.

In this experience of

mirroring the person's self-esteem and self-evaluation are strengthened.
The expression of greater self-esteem and self-worth lies in the quality
of an individual's relationship with external reality--in the ability to
perceive whole, rather than split objects; in the less defended and more
spontaneous matter of approaching others, and finally in the readiness
to welcome greater and greater segments of reality into his or her life.
Both Shea and Object Relations Theorists map out for us the process
through which an individual builds up increasingly solid and satisfying
connections with all that there is.

It is this increasing capacity for

connectedness that lies at the heart of a meaningful world.
Experiencing oneself as solidly connected to, yet separate from,
external reality is what is meant by meaning.
A fourth point that is important for this conclusion, focuses on
the God representation itself.

Shea is clear that each person responds

to Mystery's self-revelation, in a way that is personal and shaped by
the concrete circumstance of that person's life.

One person may

experience the ultimate ground of reality as graciousness, for another,
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Mystery's intentions are experienced as hostile, while for a third the
Transcendent is indifferent to the human condition.
translates this into a psychological register.

Rizzuto's work

She pinpoints the

interpersonal source of the God representation and its origin, in the
self and object representations of the person who carries it.

As we

tried to illustrate in the case of John Shea himself, the psychological
resources he brings to his faith-journey are intimately colored by his
relationship to his parents.

Rizzuto accounts for the fact that the God

representation that a person forms, while still in the cradle, may make
it impossible for him or her to assume conscious, worked-out faith
position, at the heart of the church to which his or her family belongs.
Even when a person cannot express his faith in what is for him a
traditional manner, he still maintains a "faith."
too, of course.

The opposite is true

A person from an atheistic background may find it

imperative to develop a conscious theistic stance in life.

What is

apparent is that one can no more shake off one's God representation,
than one can lose one's self-representation.
The fifth proposition is that the process of meaning-making
implies a recognition of, and confrontation with, failure.

In the

course of our odyssey we have met many possible ways in which a person's
developmental journey may become derailed.

Principal among these

possible failures that we have considered, are the following:
(1) Sometimes, the mirroring process is unsatisfactory to a serious
degree, and results in an inability to self--soothe, which gives
rise to a situation where a person cannot tolerate solitude, and
simultaneously fails in efforts towards intimacy.
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(2) Others may experience a neurotic anxiety and fear of external
reality, due to an unsatisfactory experience of support and
security, with a resultant poor readiness to explore, and fall
in love with, reality.
(3) A third category of failures congregate around the issues of
dependence and independence.

Neither the rugged individualist

nor the relentless altruist are healthy.

Both bear the scars of

battles fought and lost.
(4) The categories found in Wolf help us name an array of
developmental deficiencies--there are the failures associated
with the Mirror Hungry Personality, the Ideal Hungry
Personality, the Alter Ego Hungry Personality, the Merger Hungry
Personality and the Contact Shunning Personality.
The sixth proposition is that the spurs which entitle a person
to create a humanly meaningful environment are won in the struggle to
know oneself as integrating both "good" and "bad," to perceive oneself
and others, as whole objects, rather than part objects.

The outcome of

this struggle, at least for the child is determined, to a large degree,
by the welcome he or she gets from caregivers.

If the support offered,

and the frustration encountered, approaches the optimal levels, then the
outcome is likely to be a happy one.

In the case of the adult, Shea

tells us, that there is always the threat of falling under the sway of
the panicked heart, in one or other of its forms--either under the
influence of the rejected hearted or the envious heart.

The outcome is

rarely decided once and for all, either in childhood or in adulthood.
The sense of goodness, or of a balance of greater goodness over badness,
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is a personal achievement, that needs to be repeatedly striven for,
throughout the life cycle.
The seventh proposition is that the fruit of facing failure, and
of struggling to overcome ambivalence, is the capacity for compassionate
service and mutuality in personal relationships.

At those moments in a

person's life, when service is genuinely compassionate and personal
relationships are mutual, then he or she experiences the depth
experience of living in a meaningful, human world.
An appropriate commentary on these propositions comes in the
form of a story from a tribal tradition, in Kenya.

It is a story of the

heroine's journey.
Long, long ago, in a certain village, there was a tradition that
at the time of High Summer, all the girls who were of marriageable age
would make a necklace.

The girl who made the finest necklace, the most

beautiful necklace was the person who could choose to marry the most
attractive and eligible young man, for that year.

In this particular

year, one necklace, made by Ngethe, stood out as the finest, the most
elegant necklace of all.

Everyone agreed about this.

were filled with rage and jealousy.

Her companions

So they hit on a plan.

In the morning it was the custom that the girls would go to the
Nuke, the local river, to bathe.
for these girls.
river.

It was an important time of the day

They loved to play, to frolic on the bank of the

On the second day of the week, while they were at the river, one

of her companions, Mwaura, asked Ngethe to take off her necklace so that
she could examine it, and admire its beauty.

Ngethe complied with the

request, but no sooner had Mwaura the necklace in her hand than she
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threw it away, far out into the deep river.
jumped into the water.
down into its depths.

In consternation, Ngethe

She swam out, far into the river and deep, deep,
She could see her precious necklace nowhere.

swam, deeper and deeper, and then she noticed something strange.
below her, she could see the entrance to a cavern.
from the inside.

She

Deep

Bright light shone

She swam toward the light and entered the cavern.

When she entered, she was surprised to find that there was no water.
But the place was flooded with light instead.

As her eyes adjusted to

the bright light, she perceived the outline of a human form.

When she

could see better, the sight that greeted her eyes, turned her stomach.
Seated in the middle of this cavern was the ugliest looking hag she had
ever seen.

It seemed she was wounded all over.

were ages old, all oozing with pus.
could escape the cavern.

She had sores which

Ngethe recoiled, and wished she

Then the old hag addressed her, as she

extended her hand, her putrid hand, in Ngethe's direction.
and kiss my hand," the hag said.

"Come, girl,

Ngethe could feel her stomach heave,

but as she looked the old woman in the eye, she felt compassion sweep
through her mind and body, and slowly she made her way towards the
seated hag, with the outstretched putrid hand.

She took the hand in

hers, raised it to her mouth, and taking a deep breath, she kissed it.
Suddenly, the hag was no longer a hag, but a beautiful woman, regal,
stately, kindly, and attractive.
in a sisterly embrace.

She smiled at Ngethe, and enfolded her

As she stepped back, she said "Because you have

had the courage to kiss my wounds, I will give you a new necklace, more
beautiful, more exquisite, than the one you lost."

At that, there was a

terrible bellowing noise, and a fierce dragon appeared at the entrance
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to the cavern.

The beautiful woman told Ngethe not to be afraid,

because she would cast a spell on her which would make her invisible to
the dragon.

As Ngethe watched, the dragon searched for her, but because

of the spell, it could not find her, and after a while, it gave up the
search, and left.

Taking a necklace of indescribable beauty from her

pocket, the beautiful lady embraced Ngethe once more, and told her to
return to her companions.

On the bank of the Nuka, when her companions

saw her new necklace, they were green-eyed with envy, and asked her for
the secret of her find.

She told them of the cavern, of the beautiful

lady and of her gift of the necklace.

On hearing this part of the story

and without waiting for Ngethe to finish the story, they dived into the
water.

They swam far out, to the middle of the river.

plunged deep, deep,· into the depths.
cavern.
hag.

They saw the light from the

They swam towards it, and entered the cavern.

They experienced the revolting feelings.

invite them to come, and kiss her hand.
and curse their luck.

They saw the old

They heard the hag

Then, they began to curse her,

They abused her, shouted at her, swore at her.

Just then, the dragon roared.
unprotected.

Then they

It approached them.

They were naked,

On the river bank, Ngethe waited for her companions to

rejoin her--they never came.
The story's meaning is tropic--it has no one meaning.
context of its recounting informs its meaning.
an allegory of the heroine's journey.

The

Here we are using it as

The young woman is an image of

the adult who is graced with a theistic faith.

Such a faith, as Shea

told us, does not solve the problems of pain suffering and
disenchantment for us, rather it puts us in a position to begin to deal
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with these.

This young woman has grown up, and achieved a sense of her

own identity, within her cultural milieu.
represents that achievement.

The necklace she has made

Part of that achievement, in this context,

is that she has learned to creatively use the cultural legacy she had
inherited--we would want to include Christian stories and rituals as
part of the legacy.

Through the use of the necklace, the girl enters,

in Pruyser's word, the "illusionistic realm."

In Shea's understanding,

the use of the necklace becomes for her a moment of knowing, through
sacramental imagination.

Then the necklace is gone.

Its importance

recedes, once its function to draw her into a relationship with Mystery
has been achieved.
hag.

Mystery appears in the initial moment, as an old

Mystery, in other words becomes the recipient of all the girl's

projections.

The sores and pus are an image of the girl's own

narcissistic wounds, which prompt her to split her objects into the
"good" and the "bad"--and correspondingly, to experience herself as "all
good" or as "all bad."

The companions are a figure of this girl's

selfobjects, whose failures towards the girl have been serious, but not
mortal.

At the crucial moment, the girl sees something in the old hag's

eyes that draw her up sharply.

Looked at from another perspective, the

story is speaking about Mystery's determination to pursue a person no
matter how objectionable or complete the negative projections are.
Mystery's pursuit of us, is stronger than our projections.

In the look

she perceives in the hag's eyes, lies a call to her to engage her
freedom, the call to balance the "bad" and the "good."
the kiss is crucial.

The moment of

Psychologically, it is the moment when the self

achieves integration and cohesiveness.

It is the moment when the God
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representation she is in the process of creating, becomes adequate to
the task of welcoming Mystery's approach into her life.

The girl's

compassionate behavior--and she is really being compassionate to
herself, first, since the sores with which the hag is infected are
actually the projections of her own wounds--is the expression of her
"wholeness," of being able to bring the "good" and the "bad" together,
and to withdraw her "part" projections.
She returns from the encounter with Mystery to her companions-the encounter with Mystery always invites closer connection with other
people.

They are in awe at her new "necklace," a symbol of her whole

demeanor and lifestyle with them.

They are inflamed with a passion to

be like her--but alas, when they meet the old hag, they cannot withdraw
their projections from her, and founder in their own misery.
cannot complete the journey for the others.
herself.

The girl

Each one has to do it for

The dragon represents the experience of Mystery as

indifferent, hostile and life-threatening.

Mystery is incapable of

offering Itself as gracious, unless a person is willing to receive the
offer as friendly.

It is not that Mystery abandons such a person--

rather Mystery's solidarity with the sufferer is most complete at that
moment--such is the lesson of the Cross.

A theology of the Cross takes

Mystery's powerlessness seriously.
To complete this chapter, we now turn to the Pastoral Counselor,
the context of his or her encounter with clients, and the situation of
the clients themselves in interaction with the Pastoral Counselor.
can we interpret what goes on in the light of our conclusion in this
chapter, and in the context of the "heroine's journey"?

How
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Pastoral Counseling--A Ministry in
the Service of Faith
The Counseling Act
Have people who have launched themselves, or who are about to
launch themselves on the hero's journey, any need for a companion who
would nurture or sustain them on their pilgrimage?
question is in the positive.

The answer to that

The question we now attempt to answer is:

"what is the nature of the help that such a companion would offer the
pilgrim?"
From the point of view of Object Relations Theory, we can expect
that the counseling act will involve an encounter where the most salient
characteristic is the empathy that underlines every interaction that
occurs between the counselor and client.

Such empathy not only implies

a clear understanding of th.e· client's predicament, as she experiences
it, but it insists on a non-judgmental attitude, coupled with a behavior
pattern designed to accept, and frustrate the client in as optimal a
manner as possible--in a manner which approximates the attitude of the
"good-enough-mother."

The encounter is an activity in the present, for

the sake of the present and the future.

What is central, is the

relationship between the counselor and the client, at the present
moment, so that deficits in self-structure, the result of poor
selfobject relationships in the

past~

maybe remedied.

Looked at from

the theological perspective of John Shea, the counseling act is an
instance of a person entering a situation with genuine compassion,
equipped to be self-sacrificing, in order to support the client in her
efforts to develop behavior patterns that are compassionate and which
invite mutuality and respect.
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Pastoral Counseling, as I have said, involves an encounter, of
two (or more) people, each one with a particular life-story.

These two

life-stories interweave, for the duration of the encounter.

This is not

just any encounter.
It has a purpose:

It is rather, an intentionally organized encounter.
that the destructive images that guide the client's

life and her self-conversations, which in turn give rise to her
destructive behavior patterns, be changed, transformed, or replaced,
with healthy images, which will breed new, liberating attitudes, and
beget new, freer, behavior patterns.

The stories of these two

individuals are engaged at different points in the process of their
unfolding.

In terms of our earlier story, the counselor has returned

from the cavern and is on the bank of the river, with the client, and is
prepared, if necessary, to leap into the muddy waters of the river, with
him or her.

The client has not yet plunged into the water or is still

struggling with the horror of the old hag's sores.

The counseling act

in this context, is a multifaceted reality which constantly changes in
response to the needs of the client's "descent" or "return" from the
cavern.

We might compare it to a dance routine where one partner is so

attuned to the other's body movement, that no matter how he moves, she
moves in tempo, and in step with him.

What goes into the counseling act

includes rapport building, teaching the client to use talk as a tool for
growth, contracting with the client, giving permission to feel, entering
with the client into the whole range of his feelings, and receiving from
the client whatever projections he or she may unload onto the counselor,
without retaliation.

But no matter what the activity is, it has the

underlying qualities of empathy and solidarity, qualities supplied to
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the act by the counselor, who has returned herself from the cavern, in
possession of the beautiful necklace--who has the capacity to mirror and
affirm others.
The Counselor and Faith
It is rather artificial to treat the counselor, and the
counseling act separately, because the person, and what she does are so
intimately linked.
so.

But for the sake of completeness and clarity I do

From what I have said, it is clear that to be a counselor, one must

have at least begun the heroine's journey oneself.

This is necessary,

because without having faced one's own failures, without having named
them, experienced the sadness, the anxiety and fear that go hand in hand
with these failures, and without having uncovered the defenses that one
uses to protect oneself from these failures, great segments of
experience must be denied, repressed or deleted from awareness.

John

Shea spoke of falling, falling and hitting the bottom, at the time when
he was burying the dead fish.
journey.

That is a good illustration of the hero's

Disenchantment was his name for the required shattering of

delusion.

He met Mystery at the bottom of his fall.

Object Relations

Theorists speak of the healing of the narcissistic split, and the
emergence of an integrated self as the term of this process.
To the degree that a counselor has not undertaken the process of
healing her own self, to that degree is it impossible for her to enter,
empathically into the world of the client.

Few, if any counselors can

be expected to ever achieve the capacity to complete empathy--and since,
on the "good-enough-mothering" model, optimal frustration of the client
is desirable, maybe total empathy might hinder the healing process,
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anyway.

That said however, if a significant number of the counselor's

responses are made out of her own need, or stem from the over-determined
nature of her own motivations, then the healing, empathetic, and
welcoming environment, which is the primary requisite, if the client is
to undertake the process of restructuring the self, is missing.

The

condition of possibility of the counselor becoming the supportive,
nurturing selfobject which the client is in search of, as a part of the
journey to wholeness, is precisely, empathic, and supportive
understanding.
In the previous paragraph, the ideal of optimal frustration was
mentioned.

Perhaps a little more needs to be said about the issues that

cluster around it.

Situations may arise where a client is unable or

unwilling to assume self-responsibility.

The temptation is for the

therapist to take charge of the client's life.

A therapist somewhere

commented to fellow-therapists that while it is noble to assist a
stricken elephant while it is rising, it is foolhardy to try to catch
him while he is falling.

In terms that we have used in this essay, what

is important is that counselors maintain their own personal boundaries
and the integrity.of their own self.

At times this may involve

challenging the client, maybe even being impolite--but never without
empathy.

Looked at from the point of view of the client, he needs to

experience the counselor as a separate, differentiated, person.
There are serious ethical issues raised, when we talk of a
counselor bringing his or her faith commitments to a counseling
situation.

There are ways of bringing one's faith to bear on the

counseling act, which are unethical--the attempt to impose one's own
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theological viewpoint on a client is one such case.

But, there is

another sense in.. which one cannot escape the influence of one's faith in
the counseling session--as is the case for every other activity one
might undertake.

We have defined faith in terms of a human knowing,

basic to the creation of a meaningful human environment, and which finds
its fulfillment in a growing capacity for self-giving and service.

If

this definition of faith is acceptable, then it is hard to see how it
cannot influence what goes on in the counselling session.

The basic

images which structure the counselor's world, which are the "rooms"
which contain the "furniture" of his thinking and feeling, and which
give directionality to his concrete strategies, are the essential
elements of his faith.

Moreover, the counselor is there as a helper,

precisely in order to give expression to the outpouring of the fullness
of her inner life, to fulfill the sense of an inner imperative to share
the goodness, wisdom and healing that she herself has already
experienced.

The counselor's faith provides the structure by which the

meaning of the client's story is understood and reflected.

To ask him

to leave his faith at the door of his office, is like asking him to come
without his skin.

The issue for the counselor is not "Do I have a

faith?" but "What kind of faith do I have?"

The aims and values of

counseling, as these have been enunciated by the major counseling and
psychological associations (cf. for example, the AAPC Code of Ethics,
Principle I), seem to be congruent with this definition of faith.

Maybe

they even imply it.
The Client and Faith
Just as the counselor arrives at the session as the subject of a
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living faith, so does the client.

She comes for counseling either

because her world is upside down, and therefore meaningless, or because
there are some areas in her functioning, which are distressful, and
therefore need to be cared for.

In the optimal case, the client enters

a situation where the client and counselor together form a very special
kind of world.

The counselor offers empathy and solidarity, which is

the fruit of her own maturity and faith-experience.

The client is

invited to experience this, and responds with his story.

In the optimal

circumstance, the client is testing the images, thoughts, feelings and
strategies that he has evolved, against the images, thoughts, feelings
and strategies of the counselor, within the context of a safe, holding
environment, for whose maintenance, responsibility rests with the
counselor.

Certainly, it is never a matter of the counselor trying to

replace the beliefs of the client--even if he considers them unhealthy-with his own.

As Shea pointed out, the beliefs a person develops are

only the conceptualizations of more fundamental experiences, and remain
a mystery to another who has not had the opportunity to be privy to the
process through which the conceptualization took place.

Even where the

focus of attention is the client's unhealthy beliefs, as in R.E.T., the
effort is directed to help the client substitute new, more healthy
beliefs, of his own choosing and formulation, for the old, crippling
ones.

But with a therapy which sees faith as a fundamental aspect of

human living, it is not beliefs which hold the center stage.

Much more

fundamental is the relationship of the counselor and the client, and the
breakthrough of Mystery to the client, in and through the relationship.
This is Shea's formulation of the situation, and we have already spelled
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out the psychological concomitants of this experience.

In intimate,

holding, mirroring relating, experience is generated which becomes the
raw material for new, "whole" images of self, of others and ultimately
of God.

It is from these that healthy thinking, feeling, and behavior

patterns will flow.
A Final Word
The end is a beginning.
human beings create meaning.

We have written at length about how

The time for writing is now over.

It is

time to live, and simply appreciate the experience of meaningful contact
with others.

There is an important lesson in the following story, which

I heard a long time ago:
A young man became obsessed with a passion for Truth, so he took
leave of his family and friends and set off iri search of it. He
travelled over many lands, sailed across the oceans, climbed many
mountains, and, all in all, went through a great deal of hardship
and suffering. One day he awoke to find that he was seventy-five
years old and had not still found the truth he had been searching
for. So he decided, sadly, that he would give up the search and go
home.
It took him months and months to return to his hometown, for he
was an old man now. Once home, he opened the door of his house-and there he found Truth that had been waiting patiently for him all
these years.
The writing of an essay like this will never hand us truth or meaning,
ready-made.

But there is reason to hope that the struggle to write it,

will prepare us to recognize and appreciate them when they happen for
us.
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